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Chapter 1

Introduction

Abstract In this chapter, I offer a reflection on my nearly 50-year career in the field
of applied ethics, suggesting that certain issues (conscience and corporations) were
themes in the first twenty years. In the second 20 years, the issues still included
corporations, but added is the issue of what constitutes the common good. I introduce the four insights around which the narrative is built (the moral insight, the
institutional insight, the anthropological insight, and the Socratic insight). I remind
the reader that these explorations of the ethics of organizations take their philosophical departure from Plato’s analogical comparison of the soul of the human
person with the culture of the city-state in his dialogue, the Republic. I then provide
an overview of Times of Insight: Conscience, Corporations, and the Common Good
as a whole and the organization of the chapters to come, including a graphic depiction of these chapters that will be used as a unifying thread throughout. This chapter
is an organic part of a larger work about the overall contribution of Kenneth
Goodpaster to the field of applied ethics and is best read in the context of that
larger work.

1.1 Reflection
It is an honor to be asked to contribute to this book series. It affords me an opportunity to reflect on my body of work over the past half-century and to identify patterns
among the books, articles, book reviews, and case studies that comprise my curriculum vitae (see Appendix 1). More importantly, it allows me to highlight contributions that have been appreciated and to share some that have been less noticed (see
Appendix 2). My hope is that the reader will benefit as much from this extended
reflection as I have benefitted from writing it, and that this book can serve as a useful departure point for future work in the field of business (or organizational) ethics.1

Let me note at the outset that references to published works of mine are of course dated by their
appearance in print, which may not be their place in the timeline of my professional development.
1
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1.1.1 The First Twenty Years [1975–1995]
The title of this book, Times of Insight: Conscience, Corporations, and the Common
Good, is intended to capture a progression of insights surrounding the three main
subjects that have guided my career of teaching and research in the field of applied
ethics. I began seeking an understanding of the role of conscience in the lives of
individual persons with the conviction that such an understanding would be helpful
if it were applied to institutions.
This was something of an “inversion” of the strategy of Socrates in Plato’s
Republic, Book II. Socrates says of his friends Glaucon and Adeimantus:
They wanted to arrive at the truth, first, about the nature of justice and injustice, and secondly, about their relative advantages. I told them what I really thought: that the enquiry
would be of a serious nature and would require very good eyes.2 (Plato, p. 185).

Socrates went on to analogize the soul of the person to the structure of a republic,
implying that finding justice in the larger entity would help to discern justice in the
smaller (the person).3
Inverting this idea, my approach has been to look at the idea of virtue in the individual person and to try to discern its implications for institutions, including especially business corporations. To paraphrase Socrates, “I propose that we enquire
into the nature of responsibility and irresponsibility, first as they appear in the individual, proceeding from the lesser to the greater and comparing them.” I have called
this strategy the Principle of Moral Projection.
In the earlier manifestations of this projection strategy, there was a surge of
scholarly opinion in the direction of expanding the moral agenda of corporations to
include not only stockholders but also, in various ways, stakeholders. This “expansion” of corporate concern appeared to follow the analogy with individual conscience—based on what we will call in Chap. 2 the moral insight. It drew upon
expectations that we have of one another for consideration, respect, honesty, and
integrity (Goodpaster 1991).
Christopher D. Stone, then law professor at the University of Southern California,
appeared to have come to a similar strategy, but from the point of view of
jurisprudence:
If people are going to adopt the terminology of ‘responsibility’ (with its allied concepts of
corporate conscience) to suggest new, improved ways of dealing with corporations, then
they ought to go back and examine in detail what ‘being responsible’ entails—in the ordinary case of the responsible human being. Only after we have considered what being
responsible calls for in general does it make sense to develop the notion of a corporation
being responsible. (Stone 1975).

Emphasis added.
See Smith 1999: “Plato actually makes the analogy of state and soul—by appealing to the similarities between a tripartite state of rulers, warriors, and craftsmen, . . . to a tripartite soul of reason,
high spirit (or thumos), and appetite.” Note that this analogy is controversial among Plato scholars.
2
3
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Nevertheless, there were skeptics: those who doubted that organizations could ever
be morally analogous to individual persons (Ladd 1970) and those who doubted that
organizations should ever be morally analogous to individual persons (Friedman
1970). In the “early decades” of the field of business ethics, these skeptics required
not only comprehensive counterarguments but also a reasonable portrait of what the
idea of “corporate conscience” might look like if it were implemented in the competitive arena of business practice (Goodpaster 1991). Thus, my journey from conscience to corporate conscience called for an understanding of the meaning and
value of orienting, institutionalizing, and sustaining ethical values as an organizational attribute (Goodpaster 2007). In Chap. 3, I call this shift the institutional
insight.

1.1.2 The Second Twenty Years [1995–2015]
Eventually, the arc of my teaching and research (shifting the focus from conscience
to corporate responsibility) had to confront a different kind of question: If the projection from individual conscience to corporate conscience was to be actionable in
society, it called for a robust idea of human dignity and the common good. I was
troubled by the view that business ethics for the corporation simply amounted to
maximizing the “good” of the stakeholders, with little attention to the meaning of
“good.” It is tempting to take refuge in a less controversial “interest satisfaction”
view of the good for both stockholders and stakeholders. This is often referred to as
a “thin” theory of the good. After all, defenders of this view argue, we live in a
highly pluralistic society with little agreement about a “good life.” But it does not
take much effort to imagine misguided interests (and/or rights claims) on the parts
of any and all of the groups identified as stakeholders. And then what? Does not the
imperative to maximize interest satisfaction lose some or all of its normative hold
on us (Goodpaster 2010)?
If we are to invoke an idea like “the common good” and give it substantive meaning, rather than relegating it to a slogan that all can salute simply because it is vague
or empty of meaning, we need to have an idea of a whole person and extend that
idea to all persons.4 Thus, my journey from conscience to the corporation called for
a second movement, a movement from the idea of corporate conscience toward a
“thicker,” more substantive understanding of the common good. In Chap. 4, I refer
to this new awareness as the anthropological insight.
In addition to these reflections on the ingredients in a normative ethics for business (conscience, corporations, and the common good), I needed to offer some
reflections on a “delivery system” for those ingredients. In other words, I needed to
reflect on my teaching, both in the business school classroom and in corporate
The COVID-19 Pandemic during 2020–2021 illustrated the tension that can exist over the pursuit
of the common good. Health officials focused on curbing the disease, while economists focused on
opening schools and businesses—both in the name of the common good.
4
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executive education. In Chap. 5, I share my thoughts about the case method and
certain additional methods I have used with executives. What emerged from these
reflections was what I called the Socratic insight.

1.1.3 The Years Since [2015–2022]
During the last 8 years, perhaps not coincidentally during the severe political polarization occasioned by the election of Donald Trump as president of the United
States, in addition to reflections on a “thick” rather than “thin” account of the good
(and therefore of the common good), I have witnessed with alarm a new tendency
on the part of business organizations to invoke “corporate responsibility” and “business ethics” in defense of practices that objective observers would describe as
“political orientation” or simply “partisanship.” Corporate examples abound, but
based on a 2019 Axios-Harris Poll (Nather) the main takeaways were:
• The big tech companies do better with Democrats than Republicans, at a time
when they’ve been accused of being biased against conservatives. Even the low-
ranked Twitter was slightly more popular among Democrats.
• The most polarized companies were the Trump Organization—which scored
highly with Republicans and dead last among Democrats—and Target, which did
better among Democrats than Republicans.
• When you include independents, Wegmans was the only company that made all
three top 10 lists.
• Independents’ favorite company was Amazon.
• The least favorite companies had privacy scandals (Facebook) or other scandals
(Wells Fargo), are going bankrupt (Sears), or cut off their customers’ HBO (Dish).
What this illustrates, in my opinion, is a kind of outsourcing or “alienation” of corporate conscience to either an ideology or a political party whose purpose is to win
elections and achieve political power. But corporate responsibility as corporate conscience calls for “in-sourcing” decision-making criteria and basing them on the mission and core values of the organization.5 This trend in many ways runs the risk of
undermining rather than reinforcing the aims of business ethics as a field—of offering counterfeits for conscience. I will have more to say on this subject in Chap. 6,
but suffice it to say now that the politicization of business decision making can
infect the formation process of business decision makers in both business schools
and company programs (Fig. 1.1).

On October 10, 2019 and again on February 27, 2020, I developed these ideas in PowerPoint
presentations to members of the Center for Ethics in Practice at the Opus College of Business
within the University of St. Thomas. The title of the presentation was “Corporate Responsibility
and its Counterfeits.”
5

1.2

The Organization of this Book

• THE MORAL INSIGHT
• "Realizing the Other"
• Conscience in Ac on
• Plato's Analogy

Conscience

The
Corpora on
• THE INSTITUTIONAL
INSIGHT
• Moral Projec on
• Dual Awareness

5

•THE ANTHROPO-LOGICAL
INSIGHT
•The Whole Person and All
Persons
• Comprehensive

Business
Educa on
• THE SOCRATIC INSIGHT
• The Academy
• Execu ve Educa on

The Common
Good

• THEN & NOW
• The Insights
• Counterfeits
• A Polarized Society
• Hopeful Signs

The Last
Eight Years

Fig. 1.1 Times of Insight: Conscience, Corporations, and the Common Good

1.2 The Organization of this Book
Here is a brief summary of the chapters of this book. As will be evident, each chapter reveals—in retrospect—an important insight that advanced my thinking on the
main theme of the chapter.6
Chapter 2—Conscience and the Moral Insight begins with reflections on the
source of ethics itself as a discipline, eventually exploring the meaning and development of the concept of corporate responsibility as it unfolded during the first
20 years of my work in the field of business ethics. Here I discuss the meaning of
business ethics in relation to the study of ethics generally, and conscience more
specifically.
Chapter 3—Corporations and the Institutional Insight elaborates further on
the Principle of Moral Projection and introduces the organizational counterpart of
the moral insight for individuals, namely, the institutional insight. In addition to
tracing the elements of conscientious decision making from personal to organizational manifestations, this chapter also traces the elements of certain obstacles to
conscience, from personal to organizational manifestations. One very central such
obstacle is a pathology that I have called teleopathy.
Chapter 4—The Common Good and the Anthropological Insight reflects on
the second 20 years of my work in the field of business ethics, a realization that
normative ethics, in order to be truly normative (and non-relativistic), must explore
more robust “theories of the right and the good” than had been offered in the late
twentieth century (Brenkert and Beauchamp 2009; Goodpaster 2010, 2012, 2017
[reprinted as Appendix 2c of this book]).
Chapter 5—Business Ethics Education and the Socratic Insight shifts the
focus from the subject matter of business ethics as a field to the pedagogical point
of view. If business ethics is incorporated into the curricula of the nation’s business
schools (and into the curricula of the nation’s executive development programs), it
matters how that is done. Indeed, if business aspires to be a true profession, an

6
The moral insight, the institutional insight, the anthropological insight, and the Socratic insight.
Alongside these four insights, there are two principles that guide the flow from one chapter to
another: the Moral Projection Principle and the Moral Fractal Principle. More on these later.
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institution in the classical sense, the moral formation of its future leaders must be
initiated and developed by a faculty and administration that are fully committed to
this calling. In the course of this discussion, the Socratic insight emerges as a way
to put the ideas surrounding “conscience, corporations, and the common good”
into action.
Chapter 6—Concluding Reflections: Then and Now In the concluding chapter, I will (a) provide a summary of the journey described in Chaps. 2, 3, 4, and 5;
(b) reflect on my earlier work indicating my discoveries and changes in thinking; (c)
discuss problems that have arisen during the eight years since my becoming
Emeritus Professor; and (d) share some thoughts about the future of the field of
business and applied ethics in the face of a severe polarization of political values in
the U.S. and even abroad.
Chapter 7—Afterword Offers a retrospective summary of the book as a whole
and an image of the Sower, who in my view is a compelling portrait of the educator
in the field of applied ethics.
Appendices At the end of this book, in Appendix 1, I have included my full curriculum vitae. In Appendix 2, the reader will find reprinted three of my articles that
have received less attention than most of the others. I offer them here with the permission of their publishers to round out the retrospective and prospective thoughts
occasioned by the invitation to write this volume.
• “Toward an Integrated Approach to Business Ethics,” Thought, Volume 60 (June,
1985), pp. 161–180.
This article offers an interpretation of responsibility in business ethics on three
scales or levels of analysis—the person, the organization, and the economic system. Utilizing innovative work in mathematics on “fractals,” I suggest both
descriptive and prescriptive implications of this conceptual model. Executive
Education in the academy and in corporations might benefit from this imaginative understanding of the multi-leveled moral ecosystem within which the leader
must lead. As with all ecosystems, “everything is connected to everything else”
(Commoner 1971).
• “Tenacity: The American Pursuit of Corporate Responsibility,” Business and
Society Review (118:4, 2013), pp. 577–605.
In this article, corporate responsibility in the American experience is articulated
under the concept of tenacity, regarding the possibility that business responsibility in a (relatively) free market economy is possible. The article offers three basic
convictions that underlie that tenacity. First, the Checks & Balances Principle
tells us that there are checks and balances in democratic capitalism which give us
confidence that the pursuit of economic goals will be moderated for the common
good. Second, the Principle of Moral Projection shows that there is good reason
to consider the corporation not only as a legal person under corporate law but
also as a moral person. And, last, the Moral Common Ground Principle reflects
that there are shared moral values ascertainable by well-developed consciences
in individuals and in corporations.
• “Human Dignity and the Common Good: The Institutional Insight,” Business
and Society Review, (March, 2017), pp. 27–50.
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In this article, I develop the idea of the “institutional insight” as a pathway to two
foundational values for applied ethics: human dignity and the common good. I
explore—but do not offer a definitive analysis of—these two values, which I
believe are critical to the progress of business ethics (indeed to the progress of
applied ethics generally). In several previous articles (Goodpaster 1991, 2009,
2012, 2013), I have alluded to this theme, but here I hope to have shown that
human dignity and the common good underlie both (1) management’s fiduciary
duty to shareholders, and (2) management’s obligations to “stakeholders.”
Indeed, it may be that the frequently observed tension between the latter two
normative paradigms can be resolved only by engaging in the comprehensive
moral thinking afforded by the institutional insight.

References
Brenkert GG, Beauchamp TL (eds) (2009) Corporate responsibility and its constituents: a tripartite model. In: The Oxford handbook of business ethics. Oxford University Press, Oxford,
pp 126–157
Commoner B (1971) The closing circle; nature, man, and technology, 1st edn. Knopf, New York
Friedman M (1970) The social responsibility of business is to increase its profits. The New York
Times Magazine
Goodpaster K (1985) Toward an integrated approach to business ethics. Thought 60:161–180
Goodpaster K (1991) Business ethics and stakeholder analysis. Bus Ethics Q 1(1):52–71
Goodpaster K (2000) The Caux round table principles: Corporate moral reflection in a global business environment. In: Williams OF (ed) Global codes of conduct: an idea whose time has come.
Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, pp 183–195
Goodpaster K (2007) Conscience and corporate culture. Blackwell Publishing, Malden
Goodpaster K (2009) Corporate responsibility and its constituents. In: Brenkert G, Beauchamp
T (eds) Oxford handbook of business ethics. Oxford University Press, Oxford, New York,
pp 127–160
Goodpaster K (2010) Business ethics: two moral provisos. Bus Ethics Q 20(4):740–742
Goodpaster K (2012) Goods that are truly good and services that truly serve: reflections on “Caritas
in veritate.” J Bus Ethics 100:9–16
Goodpaster K (2013) Tenacity: the American pursuit of corporate responsibility. Bus Soc Rev
118:577–605
Goodpaster K (2017) Human dignity and the common good: the institutional insight. Bus Soc Rev
122(1):27–50
Ladd J (1970) Morality and the ideal of rationality in formal organizations. Monist 54(4):488–516
Nather D (2019) The most popular companies in America, ranked by partisan leaning.
AXIOS. https://theharrispoll.com/the-most-popular-companies-in-america-ranked-by-partisan-
leaning/. Accessed 3 Sept 2020
Plato (2008) Plato: the republic (trans: Jowett B). Forgotten Books, Charleston
Smith ND (1999) Plato’s analogy of soul and state. J Ethics 3(1):31–49
Stone CD (1975) Where the law ends: the social control of corporate behavior. Harper & Row,
New York

8

1

Introduction

Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing,
adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate
credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s Creative
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not
included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by
statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from
the copyright holder.

Chapter 2

Conscience and the Moral Insight

Abstract This chapter offers an introduction to the field of ethics and the central
place of conscience within it. To explicate the idea of conscience, I draw upon the
work of nineteenth-century Harvard philosopher Josiah Royce. Royce understood
conscience as the product of a certain insight, what he called the moral insight,
which he defined as “the realization of one’s neighbor, in the full sense of the word
realization; the resolution to treat him unselfishly.” I then go on to illustrate parallels
to Royce’s moral insight in the works of Plato, Jean Piaget, Hannah Arendt, Joseph
Ratzinger, and Anthony DeMello. This is followed by a discussion of the work of
Jonathan Haidt aimed at tracing the universality of conscience across cultures and
strategies for putting conscience into action—even in a pluralistic society. I wrap up
this chapter with two subsections: (a) some structural remarks about the field of ethics, anticipating the theme of Chap. 3: Can a corporation have a conscience? and (b)
two serious objections to the very idea of treating corporations as morally responsible entities. This chapter is an organic part of a larger work about the overall
contribution of Kenneth Goodpaster to the field of applied ethics and is best read in
the context of that larger work.

2.1 Key Terms
Philosophers usually begin their books by examining the meanings of the central
terms and ideas in their writing. I will do this eventually for phrases like “business
ethics,” “institutional insight,” and “moral anthropology.” However, in this first
chapter, I want to communicate the departure point of my career-long interest in
moral philosophy and the initial theme of this book—the phenomenon of conscience. It behooves us to clarify certain basic terms that I will be using at the outset
and throughout this book, specifically “insight,” “moral insight,” and “conscience.”

© The Author(s) 2022
K. E. Goodpaster, Times of Insight: Conscience, Corporations, and the Common
Good, Issues in Business Ethics 54, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-09712-6_2
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2.1.1 Insight
Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary defines “insight” as:
1. an instance of apprehending the true nature of a thing, esp. through intuitive
understanding: an insight into eighteenth-century life; and
2. a penetrating mental vision or discernment; faculty of seeing into inner character
or underlying truth.
The common element between (1) and (2) seems to be a shift from an accepted
understanding of a phenomenon to a deeper discernment of its true nature. To have
insight is to be able to discern something deeper (“what lies beneath”) or something
larger (“a bigger picture”). A contrasting element between (1) and (2) seems to be
that (1) refers to “an insight” as an instance, a momentary breakthrough, while (2)
refers to a human faculty, an ability, even a gift for discerning the truth of a situation.
As you, the reader, will see in what follows, when I use the term insight in connection with matters of morality or ethics, the common element and the contrasting
element become especially relevant. Some philosophers and psychologists have
focused their attention on the “moment of breakthrough” element in ethics—Josiah
Royce distinctive among them. I will discuss them in the next section. Others have
focused their attention on the “human faculty” element in ethics. I will discuss them
subsequently in the section called “Conscience.”

2.1.2 Moral Insight
Five decades ago, in Ann Arbor, my philosophical mentor and guide at the University
of Michigan, William Frankena, said to me that the deepest truths in ethics were also
the simplest. More than once he mentioned a Harvard philosopher and friend of
William James—Josiah Royce—as having articulated one of these deep and simple
truths more eloquently than anyone else he had ever read. Royce called it the moral
insight and defined it as “the realization of one’s neighbor, in the full sense of the
word realization; the resolution to treat him unselfishly.” Royce immediately added
something, however, that emphasized the fragile nature of this transformative
breakthrough:
But this resolution expresses and belongs to the moment of insight. Passion may cloud the
insight after no very long time. It is as impossible for us to avoid the illusion of selfishness
in our daily lives, as to escape seeing through the illusion at the moment of insight. We see
the reality of our neighbor; that is, we determine to treat him as we do ourselves. But then
we go back to daily action, and we feel the heat of hereditary passions, and we straightway
forget what we have seen! Our neighbor becomes obscured. He is once more a foreign
power. He is unreal. We are again deluded and selfish. This conflict goes on and will go on
as long as we live after the manner of men. Moments of insight, with their accompanying
resolutions; long stretches of delusion and selfishness: That is our life.1 (Royce 1885)

1

Emphasis added.
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For Royce, the moral insight was not to be understood as a once-and-for-all
event. Returning to the “illusion” of self is a persistent human trait. Royce’s way of
describing the foundation of ethics is notable for this recognition of our tendency to
“backslide” from the moment of insight—the moment of truth—into the illusion
that our neighbor is “unreal.” Royce believed that the moral insight (a gateway to
what later philosophers called the “moral point of view” (Baier 1958)) was the origin of ethics, the spark that gave rise to conscience. But he wished not only to identify this origin, this spark, but also to warn at the same time of its propensity for a
kind of forgetting, returning us to the delusional state of self-centeredness.2
Recent work in behavioral psychology by Ann Tenbrunsel (Bazerman and
Tenbrunsel 2011) and others seems to corroborate Royce’s perspective on the nature
of the moral insight:
According to Tenbrunsel, the business frame cognitively activates one set of goals—to be
competent, to be successful; the ethics frame triggers other goals—to be fair and not hurt
others. And once you’re in, say, a business frame, you become really focused on meeting
those goals, and other goals can completely fade from view.3 (Joffe-Walt and Spiegel 2012)

Another psychologist, Anthony DeMello, characterizes what Royce called the
moral insight as a kind of “waking up” from a sleep state to what he called awareness (DeMello 1990).4 For DeMello, awareness frees us for discerning deeper truths
about ourselves and a bigger picture than our often self-centered worldview.5 A
similar idea springs from the book Alcoholics Anonymous (1939) and forms the
basis for most 12-step programs today.6

2.1.3 Conscience
2.1.3.1 Its Basis
Many thinkers have reflected upon the nature of right and wrong, good and bad,
virtue and vice, and our ability to know and apply these moral attributes in practical
ways in our lives. Here I will mention the thoughts of four other thinkers: Plato, Jean
Piaget, Hannah Arendt, and Joseph Ratzinger. What these thinkers have in common
In the pages ahead, I urge the reader never to lose sight of this fundamental conviction about the
moral point of view, for as we explore Times of Insight: Conscience, Corporations, and the
Common Good, the touchstone of our inquiry will always be the dignity and well-being of human
persons—“our neighbors”—as well as the propensity for backsliding, for “forgetting” the insight
when we feel “the heat of hereditary passions.”
3
We shall discuss in the next chapter whether the point of view of business needs to be as amoral
as Tenbrunsel seems to think. I think it does not.
4
Anthony DeMello, S.J. was a Jesuit priest-psychologist born and raised in India. His message was
particularly rich in that it blended Eastern (Buddhist) and Western (Christian) spiritual traditions.
5
DeMello also writes: “Spirituality means waking up. Most people, even though they don’t know
it, are asleep. They’re born asleep, they live asleep, they marry in their sleep, they breed children
in their sleep, they die in their sleep without ever waking up” (p. 5).
6
“Step 12. Having had a spiritual awakening as the result of these steps, we tried to carry this message to alcoholics, and to practice these principles in all our affairs” (p. 60).
2
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is a desire to understand the human faculty of forming good moral judgments as we
decide how to act and to live. Each of these thinkers believes that our faculty of
conscience can provide reliable access to ethical knowledge under the right conditions. This contrasts with various brands of moral relativism:
• Subjectivism—in which moral judgments are not true or false but are simply the
deliverances of our considered personal preferences or emotions regarding ethical matters.
• Cultural relativism—in which moral judgments are not true or false but are the
deliverances of our cultural or sub-cultural predispositions on ethical matters
(from sources as varied as family, religion, voluntary associations, geographic
regions, racial groups, gender, national identities, etc.).7
Accounts of conscience typically seek to anchor our moral judgments in specifically human capacities: based on philosophical reasoning, social scientific observation, or theological reflection. Plato, for example, used his argument from analogy
between the republic (city state) and the human soul to suggest that conscience in
individuals is our faculty of knowing how to keep a proper balance between the
rational, the passionate, and the appetitive parts of our souls (analogous to the
knowledge class, the military class, and the merchant class, respectively, in the macrocosm of the city state). Injustice consists in a disordering of the parts of the soul,
similar to the disordering of the parts of a city whose military class pursues the
demands of the merchant class and thus makes insatiable demands on the acquisition of new land and new resources. The contributions of prudence and temperance
that would be made by the knowledge class get left behind. Such imprudence and
intemperance in individuals, of course, can lead to what we often call the seven
deadly sins.8 The central point for Plato was that there was a pathway to knowledge
about matters of ethics and morals, a non-relativistic pathway based on an account
of human nature. Socrates modeled this pathway in his dialogues.
Jean Piaget, the Swiss psychologist who in 1932 wrote his classic The Moral
Judgment of the Child, thought he saw a universal pattern in child development of
three developmental stages leading to a mature conscience: egocentrism (an ethic of
self), heteronomy (an ethic of compliance with others’ rules), and autonomy (an
ethic based on reasoned principles).
In a series of New Yorker articles that appeared in 1977, Hannah Arendt, a political theorist and philosopher, wrote of the “banality of evil” in contrast to our

It may bear mentioning that an NGO, The Caux Round Table, in 1991 espoused a set of transcultural ethical principles for business, based on input from Japanese, European, and American business leaders. A subgroup of the Round Table and scholars then developed a self-assessment and
improvement process (SAIP) based on the Caux Principles, analogous to the Baldrige process for
quality management. See Goodpaster (2000).
8
Originating in Christian theology, the seven deadly sins are pride, envy, gluttony, greed, lust,
sloth, and wrath. Pride is sometimes referred to as vanity or vainglory, greed as avarice or covetousness, and wrath as anger. Gluttony covers self-indulgent excess more generally, including
drunkenness.
7
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often-dramatic preconceptions. The context was her observation of Adolf Eichmann
during his trial in Jerusalem in the early 1960s:
The question that imposed itself was, could the activity of thinking as such, the habit of
examining whatever happens to come to pass or to attract attention, regardless of the results
and the specific content of the activity, could this activity be among the conditions that
make men abstain from evildoing, or even actually “condition” them against it? The very
word “conscience,” at any rate, points in that direction, insofar as it means “to know with
and by myself,” a kind of knowledge that is actualized in every thinking process.9

Arendt’s idea—that evil resided in a kind of thoughtlessness—was rooted in her
conviction that thinking was the key not only to our relationship to ourselves but to
our relationships with others. Reminiscent of DeMello (above), Arendt reminded us
of our propensity to substitute counterfeits for conscience:
Clichés, stock phrases, adherence to conventional, standardized codes of expression and
conduct have the socially recognized function of protecting us against reality; that is,
against the claim on our thinking attention which all events and facts make by virtue of their
existence. (p. 196)

DeMello would have agreed wholeheartedly with Arendt’s observation that “[a]
life without thinking is quite possible, . . . but it is not fully alive. Unthinking men
are like sleepwalkers” (p. 195).10 Like Plato and Piaget, DeMello and Arendt seem
to believe that the faculty of conscience among human beings is universal if only it
can be saved from the soul’s disorder (Plato), or underdevelopment (Piaget), or
thoughtlessness (Arendt), or lack of awareness (DeMello).
In 1991, Joseph Ratzinger (today Pope Benedict XVI Emeritus) in a widely
reprinted essay (Ratzinger 1991), offered an extended reflection on the nature of
conscience. He looked to Plato’s theory of anamnesis or recollection for an understanding of the way conscience works in human nature. In Ratzinger’s view, conscience functions like a memory from within in guiding human action, an inner
sense of right and wrong, good and bad, virtue and vice that was written in our
hearts when we were created.11 He might agree with Royce that it offers us a moral
intuition born of the moral insight. Ratzinger writes:

Hannah Arendt, “Thinking,” The New Yorker, November 21, 1977, pp. 65–140; November 28,
1977, pp. 135–216; December 5, 1977, pp. 135–216.
10
T.S. Eliot remarked earlier in this century that we spend too much time “dreaming of systems so
perfect that no one will need to be good.” By such dreams few practitioners can live. The problem
with contemporary counterfeits for personal and corporate conscience is the same: they are lifeless
in themselves and their laws and dictates do not replace conscience—indeed they may ultimately
suppress it.
11
In his 1991 essay, Ratzinger adds: “This means that the first so-called ontological level of the
phenomenon of conscience consists in the fact that something like an original memory of the good
and true (both are identical) has been implanted in us, that there is an inner ontological tendency
within man, who is created in the likeness of God, toward the divine. From its origin, man’s being
resonates with some things and clashes with others.” (Emphasis added.)
9
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This anamnesis of the origin, which results from the godlike constitution of our being is not
a conceptually articulated knowing, a store of retrievable contents. It is so to speak an inner
sense, a capacity to recall, so that the one whom it addresses, if he is not turned in on himself, hears its echo from within. He sees: ‘That's it! That is what my nature points to and
seeks.’12

I have found this account of conscience to be satisfying philosophically as a form of
intuitionism and theologically as a basis for natural law.13 Conscience does often
seem like an inner sense analogous to memory, much as Socrates suggested in the
Meno that mathematical knowledge is innate and “recollected.” The idea of intuition has a long and well-developed tradition in ethics, especially in the modern
period. Theologically, natural law theory views conscience as our sense of the
Creator’s intention for human behavior that must underlie positive law. For this
reason, it is invoked in such documents as the U.S. Declaration of Independence and
the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights as more basic than specific laws in
specific societies.
2.1.3.2 In Action
So much for the non-relativistic basis of conscience. It appears to be an inner
sense that is not arbitrary, that involves a kind of awakening to our human
nature, a remembering of who we are. But once we get in touch with this inner
sense, how do we translate it into the complexities of our daily lives? The biblical path might be the ten commandments. Other approaches might be more
anthropological, such as the work of Jonathan Haidt in his book The Righteous
Mind (2013). For Haidt, conscience is akin to a social intuition found through
empirical moral foundations theory in social psychology. He identifies five
innate foundations or patterns of processing moral decisions in research on
human social groups over many millennia: care/harm, fairness/cheating, loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, and sanctity/degradation. Some societies or
parts of societies have tended to emphasize one or two of these patterns to the
exclusion of the others (e.g., care and fairness to the exclusion of loyalty, authority, and sanctity).14 These foundational frames will recur, however, and conflicts
will seek to “right the ship” so that all five are represented in some way. Table 2.1
below is the diagram Haidt offers in his book.

Emphasis added.
For those less theologically inclined, this “inner sense” might be seen as the result of an evolutionary process, predisposing human beings toward and away from certain behaviors in patterns
that are quite universal.
14
Later in his book, Haidt adds a sixth foundation, Liberty/oppression, that operates in some tension with the Authority/subversion foundation (pp. 200–211).
12
13
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Table 2.1 Diagram of the five foundations of moral decision making (Haidt, p. 146)

Adaptive
challenge

Care/harm
Protect and
care for
children

Original
triggers

Fairness/cheating
Reap benefits of
two-way
partnerships

Suffering,
distress, or
neediness
expressed by
one’s child
Current
Baby seals,
triggers
cute cartoon
characters
Characteristic Compassion
emotions

Cheating,
cooperation,
deception

Relevant
virtues

Fairness, justice,
trustworthiness

Caring,
kindness

Marital fidelity,
broken vending
machines
Anger, gratitude,
guilt

Loyalty/
betrayal
Form
cohesive
coalitions

Authority/
subversion
Forge
beneficial
relationships
within
hierarchies
Threat or
Signs of
challenge to dominance
group
and
submission

Sanctity/
degradation
Avoid
contaminants

Sports
teams,
nations
Group
pride, rage
at traitors
Loyalty,
patriotism,
selfsacrifice

Bosses,
respected
professionals
Respect, fear

Taboo ideas
(communism,
racism)
Disgust

Obedience,
deference

Temperance,
chastity, piety,
cleanliness

Waste
products,
diseased people

My own work—in some ways similar in outcome to the work of Haidt—offers
four avenues of ethical analysis: interests, rights, duties, and virtues. It is at the
intersection of these avenues that moral insight (and truth) is to be found. The source
of these “avenues” is not the theory of evolution or anthropology but instead the
history of philosophy and the patterns of moral reasoning that have recurred in the
history of ethics. Like Haidt’s approach, the “four avenues” approach seeks to discipline moral dialogue using several distinct “voices” or “points of view” that
deserve consideration as a person or group confronts an ethical challenge. I shall
have much more to say about the “four avenues” approach in Chap. 5.
The principal take-away from this exposition and comparison is simply that once the
human nature of conscience is granted and moral relativism is set aside, the pathways to
structures of ethical decision making can be discerned with the help of social science
and philosophy. The task is always to bring to bear the moral point of view on the decisions that we make both personally and (as we are about to see) institutionally.
2.1.3.3 Can a Corporation Have One?
University of Chicago philosopher Alan Gewirth, writing three quarters of a century
after Josiah Royce, offered an account of the birthplace of ethics or conscience in
terms that in many ways echo the moral insight. Gewirth asks us to imagine an
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“agent” (actor) and a “recipient” in a “transaction” in which the freedom and well-
being of the recipient is at stake. This analysis proves very fruitful in addressing the
foundations of business ethics (Gewirth 1978). What Royce would call the “realization” of one’s neighbor, Gewirth would call respecting the freedom and well-being
of one’s recipient(s).
Ethics, in the views of these two philosophers, derives from (paradigmatically)15
relationships between human persons who seek to take each other’s freedom and
well-being seriously. Agents need to be accountable to the recipients in their transactions. (See red rectangle within Fig. 2.1 below.)
I have added to the rectangular diagram of the transaction between agent and
recipient two other trapezoid-shaped boxes that are intended to represent the varieties of agents and the varieties of recipients in a general theory of ethics. This will
allow me later (in Chap. 3) to explore groups or institutions as moral agents and
moral recipients. For now, it is enough to observe that the core idea of the field of
ethics is the encounter between two human persons, and the insight on the part of
each that the other is real and calls for respect.16

Domain of
Moral
Accountability

Agent

T
R
A
N
S
A
C
T
I
O
N

Recipient

Range of
Moral
Considerability

Fig. 2.1 Gewirth’s view of the central idea of ethics

Eventually, of course, one might need to consider agents that were not human persons (e.g.,
corporations and other institutions) and recipients that were not human persons (e.g., animals,
plants, and ecosystems).
16
“Re-spect”—to look again, as if the object in view deserves special consideration.
15
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2.2 Ethics
2.2.1 Three Ways of Thinking About Ethics
Much of my early work in the field of business ethics was spent clarifying the
central ideas of business ethics, corporate responsibility, and corporate conscience. The natural way to proceed in this domain seems to me to be to start with
the notions of “ethics” and “responsibility” in their unmodified meanings—only
then to introduce modifiers like “business,” “corporate,” “organizational,” “institutional,” etc.
One article in which I took this approach early on was “The Concept of Corporate
Responsibility” (1983) published in what was then the newly founded Journal of
Business Ethics. There I wrote:
Since business ethics is a part of philosophical ethics generally, we expect and find that its
divisions correspond to the divisions most frequently made in philosophical ethics, namely,
descriptive ethics, normative ethics and analytical ethics (sometimes called metaethics).
Each division may be briefly described in the order just given. (p. 3)

Since there are three main divisions within the field of ethics generally—descriptive, normative, and analytical (see Table 2.2)—it seemed reasonable to anticipate
that business ethics would have a similar tripartite division.
• Descriptive ethics is essentially an empirical enterprise. It seeks (psychologically) to describe the moral beliefs and values of a person in a neutral
way—“without judgment,” as we say. Or it seeks (anthropologically or sociologically) to describe the moral beliefs and values of past or present groups
(families, various associations, subcultures, whole nations, etc.) in a neutral
way—again “without judgment”—based on empirical data about the group(s)
under study.
• Normative ethics, on the other hand, is essentially a prescriptive enterprise. It
seeks to articulate and defend principles of right and wrong, good and bad, virtue
and vice. In contrast to descriptive ethics, normative ethics is not morally neutral
and does not seek to avoid “judgment” (although it does seek to avoid being
judgmental). Oxford philosopher Mary Midgley (1981) explains the vital, productive role of normative ethics and moral judgment:
The power of moral judgement is, in fact, not a luxury, not a perverse indulgence of the
self-righteous. It is a necessity. When we judge something to be bad or good, better or
worse than something else, we are taking it as an example to aim at or avoid. Without opinions of this sort, we would have no framework of comparison for our own policy, no chance

Table 2.2 Three ways of thinking about ethics
Three ways of thinking about ethics (“DNA”)
Descriptive
Normative

Analytical
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of profiting by other people’s insights or mistakes. In this vacuum, we could form no judgments on our own actions.17

• Being judgmental, on the other hand, is the trait of being arrogant or disparaging
of individuals or groups—of “rushing to judgment” on the basis of very limited
evidence. This of course, leads to misjudgment, which prudent persons
must avoid.
• Finally, analytical ethics (sometimes called metaethics) addresses questions
about normative ethics, such as: how are we to understand ethical claims, how
are we to justify such claims, and how are we to adjudicate moral disagreements
both within and between different societies?

2.2.2 Three Levels of Application of That Thinking
It is both a descriptive and an analytical ethical observation to say that within the
field of ethics generally, there are three possible levels of agent and three possible
levels of recipient that can come under moral scrutiny using the three ways of ethical thinking mentioned above. Moral agents and recipients can be and (paradigmatically) are human persons; but they can also be understood as organized groups or
institutions acting or being acted upon in ethically significant ways. A gang, for
example, could do violence to an individual or to another gang. A corporation, as an
organized group, might produce life-saving pacemakers for individuals with heart
diseases.
At a third level, entire social systems (“societies”) can be understood as actors
and recipients over historical time or contemporaneously. World Wars are, of course,
one sad category of such third level “transactions,” and science fiction writers have
imagined societies from distant star systems interacting in friendly or unfriendly
ways with citizens of Earth.
By combining these two tripartite distinctions—the three ways of thinking about
ethics and the three levels of application—we can discern an “architecture of the
field of applied ethics” and depict it as in Fig. 2.2 below. Note that this “architecture” carries with it an important assumption, namely, that it is ethically meaningful
to attribute moral agency (and perhaps moral recipiency) to entities “larger” than
human beings. This assumption harkens back to Plato’s Republic and will be the
subject of Chap. 3 of this book, but first it will be helpful to consider some early
resistance to such an idea.

Emphasis added. Midgley argued that moral judgment amounts to “forming an opinion and
expressing it if it is called for.” She then added: “Naturally, we ought to avoid forming—and
expressing—crude opinions. . . . But this is a different objection. The trouble with crude opinions
is that they are crude, whoever forms them, not that they are formed by the wrong people” (71).
The same observation could be made substituting other words for “crude”—words such as “authoritarian,” “dictatorial,” “tyrannical,” or “repressive.”
17
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Normative

Analytical

Ethics of the System

Ethics of the
Organization
Ethics of the
Person

Fig. 2.2 Architecture of the field of applied ethics

2.2.2.1 Not So Fast!
In 1970, two important articles appeared that were aimed at precluding the application of ethical categories to organizational actors like business corporations,
one a logical objection and one a moral objection. The first was a philosophical
article that attracted my attention because it jarred my moral intuitions! It was
written by a respected moral philosopher named John Ladd at Brown University:
“Morality and the Ideal of Rationality in Formal Organizations” (1970).18 Ladd
described corporations (and “formal organizations” generally) as more like
machines than like persons with consciences: “If we think of an organization as a
machine, it is easy to see why we cannot reasonably expect it to have any moral
obligations to people or for them to have any to it” (p. 507). If someone expects
corporations “to conform to the principles of morality,” Ladd wrote, “he is simply
committing a logical mistake.”
[I]t would be a [logical] mistake to expect a machine to comply with the principles of
morality. By the same token, an official or agent of a formal organization is simply violating
the basic rules of organizational activity if he allows his moral scruples rather than the
objectives of the organization to determine his decision. (p. 500)

In my view, Ladd went too far when he asserted that amorality in business was a
matter of necessity rather than a matter of observation, but his arguments should not
be overlooked or ignored. While comparing organizations to machines may be
excessive, the comparison serves as a useful warning about how managers and
employees in corporations can be confused about the morality of their work lives

It is worth noting that today, 50 years after Ladd’s article, the challenges of artificial intelligence
(AI) include, among other things, the puzzle of how to fashion a machine that can make sound ethical decisions!
18
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and their private lives.19 It is possible that the objectives of the management of an
organization do not in fact include moral principles, but such an absence of conscience can and should be viewed as an institutional failure—hardly as an institutional necessity.
Nevertheless, there was a second important article written in 1970 aimed at
resisting the demands of ethics and social responsibility applied to business
organizations. It was an article by Nobel Laureate Milton Friedman, entitled
“The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its Profits” (1970).
Friedman argued that special management attention to ethics or social responsibility was redundant and unnecessary. Why? Because the structure of the market
itself was such that Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” took the self-interested decisions of businesspersons and corporations and through competition led them to
the common good. In fact, Friedman argued, business leaders were ill-equipped
to make decisions with social responsibility as the principal motive and therefore should not do so! In other words, whatever ethical values the business
system requires are already programmed in, making supplementary efforts
unnecessary, even morally suspect.
My response to Milton Friedman in those days was that he was too reliant on
market forces to provide all the moral guidance that businesses needed in our society today. Because markets are imperfect, they can incentivize less-than-honest
treatment of employees, customers, local communities, and the environment. Unless
we believe that external laws and government regulations are the cure-all for such
market failures, some amount of congruence is to be expected between the moral
sensibilities of individuals and the moral sensibilities of organized groups.
2.2.2.2 Right, Left, and Center
If we “zoom out” a bit from the Ladd/Friedman objections to the idea of corporate
conscience, one way of seeing their objections is as follows, in Fig. 2.3.
Two major historical control mechanisms that have sometimes been thought to
provide “surrogates” for corporate responsibility are what we can, following Adam
Smith, call the “invisible hand” of market competition or, following a more socialist
agenda, the “visible hand” of legal and governmental control of capital. If one is
skeptical, as I have been, that either of these two “hands” (invisible or visible)
As I remarked in my book Conscience and Corporate Culture (2007): “Ladd drew largely from
the landmark works of Herbert Simon and Chester Barnard. These authors saw decision making as
anchored in a set of institutional goals. The organization’s ‘rationality’ was defined in terms of the
effective and efficient achievement of these goals, period. Simon had written that ‘decisions in
private management, like decisions in public management, must take as their ethical premises the
objectives that have been set for the organization.’ Ladd concluded from this that ethics could not
really function in the business organization. It was simply out of place: ‘. . . Actions that are wrong
by ordinary moral standards are not so for organizations; indeed, they may often be required.
Secrecy, espionage and deception do not make organizational action wrong; rather they are right,
proper, and indeed, rational, if they serve the objectives of the organization.’ (Ladd, op.cit.).”
19
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provides a satisfactory surrogate for the consciences of our intermediate institutions, including corporations, then one will resist both models in favor of a third
model in which the locus of moral responsibility resides with corporate leadership
(conditioned, of course, by both markets and law).
2.2.2.3 History as a Descriptive Argument for “Corporate” Conscience
Another line of argument against those who would resist applying moral predicates
to business organizations is that we have in fact done so for nearly two centuries in
ordinary discourse, in education, and in law. Granted, such language can be criticized by Ladd as logically inappropriate or by Friedman as ethically reckless, but it
seems to have functioned both meaningfully and coherently since the Industrial
Revolution.
There have been at least three books in the last 15 years that offer serious scholarship on the history of business ethics and corporate responsibility reaching back
into the nineteenth century:
• From Higher Aims to Hired Hands: The Social Transformation of American
Business Schools and the Unfulfilled Promise of Management as a Profession by
Rakesh Khurana, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007)
• Corporate Responsibility: The American Experience by Archie B. Carroll,
Kenneth J. Lipartito, James E. Post, Patricia H. Werhane, and Kenneth
E. Goodpaster (Executive Editor), (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2012) and
• The Moral Background: An Inquiry into the History of Business Ethics, by
Gabriel Abend (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014).
Khurana’s book emphasizes the rise of business schools in universities by analogy with law schools and medical schools—an effort to fashion management as a
profession. The authors of Corporate Responsibility: The American Experience, in
my opinion as Executive Editor of the project, display the tenacity of Americans
regarding corporate responsibility:
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During the past two centuries, corporations have demonstrated amazing productivity, innovation, and adaptability—and when they have displayed questionable ethical or social
behavior, our persistent response as Americans has been to improve them, either internally
or externally, rather than to overturn the system in favor of more socialistic models. Despite
challenges to corporate legitimacy, Americans have sought to deepen corporate responsibility.20 (Goodpaster 2013)

Gabriel Abend, in his history of business ethics (The Moral Background) applies the
language of ethics to individuals and to institutional actors in our social environment.
Finally, the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution21 has been interpreted by
the U.S. Supreme Court as applying to corporations as persons, not just to individual persons. As recently as 2010, in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission
(558 U.S. 310), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the First Amendment prohibits the
government from restricting politically independent expenditures by corporations,
associations, or labor unions, affirming again the legal rights (and responsibilities)
of organizations.

2.3 Conclusion
Let us now revisit, in Chap. 3, the (perhaps) controversial attribution of Gewirth’s
categories of “moral agent” and “moral recipient” not only to individual human
persons but to organizations and whole social systems as well. This is implied in my
account of the Architecture of the Field of Applied Ethics (see Fig. 2.2) and provides
the occasion for a new insight beyond the moral insight.
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Chapter 3

Corporations and the Institutional Insight

Abstract As anticipated in Chap. 2, this chapter takes on directly the issue of predicating conscience of corporations. In my work over many years, I have defended the analogical predication of moral attributes of organizational actors, referring to this practice
as the Principle of Moral Projection (an inversion of Plato’s strategy in the Republic).
After clarifying the meaning of analogical predication, I turn to the central theme of
this chapter: the institutional insight. Drawing upon the work of Hugh Heclo, professor
of government and public affairs at George Mason University, I describe institutions as
vehicles for achieving a measure of permanence and continuity for what we value,
despite our mortality. So if we think of business as an institution, we must attribute not
only a focal purpose to individual corporations but also an institutional purpose—to
carry forward the provision of goods that are truly good and services that truly serve.
The institutional insight does more than “give permission” or “affirm fittingness.” It
asks organizational leadership to embrace not only the presenting purposes of their
organizations but also their institutional purposes (as they relate to the common good).
This chapter then takes on several related themes such as: Does the attribution of moral
responsibility to a corporation preclude the attribution of responsibility to certain individuals within the corporation? And if corporations can be morally responsible actors,
can they also deserve moral consideration as recipients of the actions of others? This
chapter is an organic part of a larger work about the overall contribution of Kenneth
Goodpaster to the field of applied ethics and is best read in the context of that larger work.

3.1 From Moral to Institutional Insight
In the previous chapter, I offered a view of the “architecture” of the field of business
ethics, as I came to see it, drawing upon both Josiah Royce (the moral insight) and
Alan Gewirth (agents and recipients). This architecture was formed from two tripartite
distinctions: (1) descriptive, normative, and analytical ethics, and (2) personal, organizational, and societal agency. Implied in the second tripartite distinction, as we saw,
was the idea that organizations or institutions could (and should) be treated as moral
agents (and perhaps as moral recipients) analogous to individual persons (Fig. 3.1).
© The Author(s) 2022
K. E. Goodpaster, Times of Insight: Conscience, Corporations, and the Common
Good, Issues in Business Ethics 54, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-09712-6_3
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3.2 More About Transactions
I indicated in the display of Gewirth’s conception of a moral “transaction” that there
were some larger questions awaiting our attention about the domain of moral
accountability and the range of moral considerability.
The Principle of Moral Projection, as I noted in Chap. 1, presupposes that within
the domain of moral accountability (see left side of Fig. 3.2) there can be not only
persons but also organizations and even whole social systems. But the Principle of
Moral Projection presumes more than this.1 It also presumes that we can get a better
understanding of corporate responsibility or corporate conscience by employing the
analogy with personal responsibility or personal conscience—what I called the
inversion of Plato’s method in the Republic.
As I pointed out in Chap. 1, Plato’s strategy in the Republic, Book II, was to see
the city state as a macrocosm of the soul of the person. Eventually, the insatiability
of Athens for wealth led to expansionism and wars of acquisition. This is also true,
Socrates argued, for us as individuals. Without virtues like prudence, courage, and
temperance, there can be no wisdom or knowledge for the soul; there can only be
intemperate acquisition. Lack of virtue in the soul of the individual is analogous to
lack of virtue in the life of the republic.
What was the source of my conviction that normative characteristics in the macrocosm would translate into the microcosm (or vice versa)? Organizations appear in
many ways to be macro-versions (projections) of ourselves as individuals—human
beings writ large. We can sometimes see more clearly in organizations certain features we want to understand better in ourselves, but often the reverse is true.
Managers and leaders of organizations can frequently benefit from what we understand about ourselves as individuals. I have referred to this analogical approach in
the past as the Principle of Moral Projection. Formally, it can be stated as follows:
There are other questions about the domain of moral accountability, of course, including whether
it could ever be occupied by artificially intelligent machines or automata that are sufficiently
sophisticated in rational decision making. This question will not be treated in this book but deserves
careful attention.
1
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It is appropriate not only to describe organizations and their characteristics by analogy with
individuals, it is also appropriate normatively to look for and to foster moral attributes in
organizations by analogy with those we look for and seek to foster in individuals.
(Goodpaster 1997a, b)

The idea was that corporate responsibility is the projection of moral responsibility
in its ordinary (individual) sense onto a corporate agent. Corporate conscience can
evolve from pure self-centeredness (e.g., public relations or a preoccupation with
profit) through the rule-following of corporate compliance (with legal or regulatory
requirements) into an authentic, independent management concern. Such an evolution represents a maturation process analogous to the three-stage development of
conscience in individuals that we saw in the work of Piaget. Note further that attributing responsibility and conscience to corporate entities does not mean that we cannot at the same time attribute responsibility to individuals within the corporation.
Indeed, we might also at the same time attribute responsibility to the social system
surrounding the corporation. More on this shortly.

3.2.1 Analogical Predication
Sociologist Philip Selznick articulated something like this idea more than six
decades ago (1957) when he wrote about “character formation” as an important area
of exploration for those who would understand the decision making of
organizations:
The study of institutions is in some ways comparable to the clinical study of personality. It
requires a genetic and developmental approach, an emphasis on historical origins and
growth stages. There is a need to see the enterprise as a whole and to see how it is transformed as new ways of dealing with a changing environment evolve. (p. 141)
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Leadership, according to Selznick, is about institutionalizing values. We can now
see that leadership is the vehicle that makes moral projection both meaningful and
plausible. And in the late 1970s, stakeholder thinking was most often adopted as a
proxy for ethical managerial decision making and corporate conscience.
To be sure, the Principle of Moral Projection is a conjecture, but it is an intelligent conjecture. There is significant precedent for such a conjecture in the history of
philosophy under the heading of “analogical predication” (Ashworth 2017).
In the work of theologian and philosopher Thomas Aquinas, for example, “analogical predication” was contrasted with “univocal predication” and “equivocal
predication” of the same term of two different objects2:
1. Socrates and Plato are both human (univocal). The word “human” in this context
is used with the very same meaning when predicated of the two philosophers.
2. This duck has a bill and the president vetoed a bill (equivocal). The word “bill”
in these contexts is used with two completely different meanings.
3. Mary Smith is a responsible person and Lincoln Electric Company is a responsible organization (analogical). The word “responsible” in these contexts is
used with quite similar—but not identical—meanings. It is predicated
analogically.
In the context of Plato’s Republic, the central normative ethical quarry—justice;
virtue—are predicated analogically of the republic (an organized city-state with an
estimated population at the time of 120,000) and of the soul of an individual person.
It is the inner dynamics of conscience in each of these differently scaled entities that
carry the similarity, making the analogy meaningful. We can thus learn about ourselves from institutions and (I have argued) about institutions from ourselves.

3.2.2 Exploring the Analogy
In my book Conscience and Corporate Culture, I described the “moral agenda of
corporate leadership” in terms of three broad imperatives:
There are three “practical imperatives” that anchor the moral agenda of leadership: orienting, institutionalizing and sustaining shared values. The first two involve placing moral
considerations in a position of salience and authority alongside considerations of profitability and competitive strategy in the corporate mindset. The third imperative (sustenance)
has to do with passing on the spirit of this effort in two directions: to future leaders of the
organization and to the wider network of organizations and institutions that make up the
social system as a whole. (Goodpaster 2007)

Aquinas was primarily interested in predications of human-like qualities of God, or God-like
qualities of humans, in order to be able to say that, e.g., “goodness” and “wisdom” were not identical (univocal) when applied to both, but neither were they completely equivocal. They were somewhat similar, analogical, in their application to humans and to God, thus permitting some degree
of human knowledge of God.
2
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In that book, I elaborated further as I described the three ensuing chapters:
In Chapter 5, I will focus on the meaning and practical implications of orienting the ethical
values in a corporate culture. I will illustrate this process with several case studies as well
as a commentary on current employee survey practices in one large company that I have
come to know well.
In Chapter 6, the focus will shift to institutionalizing the shared values that have been
identified by the organization in the process of orientation.
Finally, in Chapter 7, I will address an often-overlooked imperative—sustaining the
shared ethical values that have been identified (Chapter 5) and institutionalized (Chapter
6). This last imperative falls as much to the board of directors as to the senior leadership of
the organization, making it a governance issue. (Goodpaster 2007))

The three imperatives for corporate leadership (and the implementation of corporate
conscience) echo the elements of personal conscience: (a) embracing the moral
point of view—achieving clarity about one’s core values/convictions (about my
own and others’ interests, rights, duties, and virtues); (b) discovering ways to make
my commitment to the moral point of view a practical part of my everyday behavior; (c) developing habits (virtues) that will allow me to sustain the moral point of
view (to minimize the likelihood of “forgetting”) in my life.

3.2.3 The Institutional Insight
Hugh Heclo, a professor of government and public affairs at George Mason
University, in his book On Thinking Institutionally (2008), offered a rich interpretation of institutions and institutional thinking that bears on the subject at hand.
In Heclo’s words, “Amid the perpetual perishing that marks our individual existences, institutions are weathered presences” (p. 127). The essence of an institution,
according to Heclo, is that it provides a way to achieve a measure of permanence
and continuity for what we value, despite our mortality. Institutions represent our
legacies to future generations and our inheritances from past generations of structures for carrying on important values that we hope to see survive beyond our lifetimes. Here are just some examples:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

the nuclear family
the church or synagogue or mosque
schools (K-12)
colleges and universities
governments (local, state, national)
guardians local (police); national (armed forces)
business organizations (for food, transportation, commerce of many kinds)
healthcare organizations (hospitals, clinics, medical schools, Red Cross, etc.)
organized communication (media, entertainment, newspapers, etc.)
voluntary associations of many kinds across our country
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As we think about the institution of business and the numerous organizations, large
and small, that it includes, using Heclo’s perspective, each organization has its presenting purpose or mission—its reason for being as a specific business. Yet at the
same time, each organization is part of the institution of business itself, which has a
social purpose: to produce goods that are truly good and services that truly serve.3
The institutional insight is the realization that one’s own institution—like all
institutions—is part of a larger enterprise of forwarding the wellbeing of humankind. This means a vision and a concurrent peripheral vision about purposes on the
part of leadership.
• General Motors focuses on building cars and trucks but as part of the human
need for transportation;
• Procter & Gamble focuses on household goods but as part of the need for family
flourishing;
• General Mills focuses on cereals and other foods, but as part of the human need
for healthy nourishment.
An impediment to the institutional insight is a kind of fixation on the foreground
and its inevitable competitiveness that I have referred to as teleopathy, the unbalanced pursuit of purpose in individuals and institutions.4 The U.S. Department of
Defense has identified a similar hazard in the training of fighter pilots:
Channelized Attention is a factor when the individual [read: institution] is focusing all conscious attention on a limited number of environmental cues to the exclusion of others of a
subjectively equal or higher or more immediate priority, leading to an unsafe situation. May
be described as a tight focus of attention that leads to the exclusion of comprehensive situational information.5 (“Executive Summary” 2006)

It is worth mentioning that because of channelized attention, combat pilots now
draw upon and provide mutual support to one another, as missions are always flown
with at least two aircraft in formation. The lead pilot must always have a “wingman”6
to help avoid the fixation that can occur.
The Principle of Moral Projection, in my view, gives permission and ethical fittingness to applying moral predicates to organizational or institutional agents. In
Gewirth’s terms, it expands the domain of moral accountability beyond individuals.
But the institutional insight does more than “give permission” or “affirm fittingness.” It requires that organizational leadership embrace not only the presenting

See Appendix 2c. Also see Donaldson & Walsh (2015).
The principal symptoms of teleopathy are fixation, rationalization, and detachment. Avoiding
teleopathy as an occupational hazard of business life is no small challenge. See Chap. 1 in
Goodpaster’s Conscience and Corporate Culture (2007) as well as the teleopathy entry in the
Encyclopedia of Management (1997).
5
Emphasis added.
6
Or since 1991, “wingmate” when women entered the air combat forces.
3
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purposes of their organizations but also their contextual or institutional purposes (as
they relate to human dignity and the common good).7

3.2.4 Moral Considerability
So far, I have drawn attention only to the left side of Gewirth’s diagram of his agent-
recipient view of the central idea of ethics. I have argued that the domain of moral
accountability can—indeed must—include corporate or institutional entities by
analogy with individual persons. It is natural at this point to ask further: if corporations (or organizations more generally) can be held responsible as moral actors, can
their own “freedom and well-being” be abridged as moral recipients? Can corporations sometimes be victims of moral actors? The answer to this question appears to
be “Yes.” Consider this observation in the award-winning history Corporate
Responsibility: The American Experience (2012):
The US Supreme Court in 1886 (Santa Clara Cnty v. S. Pac. R.R. Co.) decided that “joint-
stock companies, chartered organizations, and corporations had the same rights, or at least
the same legal rights, as individuals under the Fourteenth Amendment—rights to due process, property ownership, and equal protection—a claim that has been upheld ever since
1886. Later, in 1889 the Supreme Court ruled that a corporation was a legal person.
Corporations could not vote or hold office, but a century later, in First National Bank of
Boston v. Bellotti (1978) the Court ruled that corporations have rights to free speech. (p. 43)

It seems clear—to use Gewirth’s language—that there is precedent for the attribution not only of responsibilities to corporations as moral actors, but also for the
attribution of rights to corporations as moral recipients.
There are, of course, many other questions that could be raised about possible
occupants of the range of moral considerability (see the right side of Fig. 3.2)
besides organizations or corporations, such as sentient beings generally, living
things generally, and even entire ecosystems. I have explored this topic in my article
“On Being Morally Considerable” (1978)8 but I must leave it here as a theme in the
field of environmental ethics.

Peter Drucker seems to have puzzled over the institutional insight when he wrote: “We have to
think through how to balance two apparently contradictory requirements. Organizations must competently perform the one social function for the sake of which they exist—the school to teach, the
hospital to cure the sick, and the business to produce goods, services, or the capital to provide for
the risks of the future. They can do so only if they single-mindedly concentrate on their specialized
mission. But there is also society’s need for these organizations to take social responsibility—to
work on the problems and challenges of the community” (1994).
8
See also three other articles that I wrote on this general theme: Goodpaster 1979, 1990, 1993.
7
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3.2.5 Individual and Corporate Responsibility Simultaneously?
As I mentioned above, business leaders need to orient, institutionalize, and sustain
the ethical values of their organizations (Goodpaster 2007). To follow these imperatives, especially the third one (sustain) they need to accomplish two important tasks:
(1) passing on the ethical values of the organization to the next generation of
employees and company leadership, and (2) protecting the ethical values of the
company in its economic and social environment.
The former task, when it is directed toward organizational members and subgroups,
includes such activities as hiring and recruitment, management selection and development,
executive succession, board oversight, and (in the case of large corporations) acquisition
and divestiture of business units. The latter task includes corporate communication,
business-government relations, and company participation in its various communities, local
and global. (Goodpaster 2007, p. 195)

This dynamic reality on the part of business leadership takes place concurrently
with individual employees and managers making daily ethical decisions (responsible or irresponsible) influenced by the (internal) culture of the corporation. Similarly,
the leadership agenda is pursued concurrently with (external) cultural influences
from the company’s socio-economic and political environment.
As I see it, the phenomenon of institutional responsibility travels through time,
providing a context for individual responsibility while living within a larger socio-
economic and political system that influences it from the outside (Fig. 3.3).
I should add that this way of thinking about moral responsibility, as “interdependent” among the several levels of application (in the domain of accountability and
the range of considerability) goes a long way toward resolving conundrums about
“corporate responsibility” versus “individual responsibility.” It helps us to see how
several levels of responsibility can be acknowledged at once—how there can be an
“and” where some were convinced there could only be an “or.”
Consider this illustration: John kills William on a street corner in an urban neighborhood. The initial appearance of John killing William is a straightforward case of

SOCIO-ECONOMIC
SYSTEMS
INSTITUTIONS
(e.g. corporations)
INDIVIDUAL PERSONS
time
Fig. 3.3 Dynamic and inter-related responsibilities over time
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personal responsibility on John’s part and personal victimhood on William’s part.
But the more we learn about the context surrounding this killing, the more we may
see the backgrounds of the two parties (gang loyalties) and their cultural surroundings (drug wars and territorial power struggles), and the more we can appreciate the
complexity of the ethical situation. Yes, this is about a murder of one individual by
another—personal responsibility—but it is about more than that. It is also about a
clash of groups and of social forces beyond those groups.
This suggests that moral agency can involve multi-dimensional or multi-level
subjects (and of course multi-dimensional or multi-level recipients as well in the
range of moral considerability). Just as individual persons can be the recipients of
moral agents in the domain of moral accountability, institutional entities can be
recipients as well—can be harmed, coerced, or even destroyed—along with the
individual persons that populate them.9
It is as if transactions in “moral space” carry with them multiple levels of causality and therefore multiple levels of responsibility—none of which negate the others,
but each of which enhances our understanding of the others as we seek solutions and
change for the future. In fact, seldom do we find a moral “transaction” between an
agent and a recipient (involving the recipient’s freedom or well-being) that does not
have an accompanying contextual, multi-level narrative.
Wisdom in the field of business or institutional ethics, then, often consists in
appreciating the contextual factors that accompany moral transactions, influencing
the agents and recipients, be they individual persons or institutions or even entire
social systems. This offers us a more robust understanding of the dynamics of
“moral space,”10 and it may offer us a more reflective way to develop public sector
responses to problems that “present” on one level but are multi-level in their
true nature.

Whether corporations are artificial entities or merely associations of individuals has been debated
since Santa Clara (1886), and it makes a difference in thinking about whether and in what ways
corporations are responsible. U.S. law treats corporations as legal persons and tends to hold corporations themselves, and not merely the managers and employees who make up the corporation,
accountable. In fact, we refer to companies as if they are individual entities, and we speak of corporate responsibility as if it applied to a single entity, even though we cannot actually shake hands
with companies or lock them up. If corporations are legal persons, and thus artificial entities, this
makes sense. In practice it is often difficult to disaggregate responsibility to individuals in a large
firm (Carroll et al. 2012, pp. 43–44).
10
In 1984, I found language to help articulate the multi-level interdependence of moral responsibility in a newly developing branch of mathematics called fractal geometry. The developer of fractal
geometry was a man named Benoit Mandelbrot and he happened to be at Harvard in the 1980s
when I was also at the Harvard Business School, so we were able to meet and discuss the possible
application of his ideas to the field of business ethics. The insights that I took away from my study
of fractal geometry and my discussion with Mandelbrot led to the article in Appendix 2a of
this book.
9
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3.2.6 Two Varieties of Institutional Insight
There are two ways in which the institutional insight can manifest itself in the thinking of business leaders, and both relate to the common good. First, and most obviously, in the context of moral recipients, i.e., those affected by business decision
making. The usual stakeholders whose freedom or well-being are under scrutiny
include individuals, organized groups (e.g., labor unions), and occasionally whole
societies (e.g., the water supply of a nation or the global climate). Recipients are
those whose freedom or well-being deserve consideration. I have referred to limiting stakeholder thinking because of a too-narrow field of ethical awareness as “teleopathy” or “channelized attention.”
Two such “narrowings of ethical attention” involve (a) consideration for non-
human beings, and (b) consideration for institutions or corporations themselves.
(a) I have used the phrase “moral consideration” (or the phrase “moral considerability”) deliberately to signal a level of moral awareness and concern that may
or may not rise to the level of attributing moral rights to the recipient in question
(Goodpaster 1978). Debates about animal rights can be spirited, but we need
not take a position in those debates to accord to non-human living creatures
some level of moral consideration. It seems clear to most of us that animals are
part of the ecosystem that we inhabit and that we have certain stewardship
responsibilities toward them. Stakeholder thinking as it is conventionally
deployed, especially in business ethics, often excludes animals as a category
deserving consideration alongside employees, consumers, suppliers, and shareholders. But while it is frequently true that considerations about animal rights
and ecological awareness can enter into stakeholder thinking as concern for
future generations, it is not obvious that all of our stewardship responsibilities
can be translated in this way.
(b) Another context in which moral considerability can be overlooked by stakeholder thinking relates to our conduct toward corporations themselves. Much of
business ethics, appropriately, attends to the responsibilities of corporations
toward those parties affected by corporate decision making. But corporations
themselves are often affected parties (stakeholders, moral recipients), for example, in legal and judicial contexts as well as contexts like boycotts or labor
strikes involving public displays of disapproval.11
The point to be made here in connection with moral recipients is not that corporations are identical in all respects with human beings as bearers of rights. There is
much room for debate over the moral “personhood” of organizations. What is
During the past several years, the moral and legal consideration due to business organizations
(and in some cases labor organizations) has come under direct scrutiny by the U.S. Supreme Court.
Two cases that stand out, of course, are the Citizens United case, in which First Amendment rights
of free expression were affirmed in relation to political campaign contributions and the Hobby
Lobby case in which the company’s religious liberty was affirmed in its objection to abortifacient
coverage of employees under the Affordable Care Act.
11
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reasonable, however, is that stakeholder thinking needs to accord moral consideration to organizations, just as it needs to accord moral consideration to non-human
living creatures.
The second way the institutional insight can manifest itself in the thinking of
business leaders in relation to the common good has to do with collaboration or
partnership with institutions from other sectors (political, moral-cultural). This kind
of institutional thinking relates to the corporation as a moral agent. Occasionally,
business leaders will insist that their organizations cannot (and so should not) see
themselves as responsible for achieving objectives that are “beyond their spans of
control.” A long-defended maxim in moral philosophy is that “ought” implies “can.”
However, environmental preservation, public health, minimization of poverty, a culture of respect for life and liberty—these are aspirations for which no institution in
any single sector (economic, political, civic) can be asked to take full responsibility.
Achieving these aspirations would require the collaboration of institutions across
sectors, but does this mean that business organizations have no responsibility at all
in such situations? I think not. I have suggested that this means that they have partial responsibility (contingent responsibility) but not complete responsibility for the
result. Business is responsible to the common good but not completely for it. Peter
Drucker once observed:
We have to think through how to balance two apparently contradictory requirements.
Organizations must competently perform the one social function for the sake of which they
exist—the school to teach, the hospital to cure the sick, and the business to produce goods,
services, or the capital to provide for the risks of the future. They can do so only if they
single-mindedly concentrate on their specialized mission. But there is also society’s need
for these organizations to take social responsibility—to work on the problems and challenges of the community. (Drucker 1994)

Sometimes business leaders can overlook business responsibilities for collaborative
action—at least when institutions in other sectors are willing to collaborate.
Businesses must do their part in support of the common good—both as collaborators and as agents acting directly within their spans of control.12 They must develop
a kind of “peripheral moral vision” and a willingness to work with other institutions
to achieve what can only be accomplished together. In the words of Marvin Brown,
but with application beyond public sector institutions to include families, churches,
schools, and NGOs:
[T]he conversations between corporations and government agencies can develop new possibilities for the enhancement of human flourishing in civic life. Corporations cannot facilitate the flourishing by themselves. They need public corporations and government agencies,
just as public corporations and government agencies need them. For these conversations to
have integrity, each participant needs to cooperate with the other, guided by the mission of
the city and the dynamics of civic life.13 (Brown 2005, p. 159)

In 1991 and again in 2003, the U.S. Congress recognized the moral agency of corporations in its
passage and revision of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations (FSGO).
13
Emphasis added.
12
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Fig. 3.4 Two varieties of institutional insight (CSR Corporate Social Responsibility)

In summary, the grammar of stakeholders can be liberating, but it can also blind
companies by shaping their ethical awareness in advance and inhibiting moral
imagination—an imagination that sees more deeply the opportunities among social
sectors (agency) and between companies and their stakeholders (fiduciary obligations and non-fiduciary obligations).
In the present context, the “neighbor” can be either a collaborating moral agent
or an overlooked moral recipient.14 Figure 3.4 depicts the two possible manifestations (arrows) of the institutional insight in the thinking of business leaders.

3.3 Leadership and the Institutional Insight
Let me gather up the several strands of reflection in this chapter surrounding the
Principle of Moral Projection and the institutional insight. The Principle of Moral
Projection represents an important analogical application of personal moral attributes to organizational actors (and even to entire socio-economic systems to the
extent that they are “managed” in relation to neighboring systems). The implication
is that the field of business ethics, in addition to including descriptive, normative,
and analytical types of ethical inquiry, also allows for the exploration of these forms
of inquiry on multiple levels of moral agency and moral recipiency. The resulting
3x3 “moral space” helps clarify the kinds of questions that research and teaching in
the field take: corporate normative obligations, individual descriptive ethical convictions, systemic assumptions about objectivity in ethics, etc.

As we saw in Chap. 2, Royce’s moral insight (the “realization of one’s neighbor”) implies that
conscience does not discriminate in its answer to the question “Who is my neighbor?” It is inclusive rather than marginalizing—and avoids seeing neighbors as “foreign powers.”

14
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Moreover, this view of “moral space” in the field of business or organizational
ethics also allows (even encourages) us to look closely at relationships among and
between levels, e.g., corporate responsibility and individual responsibility. We may
discover that both corporate and individual responsibility are not mutually exclusive
in most cases—and that often a full appreciation of the ethical dynamics of a situation on one level may call for a contextual appreciation of the situation on several levels.
All this being said, the institutional insight takes the Principle of Moral Projection
a step beyond an analogical attribution from persons to organizations. It offers a
straightforward rationale for the normative expectations that we have of the modern
institution of business within the economic sector (in contrast to the moral-cultural
and political sectors) described by Michael Novak. The central insight here is that
business leaders need to cultivate a dual awareness or dual vision—in the foreground, toward the needs of the specific business at hand (e.g., automobiles, household goods, nutritious foods), and in the background, toward the wellbeing of
humankind, i.e., the common good.15
In the next chapter, I expand on the meaning of human well-being and the common good under the title “The Common Good and the Anthropological Insight.”
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Chapter 4

The Common Good
and the Anthropological Insight

Abstract In this chapter, I take up the insufficiency of the stockholder-stakeholder
debate characteristic of business ethics in its earlier years. I argue that this debate rarely
goes deeply enough: to a more comprehensive picture of the human person, a more
robust account of the good. This is not optional—if such a more robust account of the
good is not made explicit in a normative view of ethics, it inevitably enters beneath the
surface, without being made explicit. The sources for more comprehensive accounts of
the human person lie in moral traditions that we have inherited, faith traditions, or
more secular rational frameworks. This realization, that a satisfactory account of
applied normative ethics calls for an anthropology—a substantive view of the good for
the human person and the common good of the human community—I call the anthropological insight. Without this insight, appeals to the interests of shareholders or stakeholders have very little content. Before concluding, this chapter explores two important
topics: (a) the nature of the common good, and (b) the relevance of “mediating institutions.” Under (a), I discuss the aspiration of “integral human development” emphasized in several faith-based traditions. It maintains that if we focus on the good of the
whole person, body and soul, including the reaching out for relationships that whole
persons need for their flourishing, the good of all (the common good) can be achieved.
Under (b), I argue that the common good requires mediating institutions between the
individual and society at large: the family, churches, schools, voluntary organizations,
businesses, and local governments. These institutions foster and reinforce the social
motivations that are essential to the pursuit of the common good. This chapter is an
organic part of a larger work about the overall contribution of Kenneth Goodpaster to
the field of applied ethics and is best read in the context of that larger work.

4.1 From the Corporation to the Common Good
I described in Chap. 2, under the theme of conscience, Royce’s moral insight as one
of the key sources of influence on my teaching and research. In Chap. 3, under the
theme of corporations, I offered the institutional insight as another key source of
influence on my teaching and research. Now in Chap. 4, under the theme of the
© The Author(s) 2022
K. E. Goodpaster, Times of Insight: Conscience, Corporations, and the Common
Good, Issues in Business Ethics 54, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-09712-6_4
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Fig. 4.1 From the corporation to the common good

common good,1 I will offer another insight, which I will call the anthropological
insight as a third source of influence (Fig. 4.1).

4.2 The Anthropological Insight
4.2.1 Stockholders, Stakeholders, and What Lies Beneath
For many years, the normative core of business ethics seemed to revolve around the
“stockholder-stakeholder” dichotomy. That is, did the fiduciary obligations of management to shareholders (in the case of publicly traded companies) shape and limit
management’s moral agenda—or were there other obligations to so-called “stakeholders” (groups whose dignity and well-being was affected by management decisions) that needed to be factored in as equally binding?
As I reflected on this polarization, I was struck by the following passage written
by Pope John Paul II in his 1991 encyclical letter Centesimus Annus:
A given culture reveals its overall understanding of life through the choices it makes in
production and consumption. It is here that the phenomenon of consumerism arises. In singling out new needs and new means to meet them, one must be guided by a comprehensive

Hereinafter, when I use the phrase “common good,” I mean to include what I have sometimes
referred to in my written work as a compound phrase “human dignity and the common good.” The
importance of human dignity in our understanding of the common good cannot be overstated,
especially in the Catholic social tradition, since each person is seen as created “imago Dei”—in the
image of God. Thus, the common good in this tradition can never trade off the dignity of individual
persons in the face of the “good” of the community as a whole. Rights-based thinking enters here
to temper the utilitarian maximization impulse.

1
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picture of man which respects all the dimensions of his being and which subordinates his
material and instinctive dimensions to his interior and spiritual ones.2

The passage continues:
Of itself, an economic system does not possess criteria for correctly distinguishing new and
higher forms of satisfying human needs from artificial new needs which hinder the formation of a mature personality. Thus a great deal of educational and cultural work is urgently
needed, including the education of consumers in the responsible use of their power of
choice, the formation of a strong sense of responsibility among producers and among people in the mass media in particular, as well as the necessary intervention by public
authorities.3

This was something of a “Eureka!” moment for me in the sense that these passages
conveyed an insight that went deeper, beyond the framework of the conventional
debate—what I will call the anthropological insight. It is the insight that an economic system/sector is of itself morally neutral when it comes to the consumer and
producer choices that drive it, i.e., supply and demand. Thus, if we are to elicit
normative guidance from an economic system/sector, we must bring to it an anthropology, “a comprehensive picture of man,” rooted in a faith-based or reason-based
“moral tradition,” and not simply settle for satisfying preferences while embracing
moral relativism.
The anthropological insight is the realization that a satisfactory normative
account of business (or organizational) ethics requires a comprehensive view of the
good for the human person and ultimately of the common good for the human community, an anthropology, without which appeals to the interests of shareholders or
stakeholders have no content.
What was problematic about the stockholder/stakeholder debate was that it
seemed blind to the ethical neutrality of its appeal to the “interests” of the parties
affected (see Goodpaster 2010). It was a debate that was bypassing the hard work of
identifying and affirming a “comprehensive picture of man which respects all the
dimensions of his being.” This fact, in my view, ultimately prevented normative
business ethics—whether of the stockholder or the stakeholder variety—from delivering on a substantive account of personal and institutional responsibility.
Ah, but could such an account be offered in a pluralistic society in which consensus on a “comprehensive picture of man” might seem impossible (see Goodpaster
2018; Goodpaster and Naughton 2021)? Let us consider this question.
Emphasis added. John Paul II then continues: “If, on the contrary, a direct appeal is made to his
instincts—while ignoring in various ways the reality of the person as intelligent and free—then
consumer attitudes and life-styles can be created which are objectively improper and often damaging to his physical and spiritual health.”
3
Some examples then follow: “A striking example of artificial consumption contrary to the health
and dignity of the human person, and certainly not easy to control, is the use of drugs. Widespread
drug use is a sign of a serious malfunction in the social system; it also implies a materialistic and,
in a certain sense, destructive ‘reading’ of human needs. In this way the innovative capacity of a
free economy is brought to a one-sided and inadequate conclusion. Drugs, as well as pornography
and other forms of consumerism which exploit the frailty of the weak, tend to fill the resulting
spiritual void.”
2
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The usual explanation for a “thin” theory of the good in discussions of ethical
obligations, i.e., a preference-based approach to stockholder and stakeholder concerns, has been that any attempt to go beyond such an approach would land us in an
impossibly anarchic competition for a winning “thick” theory of the good. In other
words, preference-based relativism avoids having to dogmatically assert a unified
objectivism about the good for the human person or “human flourishing” with
which not everyone would agree. But this explanation (excuse?) seems to assume
that one can come to normative conclusions using stockholder or stakeholder reasoning without affirming a view of “human flourishing”—either overtly or covertly.
Arriving at practical conclusions in ethics calls for at least a provisional objectivism about human flourishing or else normative judgments become vacuous. I am
reminded here of a comment by Oxford philosopher Mary Midgley:
The power of moral judgement is, in fact, not a luxury, not a perverse indulgence of the
self-righteous. It is a necessity. When we judge something to be bad or good, better or
worse than something else, we are taking it as an example to aim at or avoid. Without opinions of this sort, we would have no framework of comparison for our own policy, no chance
of profiting by other people’s insights or mistakes. In this vacuum, we could form no judgments on our own actions.4 (Midgley 1981)

Midgley was saying that we inevitably put ourselves on the line about what is objectively worth aiming at or avoiding when we make moral judgments. We may be
persuaded to change our minds, but we provisionally are taking a stand on human
rightness or wrongness, goodness or badness.

4.2.2 A Conundrum and the Anthropological Insight
Another way of looking at this set of circumstances is that we face a philosophical
conundrum. Either:
(a) Stockholder and stakeholder accounts of business ethics would need to remain
“thin” and relativistic (because they are preference-based) and potentially committed to highly implausible decisions based on stockholder and stakeholder
preferences that could be extreme (Goodpaster 2010), or
(b) Stockholder and stakeholder accounts of business ethics—if they were to arrive
at substantive conclusions—would have to supply and acknowledge a “picture
of man” or “human flourishing” according to some moral tradition (theological
or philosophical).5
Emphasis added.
Let me offer an illustration of how an implicit “picture of man” can figure in a business ethics
case. Consider a successful video game company that has designed and marketed simulations of
extremely violent (and at times sexually aggressive) protagonists controlled by the game player.
When parents or state regulators raise objections to these game simulations, the company defends
itself under First Amendment free speech protections, despite some evidence of negative social
effects on young people. The “picture of man” in the background on the part of the company
4
5
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The thought here is that, one way or another, decision makers must bring to their
decision making an implicit “picture of man” or “moral tradition” whether they
acknowledge it or not; otherwise, they could not reach practical conclusions about
right and wrong (and ultimately, the common good). If we want a comprehensive
ethics for business (or other) organizations, taking a stand on “human flourishing”
or a “picture of man” is not optional: it comes with the territory.
The nature of the debate in normative business ethics, then, changes when we
understand that relativism lands us in a difficult place—and that most thoughtful
decision makers know this instinctively.6 So, they avoid that difficult place most
often by adopting and bringing to their arguments about right and wrong an implicit
“picture of man” that they wager others will find acceptable, at least in the context
of the decision at hand.7

4.2.3 Sources of Moral Traditions: Faith and Reason
When I introduced the idea of the anthropological insight above, I alluded to John
Paul II’s phrase “a comprehensive picture of man” and suggested that such a picture
was rooted in a faith-based or reason-based “moral tradition.” Moral traditions are
perhaps not often referred to in everyday life by decision makers in the economic
appears to be that wants and desires measured by market choices should be overriding, at least if
the younger customers have reached a certain age. Other factors about the good for humans, such
as avoiding habits that could desensitize a person by simulating violent behavior, appear not to
have sufficient weight in the company’s moral mindset. Dialogue between the company, parents,
law enforcement, and social psychologists might lead to a change in the company’s weighting of
this factor and should be encouraged—in this author’s opinion—as a step toward the common
good. There are many other illustrations that are analogous to this one, including social problems
with increased obesity, escalating consumer debt, and too few effective business initiatives in
developing countries.
6
It is worth mentioning here that there is an important difference between relativism and pluralism
in discussions of the good or human flourishing. Relativism is the view that the good varies with
the wants, desires, or preferences of an individual or a group. “That may be good-for-you, but it is
not good-for-me,” or “Pro-choice people have one view on abortion and pro-life people have
another. No group is righter than the other.” Pluralism, on the other hand, is not a relativistic view,
but is simply the view that there is not one single ethical value or principle that acts as the “umpire”
for all other ethical values or principles. There may be more than one, thus allowing for potential
conflicting values or principles in certain concrete situations requiring our decisions. As philosopher W.D. Ross might put it, each value or principle may give us a prima facie ethical duty, but our
actual ethical duty is an objective matter, even if it cannot be discerned except in the situation
at hand.
7
Note that the anthropological insight is not a claim that this or that specific picture of man (or
“moral tradition”) is the right one, but that some specific picture of man must be brought to bear if
a normative (action-guiding) account of an institution’s ethics is to be comprehensive. Clearly,
Pope John Paul II embraces a picture of humankind in which spiritual goods are superordinate to
material goods, wants, and instincts. A Marxist secular materialism would offer a very different
picture of humankind and, thus, of the common good.
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sector, even though, as I have argued, they are implicitly invoked even when they are
not explicitly invoked in ethical discourse.
To be sure, the encyclical letter Centesimus Annus is addressed not just to
Catholics, but “to all men and women of good will.” Nevertheless, it represents a
Christian faith-based reflection on capitalism—its strengths and weaknesses—
throughout the twentieth century. And it is rooted in centuries of Catholic social
teaching about human dignity and the common good. John Stuart Mill’s account of
utilitarianism offers a more philosophical account of ethical decision making, typically popularized by the imperative “Seek the greatest good of the greatest number.”
Mill’s view of the good was more sophisticated than his mentor Bentham’s hedonistic view, for he appears to have held that there are qualitative differences among
goods, not just quantitative differences and that these qualitative differences could
be arranged in a hierarchy that is not relativistic.
More recently, as indicated in Chap. 2, the work of social psychologist Jonathan
Haidt (2013) has received much attention as a kind of meta-reflection on the moral
traditions that anthropology brings to our attention. Haidt espouses a “moral foundations theory” in social psychology, identifying five or six innate human patterns
of processing moral decisions over many millennia.8 Haidt attributes a kind of normative force to this pluralistic set of moral traditions (see footnote 6 above), suggesting that consciences that exclude one or more of the considerations represented
in his framework will be unbalanced and will need eventually to “right the ship.”
The general point in this discussion is that there are multiple “moral traditions”
that spring from two main sources, faith and reason, and that despite the contemporary popularity of more relativistic “postmodern” views, the majority of leaders and
corporate employees in the economic sector identify with moral traditions of the
more traditional kind, based either in faith or reason.

4.2.4 The Common Good as Integral Human Development
Returning now to the Catholic tradition, since that is my tradition, there is an account
of the common good emphasized in the twentieth century that deserves to be highlighted and offered to other moral traditions as a model. The assumption in the utilitarian tradition is that the good of all cannot typically be achieved, so the idea of
maximization must be introduced as a kind of consolation prize: the “greatest good
of the greatest number.”
The faith-based response to this has been that if we truly focus on the good of the
whole person, including the reaching out for relationships that whole persons need
for their flourishing, the achievement of the good of all can be achieved. This conception of the common good is called Integral Human Development: the Good of
the Whole Person and of All Persons (see Fig. 4.2). In the words of Pope Benedict
E.g., care/harm, fairness/cheating, loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, and sanctity/degradation. Later in his book, Haidt adds a sixth foundation, liberty/oppression, that operates in some
tension with the authority/subversion foundation (pp. 200–211).
8
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Fig. 4.2 The
common good

XVI (2009): “The truth of development consists in its completeness: if it does not
involve the whole man and every man, it is not true development.”
The intuitive key to this mindset is that the human community is not simply an
unconnected group of human beings, each with a separate utility function unrelated
to the utility functions of his/her neighbors. Rather, the human community is a family with a shared father:
As society becomes ever more globalized, it makes us neighbors but does not make us
brothers. Reason, by itself, is capable of grasping the equality between men and of giving
stability to their civic coexistence, but it cannot establish fraternity. This originates in a
transcendent vocation from God the Father, who loved us first, teaching us through the Son
what fraternal charity is. (Benedict XVI 2009, §19)

This conception of the common good insists on “the dignity of each person and the
dignity of the human community without compromise or trade-off” (Goodpaster and
Naughton 2021). This may seem impossible in a fallen world—which is why utilitarian maximization becomes attractive—but it should be the fundamental hope of
every leader.
In the final analysis, the pursuit of “goods that are truly good and services that
truly serve” can, in a faith-based framework, contribute both to the good of each
whole person and to the good of all persons without impossible trade-offs. As philosopher Kevin Kinghorn puts it:
To avoid irresolvable dilemmas where I promote one person’s welfare only at the expense
of another person’s welfare, we will . . . need to suppose that our world is arranged in such
a way that all people’s interests coincide . . . [but] the Christian idea of heaven supposes that
there can be—and indeed is—the kind of coordination of people’s interests such that everyone experiences ultimate flourishing. (Kinghorn 2016, p. 199)

Kinghorn sees in his moral tradition a solution to the challenge of the common
good—the good of the whole person and of all persons:
If the world really is coordinated so that all people’s ultimate welfare can coincide, then our
earlier examples need not lead to irresolvable difficulties. Let us suppose that our third party
knows that all people’s ultimate welfare can coincide in our world—most straightforwardly,
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knows this in virtue of having created our world. Indeed, let us go ahead and specify that
this third party is God. (Kinghorn 2016, p. 200)

4.2.5 Mediating Institutions
Up to this point, I have approached the common good as if it were a dynamic relationship between individuals and the wider society (see Fig. 4.2 above). But this
perspective overlooks what many have called the “mediating institutions” between
the individual and the wider society: the family, the school, the church, voluntary
organizations (hospitals, community centers, etc.), law enforcement organizations,
local, state, and national governments (see Fig. 4.3 below). Not only does each of
these mediating institutions have its own “common good,” each mediating institution offers a laboratory for its participants to learn the skills and virtues needed to
temper self-interest for the sake of the wider (but limited) groups.
Mediating institutions foster and reinforce the social motivations that are essential to the pursuit of the common good. From one point of view, mediating institutions disperse a society’s institutional power across multiple centers, limiting the
power of government as the overarching institution in people’s lives (Fort 1999).
From another point of view, however, mediating institutions, because of their typically smaller scale, can serve as “learning laboratories” for the character traits
needed in the pursuit of human dignity and the common good.9

Fig. 4.3 Mediating
Institutions

Timothy Fort writes: “[T]he multiplicity of mediating institutions insures that no particular
groups gain oppressive power.” Fort observes further that mediating institutions help us to cultivate
and grow moral awareness: “[N]otions of transcendence, expressed in traditional religions or others, must operate through some kind of specific community whereby particular individuals are
socialized to understand that there is something to which they are accountable and something with
which they are interdependent. The learning laboratories for this lesson are mediating institutions” (Fort 1999). Emphasis added.
9
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4.3 Summary and Transition to Chap. 5
In this chapter, I have argued that stockholder and stakeholder thinking may be
necessary to normative business ethics but they are insufficient. The insufficiency
calls for something deeper and wider if we are to identify “goods that are truly good
and services that truly serve” (Goodpaster 2012). The moral agenda of management
calls for a more comprehensive kind of thinking—an anthropological insight—
based on human dignity as part of the common good. Normative ethics, in order to
be truly normative (and non-relativistic), must explore more robust “theories of the
right and the good” than have been offered in the late twentieth century (Goodpaster
2010; Brenkert and Beauchamp 2009; Goodpaster 2012; Goodpaster 2017 [reprinted
as Appendix 2c of this book]). The span of management concern dominated the
original debate, but the content of the interests of affected parties was seldom
addressed.10
All of this takes us to a new level of ethical inquiry in applied ethics, a level at
which the debate about stockholders and stakeholders is merely a gateway to the
hard work of normative business ethics. If the common good is not to be an empty
phrase designating whatever people want it to designate (as long as it stays vague),
then we must think more deeply about human dignity and well-being. The common
good is the good for the whole person and for all persons, simultaneously.
In the last section of this chapter, however, I described an idea elaborated by
Professor Timothy Fort and originally observed by Alexis d’Tocqueville: the idea of
educating the human heart in the direction of the common good, using mediating
institutions. This idea offers us a natural bridge to our fifth chapter: Business Ethics
Education and the Socratic Insight.
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Chapter 5

Business Ethics Education and the Socratic
Insight

Abstract This chapter shifts from “an adequate normative account of applied ethics” to the moral formation of the next generation of business leaders. In other
words, this chapter concentrates on the critical role played by pedagogy in the field
of business ethics. I begin by sharing my experience as a professional philosopher
being mentored into a radically new kind of teaching: the case method. One of the
principal motivations behind the use of this method is described in an eloquent
article entitled: because wisdom can’t be told. I learned that the art of questioning
was central to the case method, especially to teaching ethics by the case method.
Re-enter Socrates, who was the master of the art of questioning. And enter too a
fourth insight in my business ethics career. I call it the Socratic insight because it
springs from the instructor’s realization of his or her calling to participate in the
moral formation of those with whom he or she is in dialogue. It is the manifestation
in the classroom of Royce’s moral insight: the realization of the other (student,
employee, executive) as one whose moral awareness can be elicited through respectful dialogue. I complete this chapter by providing a guide to the viewpoints through
which case method questions may be shaped: the “four avenues” for ethical analysis: interests, rights, duties, and virtues. Finally, I compare the pedagogy of business
schools with that of executive education, noting that executive interactions based on
the case method are principally designed to elicit from the participants’ experience
the threats to personal and organizational conscience. This chapter is an organic part
of a larger work about the overall contribution of Kenneth Goodpaster to the field of
applied ethics and is best read in the context of that larger work.

5.1 Adding a Fourth Insight
In this chapter, I want to shift the focus from the subject matter of business ethics as
a field (Conscience, Corporations, and the Common Good) to the pedagogical point
of view. (See Fig. 5.1.) If ethics is to be incorporated (1) into the curricula of the
nation’s business schools and (2) into the curricula of the nation’s employee and
leadership development programs, it matters how that is done.
© The Author(s) 2022
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Fig. 5.1 Four chapters, four themes, and a fourth insight

5.1.1 In the Academy
As I indicated in Chap. 1, there simply is no discipline within business administration that can afford to ignore the call of conscience. Business is about human relationships and our human living environment. Indeed, if business aspires to be a true
profession, and an institution in the classical sense, the moral formation of its future
leaders must be addressed by a faculty and an administration that are fully committed to this calling (Goodpaster 2002, 2007, 2012; Naughton et al. 2012).
In this chapter, I offer some practical suggestions on how to accomplish this task
in the academy and in corporate education programs. The case method, used with
care and discipline, is surely one of the most valuable tools in the educator’s toolbox, but the “care and discipline” qualifier makes all the difference.1
My friend and colleague in Minneapolis who taught at the University of
Minnesota, Norman Bowie, asked me 20 years ago to write an article for a volume
of original articles that he was preparing for Blackwell Publishers: A Guide to
Business Ethics (my contribution: Goodpaster 2002). He wanted to have an article
devoted to teaching by the case method, since (a) he knew I had taught for 10 years
at a school where the case method is the primary pedagogy, and (b) he appreciated
that the case method was an important vehicle for moral education both in business
schools and in corporate in-house education programs. What follows in the next
section of this chapter is autobiographical and is borrowed from the opening of
that paper.

My approach to teaching business ethics at the graduate (MBA) level was influenced mightily by
two inputs: my own Ph.D. education in philosophy at the University of Michigan and the transformative influence of the case method pedagogy at the Harvard Business School.
1
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5.1.2 Teaching and Learning Ethics by the Case Method
When I joined the Harvard Business School faculty in 1980, a wayward philosopher
seeking to connect ethical theory with management education, I confronted an enormous intellectual and cultural gap. I discovered that philosophers were trained to
think differently from professional managers. They usually zigged when managers
zagged. They ascended the ladder of reflection toward premises and assumptions
when managers descended the ladder toward pragmatics and action; they often
insisted on examining a goal or purpose while managers often cared more about
implementing it (Fig. 5.2).
The effect was, at first, exasperating. Both the substance and the style of my
training ran counter to the distinctive practical orientation of business administration. Nevertheless, I was convinced that philosophy—specifically moral philosophy
or ethics—had as much to offer as to gain from a “joint venture” with management
education.
On the gain side, there was the practice-oriented pedagogy of the case method.
Moral philosophy in the twentieth century had been preoccupied with conceptual
analysis. Questions about the meanings of terms like “right” and “good” had dominated the philosophical landscape to the exclusion of questions about what actions
are right and what things are good. Conceptual analysis had run amok in many ways
and a return to “applied” ethics was needed.
What philosophy had to offer was an inheritance and a talent. The inheritance
was a body of thought about the nature of ethics and the human condition that had
developed over more than two millennia. The talent was an eye and an ear for distinguishing cogent reasoning from its counterfeits. At a time when the ethical
aspects of professional management were coming under increasing scrutiny, this
seemed like a valuable resource.
JUSTIFICATION

The four rungs on the ladder descend from
high-level shared ideals through core values
to social arrangements and finally to
pragmatics—concrete policies and guidelines
for human cooperation by which individuals
and groups “get things done.” If the
conversation descends the ladder toward
concreteness, the objective is usually to apply
or implement higher order aspirations or to
demonstrate their relevance in practice. If the
conversation ascends the ladder toward ideals,
the intent is usually to explain or justify the
lower order policies and social arrangements.

IDEALS
VALUES
SOCIAL
ARRANGEMENTS

PRAGMATICS

IMPLEMENTATION

Fig. 5.2 The ladder of reflection
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Learning aimed at integrating ethics and management education called for a different pedagogy. Professor Donald Schöen of MIT once suggested an image that
may have special meaning in this context:
In the varied topography of professional practice, there is a high, hard ground which overlooks a swamp. On the high ground, manageable problems lend themselves to solution
through the use of research-based theory and technique. In the swampy lowlands, problems
are messy and confusing and incapable of technical solution. The irony of this situation is
that the problems of the high ground tend to be relatively unimportant to individuals or to
society at large, however great their technical interest may be, while in the swamp lie the
problems of greatest human concern. The practitioner is confronted with a choice. Shall he
remain on the high ground where he can solve relatively unimportant problems according
to his standards of rigor, or shall he descend to the swamp of important problems and non-
rigorous inquiry?2

I found myself departing the high ground and entering the swamp. In the process, I
came to believe that if the field of business ethics were to have a future, a new kind
of discipline would have to be formed that did not yet exist. A generation of educators was needed that could think and teach using the skills of management education
and the reflectiveness of moral philosophy at the same time.
On the advice of several Harvard colleagues, therefore, I learned business policy
by the case method. Never mind that I was on the instructor’s side of the desk. I
considered myself a learner. I had to relinquish my “expertise” to learn. It was like
starting a second career after having become established in a first. But my students
and faculty colleagues helped.
I learned the hard way and the only way: from teaching and from practice. At
first, I could not appreciate the so-called “administrative point of view”—how competent managers think about problems; the way they identify issues, formulate and
implement strategy, and generate action plans. This appreciation was neither part of
my experience nor part of my background in moral philosophy. I had to walk in the
moccasins of the general manager. I had to puzzle over the strategic, organizational,
and interpersonal challenges that general managers face. And I had to do it case
by case.3
I gained a new respect for the vocation of the manager, charting a course amidst
the uncertainties of physical events and human nature: trying to motivate others,
remaining loyal to providers of resources, setting goals, imposing new structures,
monitoring progress and performance, and achieving purpose through cooperation
and the exercise of authority. I listened and I learned how the mind of the manager
was different from the mind of the philosopher. Not better or worse. Different.
There were challenges on the other side of the desk too. My first classes in business ethics, using the case method, were no small challenge to my students. On
some days, looks of glazed incomprehension were a relief from looks of irritation.
What had Plato or John Stuart Mill to do with this marketing strategy and these
This passage came from a working paper shared with me by Professor Schöen in 1984.
One way to accomplish this was to research and write case studies by traveling to companies,
interviewing decision-making executives, and listening to the ways in which they framed problems.
2
3
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accounting practices? What was the point of comparing and contrasting utilitarian
and social contract theories of justice? But they learned, often in spite of their professor, that questioning ends was healthy and that questioning means to ends was
healthy too; that moral reasoning was more than shooting from the hip; and that
their fellow students were actually following certain tried and true patterns in the
way they joined their realism with their idealism.
The “joint venture” eventually began to happen. It happened as I acknowledged
that the frameworks and concepts that are the stock-in-trade of philosophy often
blush in the face of the complexity and concreteness of management decisions.
What was needed was an ethical point of view, not an ethical algorithm. I had
believed this many years ago but had forgotten it. I began to change, to think differently. Outer dialogues became inner dialogues. A case method teacher had joined
the philosopher in me, and slowly the case method had become my philosophy of
moral education.

5.1.3 Because Wisdom Can’t Be Told
This philosophy of education in practice was Socratic at its heart, dynamic, anchored
in dialogue, and student centered. It called for a different kind of preparation on the
part of the instructor: the development of “teaching questions” and plans for recording student responses on the large black or white boards in the front of the classroom. Most of all, it called for an understanding that practical wisdom “can’t be
told”—that it had to be elicited with respect for the learner. As one classic commentator put it:
The outstanding virtue of the case system is that it is suited to inspiring activity, under
realistic conditions, on the part of the students; it takes them out of the role of passive
absorbers and makes them partners in the joint processes of learning and of furthering
learning. The case plan of instruction may be described as democratic in distinction to the
telling method. which is in effect dictatorial or patriarchal. With the case method, all members of the academic group, teachers and students, are in possession of the same basic
materials in the light of which analyses are to be made and decisions arrived at. Each,
therefore, has an identical opportunity to make a contribution to the body of principles
governing business practice and policy.4 (Gragg 1940)

Gragg goes on to say: “Business is not, at least not yet, an exact science. There is no single,
demonstrably right answer to a business problem. For the student or businessperson, it cannot be a
matter of peeking in the back of a book to see if he has arrived at the right solution. In every business situation, there is always a reasonable possibility that the best answer has not yet been found-even by teachers. Exercise of mature judgment obviously is inconsistent with a program of blindly
carrying out someone else’s instructions. Moreover, no matter how worthy those instructions may
be, they cannot cover every exigency.”
4
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The art of questioning was central to the case method and especially central to
teaching ethics by the case method.5 And it was Socrates who was the master of the
art of questioning. What this understanding of ethics in education brought with it
was a fourth insight in my business ethics career.

5.2 The Socratic Insight
I will call it the Socratic insight because it manifests itself in the instructor’s realization of his or her calling to participate in the moral formation of those with whom
he or she is in dialogue. The Socratic insight is the manifestation in the educational
process of the moral insight in the general case of agents and recipients. It is the
realization of the other (student, employee, executive) as one whose moral awareness can be elicited and even enhanced through respectful dialogue.6
The following autobiographical reflection on teaching by Parker Palmer in his
masterful book on education helps express the spirit of the Socratic insight:
I [often] forget that genuine solutions and authentic answers can only come from within my
students, that to “educate” them I must speak words that draw out their understanding rather
than impose my own. Even the facts and theories I must speak will not be absorbed if they
are not spoken into the receptiveness of a compelling question. . . . I have learned to ask
questions that open up a space where students can listen to their own experience, to each
other, and to the subject at hand—not merely to the authority of the teacher. Teaching by
questioning was the genius of Socrates.7 (Palmer 1993)

We have come full circle to Josiah Royce’s account of conscience applied to the
relationship between teacher and student in the academic and executive classrooms:
“the realization of one’s neighbor, in the full sense of the word realization”
(Royce 1885).8

In the words of Parker Palmer (1993): “[S]ince we as teachers are over-schooled to give answers
and solutions, and since we give them for reasons as often evasive as educative, we have special
need to develop the discipline of asking questions to create a space for truth.”
6
The very first article that I published in a refereed journal, “Morality and Dialogue” (1975),
explored the meaning of “dialogue” as the source of ethical understanding. This chapter brings this
book, and my career, full circle.
7
Emphasis added.
8
Emphasis added.
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5.2.1 Four Philosophical Avenues for Ethical Analysis
of Cases
The contribution of moral philosophy to the art of questioning, as I saw it, was to
provide a reliable set of viewpoints through which case method questions could be
shaped. I sought a guide for conscience that had some claim to represent the principal thought patterns of philosophers over two millennia. The guide that I developed
was called “Four Avenues for Ethical Analysis” and a summary of these avenues
follows.
Interest-Based Avenues One of the most influential types of ethical reasoning, at
least in the modern period, is interest-based. The fundamental idea here is that the
moral assessment of actions and policies depends on their practical consequences,
and that the only consequences that really matter are the interests of the parties
affected (usually human beings). On this view, ethics is all about harms and benefits
to identifiable parties. Moral common sense is governed by a single dominant
objective, maximizing net expectable utility (happiness, satisfaction, well-being,
pleasure). Critical thinking, on this type of view, amounts to testing our ethical
instincts and rules of thumb against the yardstick of social costs and benefits.
(Problems and questions regarding interest-based thinking are several: How does
one measure utility or interest satisfaction? For whom does one measure it (self,
group, humankind, beyond)? What about the tyranny of the majority in the
calculation?)
Rights-Based Avenues A second influential type of thinking is rights-based. The
central idea here is that moral common sense is to be governed not (or not only) by
interest satisfaction but by rights protection. The relevant rights are of two broad
kinds: rights to fair distribution of opportunities and wealth (contractarianism), and
rights to basic freedoms or liberties (libertarianism). Fair distribution is often
explained as a condition that obtains when all individuals are accorded equal respect
and equal voice in social arrangements. Basic liberties are often explained in terms
of individuals’ opportunities for self-development, work rewards, and freedoms
including religion and speech. (Problems and questions regarding this avenue
include: Is there a trade-off between equality and liberty when it comes to rights?
Does rights-based thinking lead to tyrannies of minorities that are as bad as tyrannies of majorities? Is this type of thinking excessively focused on individuals and
their entitlements without sufficient attention to larger communities and the responsibilities of individuals to such larger wholes?)
Duty-Based Avenues Duty-based thinking is perhaps the least unified and well-
defined. The governing ethical idea is duty or responsibility not so much to other
individuals as to communities of individuals. Critical thinking depends ultimately
on individuals conforming to the legitimate norms of a healthy community. Ethics
is about playing one’s role as part of a larger whole, either a web of relationships
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(like the family) or a community (communitarianism). This line of thinking was
implicit in John F. Kennedy’s inaugural address: “Ask not what your country can
do for you, ask what you can do for your country.” In management, duty-based
thinking appears in appeals to principles like fiduciary obligation. (Problems and
questions regarding this type of thinking include the concern that individualism
might get lost in a kind of collectivism (under a socialist or communitarian banner).
Also, how are our various duties to be prioritized when they come into conflict?)
Virtue-Based Avenues In virtue-based thinking, actions and policies are subjected
to scrutiny not on the basis of their consequences (for individuals or for communities) but on the basis of their genesis—the degree to which they flow from or reinforce a virtue or positive trait of character. The traditional short list of basic (or
“cardinal”) virtues includes prudence, temperance, courage, and justice.9 (Problems
or questions associated with virtue-based thinking include: What are the central virtues and their relative priorities in a postmodern world that does not appear to agree
on such matters? Are there timeless character traits that are not culture-bound so that
we can recommend them to anyone, particularly those in leadership roles?) (Fig. 5.3).
Each of these four main types of ethical thinking represents a concentration of
critical thinking in ethical matters. Each represents a “voice” in an ethical conversation across millennia. Individuals and organizations must make their own decisions
in the end, but these “voices” may well serve as “consultants to conscience.” And
each represents a “pool” of questions for the Socratic dialogue between teacher and
student in the classroom as it centers around a case study calling for ethical decision

Fig. 5.3 The four avenues of ethical thinking seeking the moral point of view

“Love, and do what you will,” Augustine is supposed to have said, indicating that the virtue of
love was ethically more basic and more directly practical than attempts at determining “the right
thing to do.”
9
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making. All four have in common the aspiration to give practical meaning to the
moral insight in human life.
There are clearly overlaps between the matrix offered by Haidt (see Chap. 2) and
the “Four Avenues” approach above. Certainly, Haidt’s care/harm foundation and
the interest-based avenue cover similar territory, and his fairness/cheating foundation (with the sixth liberty/oppression foundation) align with the rights-based avenue. Haidt’s loyalty/betrayal and authority/subversion foundations appear to align
with the duty-based avenue, while the sanctity/degradation foundation calls to mind
the virtue-based avenue.

5.2.2 Executive Development
While academic programs represent a systematic but general approach to the moral
formation of business leaders—and therefore call for a distinctive pedagogy
designed with that in mind—executive development typically represents a more
company-specific approach to moral formation. Often, but not always, executive
education presupposes an existing corporate culture and (in my experience) calls for
a searching engagement with that culture and the mission that guides it.
In my book Conscience and Corporate Culture, I share some of my 10 years of
experience with executive education at Medtronic Corporation, a Minnesota-based
medical device maker. Medtronic had grown at the time to 35,000 employees from
about half that number in a relatively short period of time (less than 10 years). Much
of my work with the top executives of this company took place off site in week-long
seminars that included case method discussions and other activities devoted to
appreciating Medtronic’s origins and its culture.
In the context of ethics education, two ideas (teleopathy and “hypocrisy exercises”) formed the backdrop against which an operational understanding of the
company’s values-in-action could be identified and examined and, when found
compelling, used to initiate newcomers, promote managers, and guide succession
planning at the highest level.
After being thoroughly introduced to the idea of teleopathy (with its three symptoms of fixation, rationalization, and detachment) in the morning session of the first
day of the week, executives are asked in the afternoon session to apply the idea (if
it applies) to a Harvard case study of mine called H.J. Heinz Company: The
Administration of Policy. It becomes clear in discussing the Heinz case that the
company’s desire to please Wall Street analysts dictated an executive compensation
program that led to significant—and hypocritical—misreporting of earnings over an
8-year period. Once the Medtronic executives saw the Heinz case dynamics, they
were asked to get into small groups to discuss possible examples of similar kinds of
hypocrisy in Medtronic itself. I refer to these discussions as hypocrisy exercises and
I see them as “making friends with hypocrisy” because every person and every
organization has a gap between walk and talk, and our ethical challenge is to deliberately, mindfully, reduce that gap as much as possible (Table 5.1).
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Table 5.1 Hypocrisy exercise template
Hypocrisy exercise template
Building upon our discussion of ethical decision making, especially the H.J. Heinz case series,
turn now to your experience within this company. In the spaces provided below, try to identify:
1a. An example from your past or current experience in 1b. What is the most realistic and
which company values pointed one way and internal
responsible way to resolve or remove
work incentives pointed another.
the disparity in 1a?
2a. An example from your past or current experience in 2b. What is the most realistic and
which company values pointed one way and external
responsible way to resolve or remove
sanctions pointed another.
the disparity in 2a?

Debriefing after these group discussions inevitably surfaced company practices
that could be modified to remove dysfunctional incentives—or at least practices that
need more careful explanation from senior management. For this reason, the exercise was always debriefed with a member of senior management present.
I mention the above educational practices with executives to supplement my discussion of ethics education and the case method in the academy because they represent practices that are tailored to the specific cultures of the organizations in which
executives find themselves, instead of the inevitably more generic ethics education
offered in business school settings. But whether in the academy or in the corporation, these practices are born of a central awareness—the awareness I am here calling the Socratic insight. Socrates was convinced that understanding and moral
wisdom could only come from respectful dialogue among educators and learners.
The case method, in both my classroom experience and my work with business
executives, shares that Socratic conviction. This was its aspiration as we saw earlier
in this chapter, articulated by Charles Gragg.
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Chapter 6

Concluding Reflections: Then and Now

Abstract This is the concluding chapter of the book but is by no means merely a
summary. I begin with a brief summary for the reader, to be sure, but then proceed
to describe my “changes and discoveries” over the many years represented by this
narrative. I acknowledge some of my critics with the advantage of hindsight and
perspective. I also share my “discoveries”—recognitions from “below my awareness,” including linkages among the four insights that unify this book and the four
avenues of ethical analysis. I then turn to a discussion of “the last eight years,” the
years of my retirement as Emeritus Professor. I describe the extraordinary polarization that has developed in the United States during this period and the impact that
this polarization has had on business behavior. I suggest that a number of “counterfeits of conscience” have emerged during this time, including a politicization of the
corporation and explicit partisanship on the part of business leaders—almost as if
“conscience” is being “outsourced” to political parties. I then turn my eyes to the
future of the field of applied ethics, acknowledging the challenges but identifying
several sources of hope, including wise books and new institutions dedicated to
bridging, indeed healing, the divide between “red and blue” citizens. This chapter is
an organic part of a larger work about the overall contribution of Kenneth Goodpaster
to the field of applied ethics and is best read in the context of that larger work.

6.1 Conclusion
In this concluding chapter, I will provide a summary of the journey described in
Chaps. 2, 3, 4, and 5; reflect on my earlier work indicating changes (and discoveries) in my thinking; discuss issues that have arisen during the 8 years since my
becoming Emeritus Professor; and finally share some thoughts about the future of
the field of business and applied ethics. Let us first summarize.1

My published work can be found in my curriculum vitae in Appendix 1. Three lesser-known
articles can be found in Appendix 2.
1

© The Author(s) 2022
K. E. Goodpaster, Times of Insight: Conscience, Corporations, and the Common
Good, Issues in Business Ethics 54, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-09712-6_6
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6.1.1 Summary
In the body of this book, and on my career journey, I have had four moments of
insight. It is useful to recall that at the outset, in Chap. 2, I said the common denominator among definitions of insight was: to be able to discern something deeper
(“what lies beneath”) or something larger (“a bigger picture”).
Thus, in my search for an understanding of conscience in Chap. 2, Royce’s moral
insight provided the deeper departure point. In my view, conscience is what holds
us together as human beings, despite the fact that moral relativism would see conscience as fragmenting us as a community.
It may be worth pointing out that according to the Oxford English Dictionary,
conscience was originally understood as a common quality that individuals shared:
“a man or a people had more or less conscience,” as groups had more or less science, knowledge, intelligence, and so on. The word came gradually to be used as a
more personal faculty, so that “my conscience” and “your conscience” were understood no longer as “our respective shares or amounts of the common quality conscience” but as “two distinct individual consciences, mine and yours.” My entry
under “conscience” in the Encyclopedia of Business Ethics and Society (2008) adds:
This individualization of the meaning of ‘conscience’ . . . signals a polarity at the core of
our moral awareness: On the one hand, conscience is our subjective touchstone for ethical
decision making. On the other hand, an appeal to conscience in moral argument (or dialogue) usually lays claim to common ground, a warrant for our ethical convictions that
reaches beyond the merely subjective. Insofar as conscience must respond in actual
decision-making situations, it has a certain private authority, both in relation to non-moral
decision guides and in relation to the consciences of others. We can refer to this as the
autonomy dimension of conscience. But because conscience can be ‘undeveloped,’
‘neglected,’ or ‘out of touch,’ philosophers have looked to it for a broader kind of authority,
less private and more rooted in human nature or reason. We can refer to this as the discernment dimension of conscience.

New York Times columnist David Brooks echoed this perspective in 2011 when he
commented on a study of the ethical attitudes of young adults in universities across
America:
In most times and in most places, the group was seen to be the essential moral unit. A shared
religion defined rules and practices. Cultures structured people’s imaginations and imposed
moral disciplines. But now more people are led to assume that the free-floating individual
is the essential moral unit. Morality was once revealed, inherited and shared, but now it’s
thought of as something that emerges in the privacy of your own heart.

I am less pessimistic than those who would see this “privatization” of conscience as
the death knell of a shared morality. I believe that Royce’s moral insight goes deeper
than superficial differences to places where human values converge rather than
diverge. It is for this reason that we often speak of individual consciences as “undeveloped,” “arrested,” “neglected,” or as Royce pointed out, “forgetful.” When philosophers anchor the idea of conscience in human nature or reason, they are
suggesting a more widely shared (even if private) faculty. The work of Jonathan
Haidt (2013) was particularly relevant in this connection.
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Turning to the idea of corporations and corporate conscience in Chap. 3, I
invoked Hugh Heclo’s work on institutions to suggest that there was an institutional
insight that must accompany our understanding of business and the economic sector
of society. It is an insight that enables business leaders to discern something deeper
and larger (“a bigger picture”) in the purposes of their organizations. This means
that leaders need to operate with a dual awareness—foreground and background—
seeing their responsibilities both to their present organization’s success and to the
success of business as an institution whose mission is to produce goods that are
truly good and services that truly serve.
Chapter 4 introduced an aspect of normative thinking in business ethics that took
us beyond the conventional debate about “stockholders and stakeholders.” The
anthropological insight helps us to see that any normative account of personal,
organizational, or societal ethics must carry with it—either up front or behind the
scenes—a “comprehensive picture of man” (borrowing the phrase from John Paul
II). Like the institutional insight, it is an insight that helps us to discern something
deeper (what lies beneath) and larger (“a bigger picture”)—this means a view of
what the good is for human beings, what happiness is for “the whole person and all
persons” (Benedict XVI 2009). This is not optional, though it is often not made
explicit by those invoking, say, “stakeholder capitalism.”2
In Chap. 5, I described the case method pedagogy in the business school environment as well as the case method and “hypocrisy exercises” in the executive education environment. The Socratic insight brought us full circle, in the sense that it
meant discerning something deeper about the role of the “ethics teacher” and something larger about the purposes of educational institutions. That “something deeper”
is the dynamic of respect between the educator and the learner that the case method
requires (Gragg 1940), and it was the genius of Plato in doing philosophy in the
form of dialogues. This is the direct application of the moral insight to the educational process. The “something larger” is the ethical role of business and executive
educational institutions in their respective environments.3

6.1.2 Changes and Discoveries
As I look back over my earlier work for instances of change (or discovery) in my
thinking, several things come to mind.

See the Business Roundtable statement of August 19, 2019, signed by 181 of the largest U.S. corporations, declaring that “companies should serve not only their shareholders, but also deliver
value to their customers, invest in employees, deal fairly with suppliers and support the communities in which they operate.”
3
It is often observed that if business schools are to be professional schools, alongside medical
schools and law schools, then they must convey a body of knowledge, to be sure, but also a set of
ethical norms for their graduates.
2
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1. Milton Friedman’s skepticism about corporate leaders acting in the public interest (see Chap. 2)
2. The concerns of some critics that the Principle of Moral Projection will somehow undermine individual responsibility for business decisions (see Chap. 3)
3. The realization that my work actually progressed beneath my awareness (until
now) from the moral insight to the institutional insight to the anthropological
insight, and finally to the Socratic insight (see Chap. 4)
4. The further realization that these four insights were “bonded” in a significant
way: the first three (moral, institutional, and anthropological) were needed to
form a comprehensive understanding of business ethics (espoused values), while
the fourth, the Socratic insight, was needed to educate (values-in-action) the next
generation of business leaders with this understanding (see Chap. 5)4
5. Finally, the realization that the “Four Avenues” of ethical analysis actually anticipated the “Four Insights” in a surprising fashion
6.1.2.1 Milton Friedman Revisited
Reflecting now on my convictions three or four decades ago about Milton Friedman’s
(1970) concerns about business leaders and “social responsibility,” I have to say that
a recent development leads me to appreciate more than I did then the wisdom of his
warnings. This development is social in nature: it is the tendency during the last 6 or
7 years for business leaders to substitute political partisanship for corporate conscience. Friedman was concerned about the legitimacy of corporations using their
economic power without a “political license,” so to speak, untethered and unaccountable to the public generally (Nather 2019; Jamison 2018). Friedman’s warning
then seemed a bit excessive, but today it seems almost prophetic (Goodpaster 1991,
2018). The drift on the part of many left-leaning companies toward political correctness and “resistance”—and the drift on the part of many right-leaning companies
toward political “incorrectness” and conservative values—is becoming embarrassing, given any plausible distinction between the private and the public sectors.5
So, as I look back on Milton Friedman’s famous essay warning against corporate
leadership straying too far from its fiduciary duties to shareholders, I appreciate its
wisdom more today than I did when I first read it. Friedman anticipated by 50 years
the Business Roundtable Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation (2019) when
he wrote:
I share Adam Smith's skepticism about the benefits that can be expected from “those who
affected to trade for the public good”—this argument must be rejected on grounds of principle. What it amounts to is an assertion that those who favor the taxes and expenditures in
I first became aware of the distinction between “espoused values” and “values-in-action” from the
work of Harvard professor Chris Argyris.
5
Some striking examples are the “canceling” done during the 2020 presidential election in the
U.S. by Twitter, Google, Facebook, and Amazon.
4
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question [corporate leaders] have failed to persuade a majority of their fellow citizens to be
of like mind and that they are seeking to attain by undemocratic procedures what they cannot attain by democratic procedures. In a free society, it is hard for “good” people to do
“good,” but that is a small price to pay for making it hard for “evil” people to do “evil,”
especially since one man's good is another's evil. (Friedman 1970)

Sometimes the use of private sector resources by corporate leaders for the sake of
controversial political causes in our contemporary environment does seem to represent “seeking to attain by undemocratic procedures what they cannot attain by democratic procedures.”
6.1.2.2 Moral Projection and Personal Responsibility
During the 1980s, when I was defending the appropriateness of predicating responsibility of corporations, I received pushback from some respected philosophers who
believed that attributing responsibility to corporations was tantamount to denying
responsibility on the part of individual persons within corporations who made decisions for which they should be held accountable.6 These objectors were convinced
that attributing responsibility to corporations meant not attributing responsibility to
individuals within the corporation. My response was to disagree—I insisted that
both corporations and the decision-making individuals within them could be held
responsible simultaneously (see Chap. 3, “Individual and Corporate Responsibility
Simultaneously?”).
In twenty-twenty hindsight, I now see that it was not enough at the time to simply
deny that there was a logical implication between attributing responsibility to a
corporation and refusing to affirm responsibility to individuals working for the corporation. It is true (as I insisted at the time) that this logical implication does not
exist, either from the organizational level to the personal level, or from the personal
level to the organizational level. (That is, if a corporation is held responsible for a
certain wrongdoing, individuals within that corporation can also be held responsible
for their decisions that contributed to the corporate wrongdoing. Conversely, if an
individual within a corporation is responsible for a certain wrongdoing, the organization itself may or may not be held responsible for wrongdoing at the same time.)
When I say “I now see that it was not enough,” I mean that I now believe that a
full ethical understanding of organizational decision making calls for an appreciation of the reality that individual persons in their organizational contexts are acting
both as sovereign persons and as participants in a person-like actor that has a moral-
cultural life of its own. Somehow, persons, organizations, and (dare I say) organized
social systems face moral accountability as a connected whole, not simply as

Two noteworthy critics were Professor Manuel Velasquez (Santa Clara) and Professor Nani
Ranken (Indiana University). My formal responses can be found at “Commentary: Velasquez on
Corporate Responsibility” (1983) and “The Principle of Moral Projection: A Reply to Professor
Ranken” (1987). Professor Ranken’s original article was “Corporations as Persons: Objections to
Goodpaster’s ‘Principle of Moral Projection’” (1987).
6
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Fig. 6.1 Relationship among the levels in applied ethics (from Chap. 2)

discrete abstracted fragments. (See Fig. 6.1.) This is why it is not enough to simply
deny that predications on one level fail to exclude predications on other levels. The
reality is that the levels are not culturally independent of one another. They are
culturally interdependent like the various pieces of a balanced mobile, all moving
with a perturbation of just one.
6.1.2.3 Progress Beneath My Awareness: The Four Insights
In reviewing my work over nearly 50 years for this book, I came to see patterns that
were often beneath my awareness. Principal among those patterns are the “four
insights,” around which I have organized Chaps. 2, 3, 4 and 5. The moral insight
was defined by Royce as “the realization of one’s neighbor, in the full sense of the
word realization; the resolution to treat him unselfishly” (Royce 1885).7 This provided an account of conscience (Chap. 2). The institutional insight is the realization
that one’s own institution—like all institutions—is part of a larger enterprise of
forwarding the well-being of humankind. This means that business leaders must
foster in themselves and in their leadership teams a vision and a concurrent peripheral vision about the purposes of their corporation (Chap. 3). Then the anthropological insight emerges as the realization that a satisfactory normative account of
business (or organizational) ethics requires a comprehensive view of the good for
the human person and ultimately of the common good for the human community—
an anthropology—without which appeals to the interests of shareholders or stakeholders have no content. The inclusion of an anthropology is not an option in
business ethics; it is a necessity. Thus, asking what “picture of man” is implicit in

Remember, however, Royce’s proviso: “[T]his resolution expresses and belongs to the moment of
insight. Passion may cloud the insight after no very long time.”
7
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any given normative ethical action-guide for business is always a legitimate question (Chap. 4). Finally, weaving the three insights above into a unity, each calling
for the other and all of them reaching for action in the marketplace, we have the
Socratic insight. This insight guides the formation of the current and next generation of business leadership in our society (and often in other countries). It is the
manifestation in the educational process of the moral insight in the general case of
agents and recipients. It is the realization of the other (student, employee, executive)
as one whose moral, institutional, and anthropological awareness can be elicited
through respectful dialogue.8 The Socratic insight applies the moral, institutional,
and anthropological insights to the very methodology of business formation and
practice, using the case method and certain other tools—because wisdom can’t be
told (Chap. 5). Awareness (moral, institutional, and anthropological) without interaction is powerless, but (Socratic) interaction without awareness is blind.
6.1.2.4 The Four Insights Enrich the “Four Avenues” Approach
to Ethical Analysis
As I reflect on the progress beneath my awareness afforded by the four insights, it
becomes clear to me that the “four avenues” approach to ethical analysis that I have
been using with my students (described in Chap. 5) could and should be enriched
using those four insights.
In discussing interest-based avenues of ethical analysis, the central idea was that
the moral assessment of actions and policies depends on their practical consequences, and that the only consequences that really matter are the interests of the
parties affected. This way of thinking can be enriched by the anthropological insight
in the sense that the latter seeks to discern more deeply and more widely the content
of the word “interests.” It calls for the “comprehensive picture of man” in the background. My answer to that call was to identify the “whole person and all persons,”
interpreted from a “family of God” perspective.9 Others, of course, will have a more
secular picture.
In discussing rights-based avenues of ethical analysis, the central idea was that
all individuals are accorded equal respect and equal voice in social arrangements
and also accorded basic liberties, such as opportunities for self-development, work
rewards, and freedoms including religion and speech. This way of thinking is
enriched by the moral insight itself, in the sense that it emphasizes “the realization
of one’s neighbor.” It calls our attention to human dignity and reminds us that we
seek not only the good of all persons but also the good of each person.

As Benedict XVI would have put it: “one who is a brother, not just a neighbor” (Benedict
XVI 2009).
9
Some have distinguished between the temporal common good and the spiritual common good.
8
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In discussing duty-based avenues of ethical analysis, the central idea was that
“ethics is about playing one’s role as part of a larger whole,” such as family obligations, obligations to local communities and various associations, and obligations to
larger communities like the business community itself or the nation as a whole.
Eventually, duty-based thinking can extend to humanity at large, as in the cases of
pandemics and global warming. This way of thinking is enriched by the institutional insight, which calls for each of us to navigate ethically with multiple levels of
awareness that correspond to the many intersecting communities to which we
belong. Recall that the institutional insight asks business leaders to maintain at least
a dual awareness of their obligations to the company that they lead and also to business as an institution for the common good. Expanding this dual awareness to
include other intersecting institutions is a natural next step.
Finally, in discussing virtue-based avenues of ethical analysis, the central idea is
that actions should be assessed by the degree to which they flow from or reinforce a
virtue or positive trait of character. This way of thinking is enriched by the Socratic
insight because that insight calls for the positive traits of character needed for effective dialogue. These traits include respect, honesty, prudence, humility, and courage.10 As we have seen, the Socratic insight invites us to carry into practice the other
insights—from espoused values to values-in-action.

6.1.3 The Last 8 Years
During the 8 years since I have retired to the role of Emeritus Professor at the
University of St. Thomas, political and cultural polarization has increased in the
United States at an alarming rate, culminating in the 2020 presidential election and
the events of January 6, 2021, in which the nation’s Capitol building was breached
by demonstrators. Frank Newport, Ph.D., a Gallup senior scientist and author of
Polling Matters: Why Leaders Must Listen to the Wisdom of the People, wrote:
Any functioning society needs to develop and maintain its social institutions—the widely
agreed-upon ways in which society handles the core functions necessary for survival. But
that agreement appears to be waning. Partisans on both sides increasingly see institutions
in the U.S. not as beneficial and necessary, but as part of an effort by the other side to gain
advantage and to perpetuate its power and philosophical positions. Liberals and Democrats
today, for example, have lower trust in traditional family institutions, traditional religious
institutions and the economic system. Republicans have lower trust in the scientific process, higher education, the mass media, and the role of the state (government).
(Newport 2019)

As mentioned earlier “Love, and do what you will,” Augustine is supposed to have said, indicating that the virtue of love was ethically more basic and more directly practical than attempts at
determining “the right thing to do.” It summed up all the other virtues.
10
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This polarization found its way into workplaces and the C-suites of large publicly
traded corporations and into the halls of most American colleges and universities.
During the pandemic year of 2020, which was also a highly contested presidential
election year and a year of intense social protest surrounding the death of George
Floyd in Minneapolis, Minnesota, ideological clashes and political partisanship
were on display across the country and even internationally. The intensity of the
polarization led New York Times columnist David Brooks (quoted earlier in this
chapter) to write in March 2021:
These days it’s hard to be blithely confident in the core American creed we used to be so
proud about—e pluribus unum. Out of many one. We don’t seem like “one” today if you
look at the facts. This general disillusion with e pluribus unum has caused many people to
give up on patriotism altogether.11 (Brooks 2021)

These events, combined with the comments by Brooks, led me to reflect on their
implications for the discussion in this book (and throughout my career) of conscience, corporations, and the common good.
At a time of intense social and political unrest and polarization, it is difficult not
to hear the echo of Josiah Royce’s prophetic description of the moral insight in
Chap. 2: “It is the realization of one’s neighbor, in the full sense of the word realization; the resolution to treat him unselfishly” (Royce 1885).
But. . . [p]assion may cloud the insight after no very long time. It is as impossible for us to
avoid the illusion of selfishness in our daily lives, as to escape seeing through the illusion at
the moment of insight. We see the reality of our neighbor, that is, we determine to treat him
as we do ourselves. But then we go back to daily action, and we feel the heat of hereditary
passions, and we straightway forget what we have seen. Our neighbor becomes obscured.
He is once more a foreign power. He is unreal. We are again deluded and selfish. This conflict goes on and will go on as long as we live after the manner of men. Moments of insight,
with their accompanying resolutions; long stretches of delusion and selfishness: That is our
life.12 (Royce 1885)

In a time of “passion clouding insight” and opposing factions being characterized as
“foreign powers,” the need for moral insight is as great as the forces that would
obscure it.
And what is more, at such a time, it is difficult not to hear the echo of the institutional insight from Chap. 3, the need for leaders to operate with a dual awareness:
foreground and background—seeing their responsibilities both to their present
organization’s success and to the success of business as an institution whose mission is to produce goods that are truly good and services that truly serve.
Corporations that guide themselves by an inner compass using the institutional
insight will be less likely, in my opinion, to dive headlong into the political and
ideological fray, as so many seem to have done. In this regard, and under these circumstances, it is tempting to be drawn into what I have called “counterfeits” of
corporate conscience or corporate responsibility.
Brooks draws special attention in this article to a newly published book by Yale professor Steven
B. Smith: Reclaiming Patriotism in an Age of Extremes.
12
Emphasis added.
11
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6.1.3.1 Counterfeits of Conscience
What most of these counterfeits have in common—like counterfeit currencies—is
the use of a substitute in place of the “real thing.” Many have pointed out that corporations like Google, Facebook, Twitter, and even Amazon adopted policies during
2020 that were calculated to disadvantage the right and advantage the left by “canceling” many conservative communications, tweets, books, etc.13 While these policies (when acknowledged) might have been rationalized using moral or ethical
categories, it seems clear to dispassionate observers that this behavior did not stem
so much from corporate conscience as from corporate political gamesmanship. And
similar observations could be made regarding corporations not in the information
business when their leaders decided how to allocate political monetary contributions.14 What may be happening in such cases is that corporate conscience, guided
by the institutional insight, is being muted and outsourced to political expediency, a
set of norms external to and only contingently related to the company’s considered
values.15
In Conscience and Corporate Culture (2007), I discussed another possible source
of this counterfeit phenomenon in connection with what I called the paradox of
paternalism: “It seems essential for sustaining a group conscience, yet coercive, to
seek to dictate the value orientation of others, whether inside the corporation or
outside.” I argued that corporate leaders could insist on a low degree of value congruence in their organizations or a high (“lock step”) degree—or a golden mean
between these two. I said that the “high range is too dogmatic to be respectful, while
the low range is too relativistic to be stable” for the culture over time. This is the
way to manage (if not resolve) the paradox of paternalism. Corporate leaders who
speak and allocate/withhold resources in a partisan way, however, tend to disrespect
members of their own corporate community (employees) whose views about politics may be very different.16

The so-called “cancel culture” got its start, according to many, on college and university campuses during the last two decades. For an informative article (with data) on this subject, see Eric
Kaufmann’s “Academic Freedom is Withering.” (2021)
14
I hasten to add that all of the above remarks could apply if the political tables were turned from
left to right.
15
It is possible for a company to consider carefully and conscientiously to put its resources in the
political arena in one direction for the sake of human dignity and the common good. If the reasoning is sound in such a case, this would not be what I am calling “counterfeit.”
16
Here is a sampling of recent articles that touch on this topic: Washington and Spierings (2021),
Wall Street Journal Editorial Board (2021), and Golub (2021).
13
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6.1.3.2 Other Counterfeits
There are other instances of “outsourcing conscience,” of course. Socialism is one
well-known counterfeit that would simply put the public sector itself in the place of
private sector conscience—and law and regulation in the place of markets.
Sometimes “compliance” is interpreted along these lines, but not always. We saw in
Chap. 4 that “stockholder thinking” and “stakeholder thinking,” if unspecified
regarding “a comprehensive picture of man,” amount to counterfeits as well.
One other recent counterfeit comes to us from the field of Artificial Intelligence
(AI). The more sophisticated robotics, self-driven automobiles, and mining big data
become, the more software engineers (and their managers) are faced with the challenge of programing “decision trees” that are ethically value laden, that favor certain outcomes over others depending on the preferences of the manufacturers
(Murawski 2019). AI-based manufacturing is analogous to “building in” (or “freezing in”) to the decision-making software of an “autonomous” system various prescriptions or norms, meaning that those “built in” decisions may or may not
represent the organization’s judgments at the moment of the automaton’s decision.17
While AI can build into automatons “consciences” that are unreflectively sourced to
the ethical views of the software engineers at the time of manufacture, stepping
back, we might say that political partisanship can easily display the unreflective
outsourcing of corporate conscience to an external political party. Either way, there
is a kind of alienation of the moral and institutional insights, a reverting—as Jean
Piaget might say—from an ethic of core values to an ethic guided by the rules of
another (“heteronomy”).

6.1.4 The Future of the Field—Can the Insights
Find Traction?
It is tempting to be pessimistic in the face of the societal divisions that have intensified over the past decade, especially if one believes, as I do, that the four insights
described in these pages depend importantly on a basic spirit of community behind
our inevitable differences.18 The moral insight, when it is not lost or forgotten,
invites reciprocity and respect. The institutional insight carries with it a recognition
of the common good as an underlying purpose of the economic sector. The anthropological insight calls for finding common ground in our views about humanity.
The Socratic insight calls for our pedagogy itself to mirror the ethical message of
conscience, personal and institutional, in service of the common good.
WSJ Pro, Artificial Intelligence Newsletter (n.d.): “Our weekday AI newsletter provides news
and insight into business opportunities and challenges companies face when implementing
machine learning, deep learning and other advanced technologies.”
18
See a recent interview of this author by David Bevan: “The Business Ethics Pioneers Project: An
Introduction and a First Sample” (2020).
17
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Severe polarization threatens our ability to live out these ethical aspirations, even
our ability to formulate a coherent normative ethics for business. Are there any signs
of hope in such circumstances? My answer to this question is an emphatic affirmative. For one thing, thoughtful reflection can and does reveal more common ground
than one might expect regarding the virtues we recognize in our “comprehensive
picture of man.” As Yale professor Steven Smith observes: “American patriotism at
its best does not rely on indoctrination but on teaching and supporting the virtues of
civility, respect for law, respect for others, responsibility, honor, courage, loyalty,
and leadership—all virtues worth having and keeping.” Smith says further that
“among the themes that constitute our national symphony,” we should include
equality, liberty, human dignity, limited government, pluralism and respect for
diversity, love of culture and the arts, positive attitudes toward invention and discovery, economic development and opportunity, faith and hope, and individualism and
exceptionalism (properly understood) (Smith 2021).19 No doubt Smith’s two lists
above will occasion some energetic debates, but they provide a platform for hope, I
think, that the idea of common ground—and thus a “common good”—is attainable
even in a time of serious division.
Another reason for my emphatic affirmative answer to the question about signs
of hope is the founding and flourishing of a non-profit organization called Braver
Angels.20 This is a grassroots organization that originated from a simple idea in one
state and spread to all fifty of the United States and beyond. The simple idea was
that the principles and techniques of family counseling might be “writ large” to help
in practical ways to heal the divisions that plague an entire nation.21 To quote from
the Braver Angels website:
[T]oday, there is evidence to suggest that we are now as polarized as we have been since the
Civil War. We are in what some are calling a “cold civil war” right at the moment when a
spreading pandemic, vast economic trouble, and other national and global challenges call
upon us to support each other like never before.
At Braver Angels we do not accept this division. . . . Our work is about restoring civic
trust in the USA. It is about healing the wounds between left and right. It is about challenging institutions to be better, building community together, and discovering what it means to
be American in our time. . . . At Braver Angels, our work is about building a house united.22
And compare the speech by Kofi Annan, former Secretary-General of the United Nations, at
Tübingen University, Germany in 2003 in which he said that “universal values are acutely
needed”—and he named five of them: Peace, Freedom, Social Progress, Equal Rights, and Human
Dignity.
20
From the Braver Angels website: “Braver Angels was inspired by the words of Abraham Lincoln,
who not only called on Americans to summon the ‘better angels’ of our nature—but called on us
to find the courage needed to pursue a more perfect union, ‘with malice toward none, with charity
for all, with firmness in the right.’ To meet the current moment, at this time of national crisis, we
need more than civility. We need to challenge ourselves to work together when we disagree. We
need bravery.”(Braver Angels n.d.)
21
Reflect here again on the inversion of Plato’s analogy, using the Principle of Moral Projection
(see Chap. 3). The projection is from the microcosm of the family and family therapy to help us
heal the macrocosm of a divided nation (the American family).
22
See the documentary film The ReUnited States (2021)
19
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Using an army of trained volunteer moderators, the organization puts on “Red/
Blue” and “Skills” workshops (Depolarizing Within, Families and Politics, Bridging
the Divide); hosts general debates attended by thousands of citizens, college debates,
book discussions, film discussion clubs, Zoom webinars; curates a library; and
much more. Braver Angels is just one of many efforts underway at the time of this
writing (though it is a particularly striking one) that are signs of hope in difficult times.
Another striking sign of hope deserves mention in this context. In 2019, Arthur
C. Brooks published an extraordinary book entitled Love Your Enemies: How
Decent People Can Save America from the Culture of Contempt. Brooks
observes that:
From the philosophers of ancient Greece to the world’s great religions to our own Founding
Fathers to the psychology research of the modern era, we are exhorted to choose our heart’s
true desire: love and kindness. All warn unambiguously that division, if allowed to take
permanent root, will be our misery and downfall. (p. 37)

Brooks emphasizes, however, that “unity does not necessarily mean agreement” and
that “unity is always an aspiration; we will never be 100 percent unified.”
Nevertheless, he reminds his readers of the response that the Dalai Lama gave to his
very personal question “Your Holiness, what do I do when I feel contempt?” The
response was: “Practice warm-heartedness” (p. 40). The rest of the book gives practical meaning to this strong, not weak, reply: “Warm-heartedness is not for the faint-
hearted.” In my opinion, this is a strong sign of hope!

6.2 Message to the Reader
This concludes my reflections on nearly 50 years of teaching and research in applied
ethics, most of those years in business ethics at three institutions: the University of
Notre Dame, Harvard Business School, and the University of St. Thomas. The
record of my published work appears as Appendix 1 to this volume, and Appendix
2 contains three of my articles that are especially relevant to the narrative. I reprint
them here with the permission of their publishers to round out the retrospective and
prospective thoughts in this volume.
• “Toward an Integrated Approach to Business Ethics,” Thought, Volume 60 (June,
1985), pp. 161–180.
• “Tenacity: The American Pursuit of Corporate Responsibility,” Business and
Society Review (118:4, 2013), pp. 577–605.
• “Human Dignity and the Common Good: The Institutional Insight,” Business
and Society Review, (March, 2017), pp. 27–50.
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Fig. 6.2 Awareness without interaction is powerless, but interaction without awareness is blind

Figure 6.2 above indicates the flow of chapters in this tale of my career journey,
ending for me in a period of challenge with hopeful signs—but beginning for you to
carry forward with these same hopeful signs. Thank you for joining me on my journey, and on yours, I wish you the very best.
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Chapter 7

Afterword

Abstract Since completing these chapters and sharing them with a number of
thoughtful colleagues, including Series Editor Frank den Hond, I would like to
revisit briefly five convictions: the four insights and one additional concern about
the future of the field of business ethics alluded to in the final chapter. Four of these
convictions, in retrospect, have been the sources of energy behind much of my work
in the field of business or organizational ethics, the motivators that have guided my
teaching and research for over five decades. The fifth theme signals my worries but
also my optimism regarding the future of the field to which I hope I have contributed. This Afterword is the book in microcosm, I suppose, even though it does not
do justice to the richness of the story told in Chapters 1 through 6. It is nevertheless
an organic part of a larger work about my overall contribution to the field of applied
ethics and is best read in the context of that larger work.

7.1 The Birth of Conscience in the Moral Insight
Josiah Royce articulates the moral insight in a beautiful way—as if it were a discovery that changes the whole world of the person having the insight:
[T]he realization of one’s neighbor, in the full sense of the word realization; the resolution
to treat him unselfishly.

Imagine if today we were to discover that there were intelligent beings on another
planet in orbit around another star in another galaxy. I am reminded of the 1996
novel The Sparrow by Mary Doria Russell. “We’re not alone!” the headline in the
New York Times might read. Well, the same is true with the moral insight, only it
begins with: “I’m not alone!” Of course, that is in many ways both the ethical good
news and the ethical bad news. It is the good news because it means that one of the
fundamental needs of my humanity—the need for companionship, love, fellowship,
friendship—might possibly be met! It means that I am not doomed to solipsistic
bondage despite my longing for something more. Yes, that is the ethical good news.
But there is a curious downside to this discovery of my neighbor.
© The Author(s) 2022
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The ethical “bad news” is that the moment I discover there is another being (perhaps
many) occupying moral space with me, I must find a way to treat them as they deserve
to be treated. This complicates (and makes more difficult) my decision making, perhaps enormously! For now, I must not only consider my own good and my own dignity; I must consider the “goods” and “dignities” of all those affected by my behavior!
Notice too that the “complication” the moral insight introduces is twofold. The
complication is at first numerical—not just my good/dignity but the good/dignity of
others. The complication also calls for understanding what my good/dignity and
others’ good/dignity really amounts to. There are various candidates, like satisfying
wants, desires, and interests. What is the highest and best good for human beings?
What lies behind the often-used phrase “human flourishing”? (See Sect. 7.3 below.)
So the moral insight presents us with an extraordinary moment: it is the birth of
conscience within each of us and among all of us! It is no less than the creation of a
new world! A shared world! There is now no longer just an “I” but a “we”! Our
language changes—there is a first-, second-, and third-person plural now! Kant
would say that now categorical imperatives are possible; now there is a kingdom of
ends in terms of which our moral judgments can be measured. John Stuart Mill
would say that now there is a greater number than I to whose happiness (“higher
quality pleasure”) my actions can and must be dedicated.
In the field of ethics, then, the moral insight is the departure point for all normative and applied reflection.

7.2 Moral Projection, Leadership,
and the Institutional Insight
The next step is crucial, however. A great deal of my work in the field of business
and organizational ethics has turned on the analogical predication of moral attributes to organized groups or corporations—attributes like conscience and responsibility. Inspired by Plato’s methodology in the Republic, I first offered the Principle
of Moral Projection:
It is appropriate not only to describe organizations and their characteristics by analogy with
individuals, it is also appropriate normatively to look for and to foster moral attributes in
organizations by analogy with those we look for and foster in individuals. (Goodpaster 1997)

I believe that this methodology fits well with what I call the institutional insight,
which contrasts with Royce’s moral insight in that it applies not so much to the
ordinary private lives of persons but to the mindsets of organizational leaders as
they navigate their institutions through the cultural waters that they inhabit. The
institutional insight is similar to the moral insight in the sense that, at its core, it is
about the social importance of institutions—and it can be lost and regained, as well
as supported or unsupported by “resolutions” on the part of senior leadership.
As with the moral insight, the institutional insight, from the point of view of
institutional leadership, represents a discovery moment—a moment in which leadership can exclaim:

7.3

The Anthropological Insight—Seeking the Common Good

79

This organization is not alone! It is really an institution! It is part of a joint venture with
other similar organizations now and over (past) time devoted to the dignity and common
good of humankind. Yes, we must lead and govern this organization so that it survives its
current competitive pressures—but we must also see it as one in a long line of organizations
of its kind called to make contributions to the common good.

What kinds of contributions? Contributions to transportation; to the provision of
energy; to financial services; to commerce and its supply chains; to housing; to
healthcare; to family life; to executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government; to law enforcement; to education and the application of knowledge; and
on and on.
Of course, institutions may fail at their callings or vocations—they may thereby
“institutionalize” injustice (render it systemic) or unethical practices that perpetuate
wrongdoing. In such cases, we call for reforming or rehabilitating institutions.
All of these contributions, at various levels, from families and schools to nation
states and international alliances—and in various domains of human fulfillment,
from work to learning to leisure to worship to the pursuit of justice—represent contributions to human dignity and the common good.
Thus, the discovery by leaders of the institutional insight is the discovery that
their organizations have social callings, not just individual purposes, and that these
social callings underwrite the moral expectations we have toward them, not unlike
the way conscience in individuals underwrites individual moral expectations.
Corporations, through the lens of the institutional insight, can be said to have (or
lack) consciences in a similar way that individuals, through the lens of the moral
insight, can be said to have (or lack) consciences. And corporations, through the
lens of the institutional insight, can make their social contributions at various levels
and in various domains of human endeavor.

7.3 The Anthropological Insight—Seeking
the Common Good
Both the moral insight and the institutional insight enlarge our minds and hearts
dramatically by opening them up to a shared reality—by transforming a self-
centered mindset into a social mindset. As noted above, however, there is another
transformation that is essential to a well-grounded normative ethics for both individuals and organizations. What I/we want, wish, desire, have an interest in, seek at
the moment—whatever this may be—could fall short, could fail to be good. Here
we have an echo of G.E. Moore’s Open Question Argument: “This is something I
want, wish, desire, have an interest in, seek at the moment, but is it good?”
(Moore 1903).
Royce’s idea of “treating someone unselfishly” raises a question that is not self-
answering: How do I truly serve and do good for human beings? This question
introduces another dimension into the conscience of the individual and of the
would-be leader: Is there such a thing as the nature of a human being and a shared
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idea of human fulfillment or human flourishing? The answer to this question requires
what we call an anthropology. If ethics is supposed to serve human well-being, we
need a minimally shared conception of what human well-being is!
The ideas of “human dignity” and the “common good” cannot be fully understood without a sufficiently shared anthropology that allows for “the good of the
whole person and of all persons.” And for this to be possible, a perspective is needed
that sees human persons as physical, emotional, social, and spiritual beings. I have
referred to this as the anthropological insight:
the realization that a satisfactory normative account of business (or organizational) ethics
requires a comprehensive view of the good for the human person and ultimately of the common good for the human community, an anthropology, without which appeals to the interests of shareholders or stakeholders have no content.

In a society or moral culture as fragmented as ours, can we hope to find consensus
on an account of human dignity and the good for human beings? When the prospects for such a consensus seem dim, we must remember that any normative assertion of right or wrong, good or bad, virtue or vice, carries with it to some degree an
implicit commitment to a picture of human flourishing—of what it is to be a human
being deserving of respect and (at least) the pursuit of happiness. For without such
an implicit commitment (appeal), normative judgments inevitably collapse into subjective exhortations on the part of those who utter them—exercises in self-will,
perhaps, but not exercises in reason-based (or even faith-based) moral argument.
It is true, of course, as I discussed in Chap. 2, that there are different moral traditions with different emphases on the central aspects of human nature that should
guide or govern conscience. What is striking, however, is not the multiplicity of
these traditions and their contents, but their congruence.
Much more work remains to be done in this anthropological arena to clarify the
elements of our human “moral inheritance”—work that inevitably includes questions about our origins and our destiny—but it is essential work if we are to develop
a coherent notion of our common good.
Whether the ethical aspiration is a Kantian “kingdom of ends” or a utilitarian
“greatest happiness of the greatest number,” either of which can be viewed as
approximations to what Catholic Social Teaching calls the common good, the challenge will always be to find practical choices and corporate policies aimed at “goods
that are truly good and services that truly serve.” (Goodpaster 2012)
Such goods and services contribute both to the well-being/dignity of each whole
person and to the wellbeing/dignity of all persons without conventional utilitarian
compromises and tradeoffs. A faith-based anthropology supports an arrangement of
the world that allows all people’s interests to coincide—an ultimate resolution in the
kingdom of heaven of the challenges to happiness and justice that we experience
on earth.
As I indicated in Chap. 4, it matters greatly for a normative account of ethics
whether one believes that there is a fundamental coordination of people’s interests
by a higher power. Human flourishing “of each whole person and of all persons”
may not be a realistic aspiration without such an ultimate reconciliation of interests.
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A secular worldview may inevitably have a distinct picture of the common good, a
more limited “humanistic” approach to happiness, justice, and dignity. This depends,
of course, on whether faith and reason can arrive at similar accounts of the right and
the obligatory, of virtue and vice, of the good for humankind.
In sum, the anthropological insight aims to resolve two important challenges in
applied ethics:
1. the challenge to avoid relativism regarding “the good” associated with both personal and institutional conscience; and
2. the challenge to conceptualize the common good in a way that avoids the stumbling block of utilitarian compromises (promoting one party’s wellbeing at the
expense of another party’s wellbeing, and at the expense of justice when wrongdoing has been severe).
Conscience calls for more than an acknowledgement of our sociality—it calls also
for a substantive insight into our humanity: Who am I and who is my neighbor? This
is what lies behind a call for “goods that are truly good and services that truly
serve.” Let us turn now to my fourth conviction.

7.4 The Socratic Insight: Dialogue, Discernment,
and Finding Moral Common Ground
It is not an accident that the comprehensive picture of humankind discussed in connection with the anthropological insight should figure centrally in our decision
making about not only how to treat others but also how to teach or educate others
when it comes to applied normative ethics. This is the role of the Socratic insight,
which is simply the application of the first three insights (above) to the perennial
task in every generation of passing on the torch of a healthy conscience, sustaining
a core set of values. Socrates understood, perhaps better than anyone, that it was the
love of wisdom (philo-sophia) that needed to be cultivated and passed on if wisdom
were to survive. And if “wisdom can’t be told” (as discussed in Chap. 5), then methods for somehow communicating wisdom across generations needed to be developed. And these methods needed to embody the three insights: the moral, the
institutional, and the anthropological.
The influence of the case method in my journey as an educator has been substantial. I believe that the dialogical process, with a teacher properly managing respect
for student participants, will lead the group closer to something resembling the truth
than using any other method.
For this to happen, both the teacher and the student need to understand that the
enterprise in which they are engaged when business ethics is the subject matter is
not ordinary instruction, information sharing, historical criticism, or case analysis.
It must include these things, to be sure, but it is, at its foundation, a different kind of
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enterprise: moral formation, the shaping of the professional consciences of students
with an eye toward the common good.
The Socratic insight is the realization in the educational process of the moral
insight in the general case of agents and recipients. It is the realization of the other
(student, employee, executive) as one whose moral awareness can be elicited
through respectful dialogue. Or to put it differently, it is to engage in professional
moral formation using a method that practices the very virtues it seeks to inculcate:
conscience, personal and institutional, in service of the common good.
The very first article I published in a refereed journal, “Morality and Dialogue”
(1975), explored the meaning of “dialogue” as the source of ethical understanding.
The Socratic insight seems to bring this book, and my career, full circle (Fig. 7.1).

7.5 Recent Directions in Business Decision Making—Ethics
and Its Counterfeits
A recent New York Times article by David Gelles entitled “Red Brands and Blue
Brands: Is Hyper-Partisanship Coming for Corporate America?” (2021) summed up
many of my concerns about the field of business ethics—concerns that began during
the run up to the 2016 election of Donald J. Trump as President of the United States.
Gelles opines, alluding to the 2020 Trump re-election campaign, that
More likely is a world where chief executives and the companies they lead are more and
more often affiliated with one party or the other. When Mr. Trump ran for re-election, news
sites feverishly tracked which executives were supporting his campaign, and which had
sided with Joe Biden. In the months since the Jan. 6 insurrection at the U.S. Capitol,
research groups have tracked which companies are donating to Republicans who voted
against certifying the Electoral College results.

In the years since my retirement in 2014–15, one of the more notable trends in the
academy and in the business community has been the partisan polarization suggested by Gelles, a polarization that he seems to believe is likely to continue.
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The 2021 presidential address at the Society for Business Ethics by Danielle
E. Warren of Rutgers University entitled “‘Woke’ Corporations and the Stigmatization
of Corporate Social Initiatives” (Warren 2022) also paid special notice to the politicization phenomenon, as well as C. Rhodes’s book Woke Capitalism: How Corporate
Morality is Sabotaging Democracy (Rhodes 2021).
To someone, such as myself, whose life project has been articulating and helping
to implement the ideal of a corporation being responsible (analogized with a responsible individual with a healthy conscience), the prospect of a corporate leadership
team deliberately steering the organization in a partisan political direction is quite
simply abhorrent. It represents an abandonment of the pursuit of ethical responsibility in favor of political partisanship.
Perhaps the setting aside of the moral point of view in business ethics in favor of
a partisan political perspective is a temptation that regularly presents itself to leaders in power. After all, Royce did refer to a kind of “forgetting”—when “[o]ur
neighbor becomes obscured. . . [h]e is once more a foreign power. . . [h]e is unreal.
. . [w]e are again deluded and selfish.” (Royce 1885) At times during the past several
years, in the name of “reds” and “blues,” it has seemed like companies were entering the fray as one foreign power against another, indeed against even those persons
within their organizations who held contrary views. In my view, this has been a
“forgetting” of the kind to which Royce alluded.
On more conservative (stockholder primacy) accounts of corporate governance,
such partisanship could be viewed as property theft pure and simple. On more liberal (stakeholder primacy) accounts of corporate governance, partisan political allocation of corporate resources without a careful analysis of the implications for
employee stakeholders, customers, suppliers, and local communities runs the risk of
significant injustice, if not backlash from stakeholders whose political leanings are
contrary to those of corporate leadership.
Partisanship, almost by definition, is a counterfeit for conscience in the sense that
it represents an outsourcing of decision making values from the (private sector)
company center to various power centers ultimately aimed at executive, legislative,
and judicial (public sector) offices. (There are other counterfeits for corporate conscience, by the way, such as maximization of shareholder return, corporate compliance, and socialism, but these call for separate discussions.)
Returning to partisanship, however, there are two problems.
1. One is that joining forces with polarized social power centers and guiding corporate behavior (policy making, resource allocation, even human resource management) accordingly seems to derail the orienting, institutionalizing, and sustaining
of core company values identified over time as constituting the moral identity of
the organization. I wrote extensively about this topic in my 2007 book Conscience
and Corporate Culture. The “derailing” consists in externalizing or alienating
the conscience of the corporation in the direction of competing political ideologies (left or right) that are seeking allegiance.
2. The other problem is that the eventual cultural outcome of such outsourcing
behavior over time blurs the lines between private sector and public sector insti-
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tutions. The blurring of the sectors (public, private, moral/cultural) has always
been an issue at their margins and intersections, but when the private sector
jumps into the public sector (or for that matter vice versa) faults develop in the
underlying structure of the social system itself. My concern is that if we are not
circumspect, this can happen to the American social system.
Significant efforts are being made at this writing (and as indicated in Chap. 5), by
organizations like Braver Angels, to depolarize the “culture of contempt” and to find
common ground.
Where will these efforts lead in the face of the cultural forces that confront
them—forces that would displace business ethics with business partisan politics and
social fragmentation? It is difficult to say, impossible to predict. The answer surely
lies in the minds and hearts of the next generation of business leadership—formed
as they will be by the current generation of executives and business educators.
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The painting by early impressionist François Millet entitled The Sower (1850)
has for many years been an inspiration to me in my teaching and my research. So it
seems appropriate at the end of these reflections on my career to share it with my
readers. It shows the Sower casting his seed with energy to complete his task as
evening approaches. As I said at the end of Chap. 6, these reflections on the field of
applied ethics are “ending for me in a period of challenge with hopeful signs–but
beginning for you to carry forward with these same hopeful signs.” I hope that my
sowing of seeds will bear fruit in the work of those who might read these words.
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 ppendix 2a: Toward an Integrated Approach
A
to Business Ethics
KENNETH E. GOODPASTER
What are the practical limits of moral imagination and vision? Is there a collective or institutional ethic beyond the ethics of the individual? (McCoy 106)

Abstract This essay offers an interpretation of accountability in business ethics on
three scales or levels of analysis—the person, the organization, and the economic
system. Utilizing innovative work in mathematics on “fractals,” the author suggests
both descriptive and prescriptive implications of this conceptual model.
Relationships of this account to recent literature in business ethics are indicated,
as well as its classical roots. Theorists and practitioners alike are invited to expand
and apply the ideas presented with a view toward future research.
THE AIM OF THIS ESSAY is to outline a framework or model for accountability in business ethics. To help motivate such an undertaking, I will sketch in Part I
an overview of the field and then suggest some basic categories for classifying
research.
Part II will go beyond classification toward an integrated approach to issues in
the field. A geometrical analogue will be presented—the concept of a fractal—and
it will be related to ethics with the help of a case study.
Part III will then draw out some of the theoretical and practical implications of
“moral fractals,” along with directions for future research.
Part I. Motivating the Model
There is today a growing network of educators in business ethics that includes not
only philosophers and theologians, but also humanities scholars, social scientists,
and managers—all of whom are as interested in applying practice to theory as they
are in applying theory to practice. The discussion that follows is intended for this
growing audience and seeks to develop a vocabulary for dialogue that is interdisciplinary without sacrificing precision and clarity of thought.
A Field Both Old and New
Interest in the subject matter of business ethics has, by most accounts, grown dramatically over the past two decades. Business managers, academicians, and the general public have come to appreciate in new ways the importance of the relationship
between economic excellence and ethical judgment. Speculation abounds, of
‘‘Toward an Integrated Approach to Business Ethics,” Thought, Volume 60 (June, 1985), pp.
161–180.
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course, as to why this interest has developed: institutional self-examination after
Watergate, the environmental movement, concern over employee rights, the
increased number of working women, affirmative action regarding minorities, new
challenges on the health and safety front, competition and comparisons with
European and Asian business practices, and so on. Probably none of these factors is
a sufficient explanation, but jointly they explain a lot.
Many of the concerns that are now being addressed under the rubric of “business
ethics” were addressed during earlier decades under different names. Some were
called “business and society.” Others were called “human relations in organizations.” Still others focused on “business-government relations” or “international
business.” There is, therefore, considerable topical continuity and history to what is
now called business ethics.
If there is a new twist, it has to do with a more sustained and systematic push in
the seventies and eighties for an application of the tools and concepts of the humanities. Whereas in previous decades, it was largely the social sciences (psychology,
sociology, economics, and political science) to which management studies turned,
we see today increasing attention to disciplines such as philosophy and theology. An
awareness seems to be growing that there are as many untapped resources in the
disciplines that focus on frameworks for ethical thought as in those that focus on
individual and group behavior.1
Ethics: Three Ways of Thinking About Morality
“Ethics” and “moral philosophy” refer to a domain of inquiry, a discipline in which
matters of right and wrong, good and evil, virtue and vice, are systematically (or at
least carefully) examined. “Morality,” by contrast, most often refers not to a discipline but to a pattern of thought and action “in place” in an individual or a group or
a whole society. Thus morality is what the discipline of ethics is about—and business morality is what business ethics is about.
Understood in this way, ethical inquiry may take one of three forms: descriptive,
normative, or analytical. It is useful to distinguish these forms not just to maintain
precise terminology but because discussions that ignore their differences create
confusion. A comment like “for Americans bribery is unethical but for others not
so” illustrates how such confusion can arise.

Some notable examples of recent texts, anthologies, and casebooks are: Bowie, Business Ethics;
DeGeorge, Business Ethics; Donaldson, Corporations and Morality; Barry, Moral Issues in
Business; Beauchamp and Bowie, Ethical Theory and Business; Des Jardins and McCall,
Contemporary Issues in Business Ethics; Donaldson and Werhane, Ethical Issues in Business: A
Philosophical Approach; Hoffman and Moore, Business Ethics: Readings and Cases in Corporate
Morality; Regan, Just Business: New Introductory Essays in Business Ethics; Williams and Houck,
The Judeo-Christian Vision and the Modern Corporation; Velasquez, Business Ethics: Concepts
and Cases; Werhane, Persons, Rights, and Corporations; Beauchamp, Case Studies in Business,
Society, and Ethics; Donaldson, Case Studies in Business Ethics; Goodpaster, Ethics in
Management; Matthews, Goodpaster, and Nash, Policies and Persons: A Casebook in
Business Ethics.
1
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If the intention is descriptive, the speaker would (correctly or not) be claiming
that there are differences in moral beliefs about bribery across societies. If the intention is analytical, the speaker would (again, correctly or not) be saying something
about the lack of an objective or crosscultural ethical standard. Finally, if the intention is normative, the speaker would be expressing a conviction about the moral
unacceptability of bribery, at least for Americans. Any agreement or disagreement
that we might have with the speaker, then, depends a great deal on how we understand the comment.
Much philosophical effort has been devoted in this country to the analytical form
of ethical inquiry (also referred to as metaethics). Some have sought to make normative ethics objective by defining “good” and “right” in empirically verifiable
terms. Others, convinced that such definitions involved an “is/ought” fallacy, found
themselves unable to offer an alternative account of objectivity and lapsed into ethical relativism.
While a primary task of this essay will be analytical, in the sense of providing a
model or conceptual framework, equally important are the descriptive and prescriptive tasks that it seeks to advance, i.e., understanding the values that can and should
guide persons and organizations in the context of democratic capitalism as a socioeconomic system.
Moral Transactions: The Subject Matter of Ethics
If morality, as the subject matter of ethics, refers to a pattern of thought and action
in the real world, what kind of pattern might this be? Following philosopher Alan
Gewirth, we can say that morality has to do with transactions between “agents” and
“recipients” in which what is affected is the recipient’s freedom and well-being, and
hence his capacity for action. Such modes of affecting in transactions can be most
readily recognized in their negative forms: when one person coerces another, hence
preventing him from participating purposively or with well-being in the transaction. (78).
At the core of morality, then, is the idea of a transaction between parties in which
the freedom and well-being of each is at stake. One of the merits of this characterization is that it implies two importantly different functions for ethical reflection:
1. Understanding the nature of the parties to moral transactions and the criteria for
identifying members of each group (agents and recipients); and
2. Giving critical attention to the transactions themselves (either prospectively or
retrospectively), using frameworks such as those implicit in Gewirth’s mention
of the “freedom and well-being” of the parties.
Unfortunately, the first of these two functions has been insufficiently explored by
philosophers. There is a tendency to assume that the parties to moral transactions
are easily identified or that ethical problems come prepackaged with respect to
“agent” and “recipient.” Since the conventional paradigm is one in which the parties
are individual persons, e.g., “Cain strikes Abel,” one could easily overlook the fact
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that an initial process of interpretation takes place, and that such a process might
have ethical ramifications of its own. The moral point of view or conscience, after
identifying Cain and Abel as relevant parties, moves directly to the challenge of
evaluating the transaction between them.
Debates over the morality of abortion illustrate the importance of distinguishing
these two functions of ethical reflection, for it becomes clear that a question of the
first type—“ls the fetus a human life in the morally relevant sense?”—lies behind
the question of the second type—“How are we to evaluate the taking of this life?”
Conventional wisdom about the parties to various moral transactions can be and
has been called into question in recent years. Concerns about the environment as
well as concerns about business and professional ethics have led many to ask: What
are the criteria for including something in the range of morally “considerable”
recipients or in the domain of morally “accountable” agents? Who or what might
count as considerable from the moral point of view? Obviously contemporary individual persons, but what about other possibilities: future persons? developing persons? animals? whole systems of living things? Such questioning is at the foundation
of what is now called environmental ethics, and is leading us to a deeper understanding of the roots of Western moral thought.2
More important for present purposes is the question: What might count as an
“agent” or morally accountable in the basic ethical transaction? Again, the conventional paradigm tells us that individual persons count. But what about organizations
and nations or whole social systems? Are these not significant actors on the human
stage and are they not in some sense “more than the sums of their parts (individual
members)”? Might corporate or government policy decisions and various forms of
resource allocation be thought of as “transactions” on an institutional scale?3
In the context of business ethics, what I have called the conventional paradigm
has led many researchers to focus on business transactions (e.g., employment, production, investment, marketing, accounting, etc.) without identifying the morally
accountable parties in such transactions.4 There is a danger, however, in relying
solely upon this approach in defining our subject matter. We shall see that it can lead
to a kind of myopia or narrowness of vision with respect to the full complexity of
the issues involved. .
Figure A2.1 depicts the basic moral transaction, labeling the class to which the
agent belongs the “domain of moral accountability”and the class to which the recipiept belongs the “range of moral considerability.” It leaves open questions regarding
who or what might belong to each of these two classes.

For further discussion of the range of moral considerability, see Goodpaster, 1978 and 1979.
For further discussion of the domain of moral accountability, see Goodpaster, “Morality and
Organizations,” and “The Concept of Corporate Responsibility.”
4
An examination of the tables of contents of the books listed in footnote #1 will confirm this point.
Also see Braybrooke, Ethics in the World of Business; Jones, Doing Ethics in Business; and
Solomon and Hanson, Above the Bottom Line.
2
3
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Fig. A2.1 Morality as a transaction

Mapping the Domain of Moral Accountability
While business ethics can and should include questions about considerability (e.g.,
Do organizations have rights?), primary attention naturally turns to the domain of
moral accountability in exploring the conventional paradigm for business transactions. The three most plausible candidates for moral accountability are the choices
and characters of persons, the policies and cultures of organizations, and the
arrangements and ideologies of entire social systems (such as democratic
capitalism).
Much if not all recent research in business ethics can be classified as descriptive,
normative, or analytical with respect to issues on one of these three levels, though
as we have seen, most writers use a more transaction-oriented classification scheme.
The problem of “whistle-blowing” illustrates the ethics of the person, for example,
and might be examined descriptively through case studies (How and to whom does
it become an issue?), normatively through moral arguments (When is it right and
when is it wrong?), or analytically through inquiries into meaning and justification
(Can we define and defend it as a practice?).5
Issues such as employee rights, product safety, and environmental protection
illustrate the ethics of the organization and, again, can be investigated along descriptive, normative, and analytical lines.6 The ethics of the social system itself can come

See Westin, Whistleblowing!; Maccoby, The Gamesman and The Leader.
See Ewing, Freedom Inside the Organization and Do It My Way Or You’re Fired!; also Stone,
Where the Law Ends: The Social Control of Corporate Behavior.
5
6
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Fig. A2.2 The domain of moral accountability

under scrutiny in the arena of international business practices such as questionable
payments or exports of hazardous substances.7
Figure A2.2 depicts the distinctions so far discussed, arranging the levels of
moral accountability to indicate a broadening of scope as one moves upward from
the level of the person.
One senses in this multiplicity of issues and levels a somewhat disordered “state
of the art” in the field of business ethics. Part II will outline a framework or model
that not only helps to classify research in the field but also illuminates linkages
between research efforts and results on different levels.
Part II. Explicating the Model
Metaphysics aside, we think naturally of the domain of players on the human stage
as populated by several “levels” of accountability. The institutional structures that
we both form and are formed by admit of meaningful description and evaluation in
terms analogous to those applied to individual persons. Once we begin to move in
this direction, however, we are moving beyond simply “classifying” problems and
issues in the field of business ethics.
Beyond Classification
What might it mean to go “beyond classification” in the direction of a unified framework for business ethics? We get a hint about an answer to this question when we
ask another: Might there be relationships among the three levels of moral accountability that contribute to our understanding of each issue or problem that we
7
See Evans, Management Ethics: An Intercultural Perspective. Also see Heilbroner, Business
Civilization in Decline; Lodge, The New American Ideology; and Novak, The Spirit of Democratic
Capitalism.
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meet—much as when we look through different lenses on a microscope or camera,
we reveal successive layers of detail and various kinds of kinship among them?
If so, then specific issues in business ethics might turn out to have several scales
or level scales or levels of moral detail to them (system, organization, person). And
we might inquire as to whether there were useful generalizations or patterns to be
found from level to level for a given problem or kind of problem. One might seek
not only to identify and address issues consistently on any given level, but also to
relate the levels themselves in ways that might have implications for both philosophical understanding and management practice. Phenomena on one level might
be expected to illuminate or even explain phenomena on other levels.8
Such an approach is what I will propose—going beyond classification in the
direction of a unified framework by taking cues from a branch of contemporary
mathematics: the theory of “fractals.” I will argue later that this approach has significant heuristic value for the three kinds of ethical inquiry mentioned earlier:
descriptive, normative, and analytical.
An Integrating Image: Fractals in Geometry
There seems to be wide consensus in the mathematical community that the inventor
of “fractals” is Benoit B. Mandelbrot, whose original essays on the subject have
been refined in his book The Fractal Geometry of Nature. Mandelbrot coined the
term “fractal” a decade ago (from the Latin fractus: broken or fragmented) to refer
to geometrical objects that have a unique property, unlike ordinary Euclidean
curves. If you look at a circle, Mandelbrot explains,
then look at it more and more closely, you will see a smaller and smaller segment of the
curve and it will appear to become straighter and straighter. There is no new structure in a
circle at higher magnifications. It simply looks more and more like a straight line. But
imagine a shape in which increasing detail is revealed with increasing magnification, and
the newly revealed structure looks the same as what you have seen at lower magnifications.
This shape is a fractal. (McDermott 112)

Not all fractals are strictly “self-similar” in the sense of being assembled out of
smaller identical copies of themselves (like the classic “Koch Snowflake” in Fig.
A2.3, courtesy of B. Mandelbrot).
In some cases the similarity is only statistical. Mandelbrot points out, for example, that
the coast of Britain is not an exact copy of parts of itself. However, if you magnify a section
of the coastline, it looks like a plausible piece of coastline from somewhere. Its pattern of
wiggles is the same; there are the same number, roughly, of big wiggles and medium wiggles and small wiggles. In a statistical sense, it looks just like it did before. Just as a twig
resembles a branch and a branch resembles the tree, each part of a fractal is like the whole.
This property, that the statistical nature of the object remains the same if it is magnified, is
known as statistical self-similarity, and it is very common indeed in nature. (Prince 48)

One is reminded here of Hume’s relations of resemblance, contiguity, and causality (Treatise,
Book I, 4).

8
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Fig. A2.3 A fractal produced by adding more and more triangles to the sides of triangles

The concept of a fractal, sketched here in only the most elementary terms, has
opened up new vistas in science and mathematics for two basic reasons: manageability and explanatory utility. By manageability, I mean simply the technical
capacity to generate computer representations of hitherto “chaotic” phenomena—to
see them as possessing an unexpected regularity:
Until recently, scientists believed that the only shapes that were useful in science were those
simple Euclidean shapes, lines, planes, and spheres; all else was chaos. There was order and
there was disorder. Now there is order (simple shapes), manageable chaos (fractals) and
unmanageable chaos. (McDermott 115)

By explanatory utility I mean that fractal geometry often enables us to predict the
behavior of natural objects better than conventional constructs. Mandelbrot believed
that fractals described nature better than any Euclidean shapes and he set out to
prove it:
(Mandelbrot) scavenged problems that scientists had swept under the rugs of their disciplines, problems that did not fit conventional thinking. He characterized price jumps in the
stock market, turbulence in the weather, the distribution of galaxies, the flooding of the
Nile, even the length of coastlines. (McDermott 114)

The contexts in which the theory of fractals has found application, therefore, are
many and varied—including meteorology, geography, metallurgy, computer science, and economics. While I have been unable to discover any previous applications in the field of ethics, it is my hope that in the future such an idea will not seem
strange. The suggestion of this essay is that the notion of a fractal has as much
power in the context of moral subjects as in the context of natural objects.9
Giving Meaning to “Moral Fractals”
To clarify this latter suggestion, and thus to give meaning to the notion of a “moral
fractal,” three features of our geometrical analogue need to be emphasized. Each
represents a condition or requirement for the transferability of the notion of a fractal
to the field of ethics.
See Mandelbrot, especially Chapter XII, for connections between fractal geometry and certain
basic themes in classical philosophical and scientific thought.
9
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1. The first feature is that our ordinary intuitions about space permit mathematical
objects to have similar properties at various “scales”—and therefore to be self-
similar. While this may seem obvious for geometry, it is less obvious in the
domain of moral accountability and therefore deserves special notice.
It is necessary for the intelligibility of moral fractals that ethical attributes be meaningful at different “scales” (person, organization, system). Without some constancy
of meaning across levels of attribution, similarity between levels cannot be defined.
And without the availability of similarity as a relation among levels, the idea of
fractal self-similarity cannot be understood.
Thus concepts like “right” and “wrong,” “good” and “evil,” “responsible” and
“virtuous,” must have analogous meaning as applied to moral subjects on the personal, organizational, and systematic levels. Otherwise the fractal comparison cannot even get a foothold.
This way of thinking is already implicit in our use of persons, organizations, and
systems as units of analysis in social scientific description and explanation. It is not
only logically possible, but often quite illuminating, to view them as agents in transactions with other persons, organizations, and systems, particularly when they manifest symptoms of rationality and self-interest. We speak, for example, of the goals
and purposes of individuals like Tom and Mary, the interests and strategies of organizations like IBM, and the directions of entire social systems including nations and
groups of nations (e.g., “the West”).
I have argued elsewhere that it is meaningful to attribute general moral characteristics to organizations by analogy with individual persons.10 Extending this line
of thought to social systems by analogy with organizations, of course, requires certain qualifications (having to do with the sense in which such systems can be “managed” as unified wholes), but raises no insurmountable obstacles.
2. The second feature of our geometrical analogue that needs emphasis is that it is
a theory about “full-scale” objects. That is, while it is possible to distinguish
between scales from the point of view of the scientific observer, objects come
packaged in nature with all scales in place at once.
The corresponding feature of moral accountability is illuminating, for it represents a condition (in fact satisfied) that persons, organizations, and systems do not
come separated neatly in real life. They are inevitably and inextricably linked. A
moral fractal is a complex reality made up of persons-in-organizations-in-systems
that manifests more or less self-similarity with respect to a given set of ethical characteristics. It is not enough in trying to understand problem situations to focus on
individuals or organizations or systems in isolation from one another. This point
will be clarified further in the next section with the help of a case study.
3. The third feature of our geometrical analogue that should be emphasized is that
not all fractals are strictly self-similar. One should not interpret the claim that
certain persons or organizations are parts of moral fractals to mean that precisely
10

Goodpaster, “The Concept of Corporate Responsibility.”
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the same attributes will be found in one that are found in the other. It may be that
the attributes are only remotely similar—or indeed it may be that they are not
similar at all, but eventually will be given the playing out of certain social or
psychological dynamics.
In the context of moral accountability, this last feature of fractal geometry
requires that we be able to make sense of partial similarities as well as tendencies
toward congruence from one level to another. That this condition is satisfied can be
seen from such observations as the following by psychiatrist M. Scott Peck, writing
of the infamous massacre at MyLai:
For many years it has seemed to me that human groups tend to behave in much the same
ways as human individuals—except at a level that is more primitive and immature than one
might expect.

Why this is so, Peck says, he does not know. But he adds:
It is an extremely important question, deserving great thought and research. It is an issue
not only specific to group evil in general—as if that were not enough—but crucial to the
understanding of all human group phenomena, from international relations to the nature of
the family. (216)

Up to this point, we have been exploring the meaningfulness of the notion of a
moral fractal in terms of three key features of its geometrical analogue. These features add up to the simultaneous presence in real world situations of different levels
of moral accountability and different degrees of self-similarity. Let us now enrich
this somewhat abstract analogy with the help of a case study, and then (in Part III)
explore some of its philosophical and managerial implications.
Moral Fractals in Business Ethics: A Case Study
Consider the (disguised but real) case of John Reed, president of the Food Products
Division of Diversified Industries, Inc., a large multinational corporation headquartered in Atlanta, Georgia:
It had been a very profitable year, but Reed was under pressure to misrepresent his division’s financial success by asking several major suppliers to bill him in advance for amounts
totalling $1 million in future goods and services. This would reduce profits just enough to
make his division's goal for the year, while not encouraging corporate headquarters to
increase the goal too much for next year. Forty percent of Reed’s compensation, as well as
the compensation of a significant number of his best managers, depended upon the bonus
allocated for achieving the division’s annual financial goals.
Each year Reed was expected to sign a document attesting to his compliance with
Diversified’s Code of Ethics, a code that explicitly mentioned honest financial reporting.
Nevertheless, he was aware that his ambitious counterparts in other divisions understated
their income regularly as a kind of “savings account” for future success.

What, and on what level, is the ethical problem in this case? It is possible to view
the case as a study in the ethics of the person—John Reed—as he struggled to maintain his integrity in the face of significant pressures to compromise. It is also
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possible to view it as a study in the ethics of the organization—Diversified Industries,
Inc.—as it sought to encourage both ethical behavior and dependable growth
through a management incentive system. On still a third level, it is possible to view
the case as a study in the values and competitive dynamics of capitalism itself: large
and small investors guide their resource-allocation decisions by the quarterly and
annual earnings reported by large organizations.
To ask “On what level is the ethical problem in this case?” is, in a sense, to do
violence to the moral reality of the situation. It is to look at the level structure
depicted earlier in Fig. 2 from a classificatory rather than a fractal point of view. A
full understanding of John Reed’s problem and meaningful suggestions for resolving it demand that we look at the issues on all three levels at once and that we see
the relationships between them. The “problem” does not exist on only one level—
any more than objects in nature exist on only one “scale”—even though they must
of course present themselves to us at a given scale.
Thus it would be accurate—but misleading—to say that this is a case about whistleblowing, or about corporate management incentive systems and ethical codes, or
about the values implicit in capital markets. In reality, it is a case about all three—
and about their “connectedness.” What is more, we can see certain structural similarities on each level of moral accountability: the person, the organization, and the
system each confront circumstances in which “breaking ranks” in the name of ethical values could be costly. We cannot fully understand the moral transactions (and
hence responsibilities) in this case until we see them as resonating through several
levels of moral accountability.11
Part III. Some Implications of the Model
I shall call the strategic or methodological principle that I am proposing here the
“Moral Fractal Principle”(MFP).12 In its simplest form it can be stated as follows:
(MFP) Persons, organizations, and social systems can usefully be seen from the fractal
point of view as aspects of self-similar coalitions of moral accountability.

Just as many phenomena in nature can usefully be seen as complex unities which
copy themselves when one enlarges or reduces their scale, the MFP asserts that
certain ethical “patterns” reappear in the domain of moral accountability at the
“scale” of the person, the organization, and the system as a whole. Morally accountable “coalitions” in transactions, like “players” in game theory, can be understood

Greater detail on this and several other case studies that invite ethical analysis from a fractal point
of view can be found in Goodpaster, Ethics in Management.
12
Readers of Goodpaster, “The Concept of Corporate Responsibility” will see in the MFP a generalization of what I there called the “Principle of Moral Projection” (see §8). Readers will also see
that a corresponding “Fractal Principle of Moral Considerability” might be developed on the other
side of the transaction in Figure 1. The seeds for such a corresponding principle were planted in
the essay “From Egoism to Environmentalism.”
11
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and analyzed similarly on multiple levels—not in “perceptual” space, as with geometrical fractals, but in “conceptual” space.13
To try to set out the full implications of the fractal point of view in business ethics
would take us beyond the scope of this essay, but we can get a sense of its heuristic
value for three primary groups whose interests in the field are significant—social
scientists, managers, and ethical theorists. The perspectives of these groups, it
should be noted, correspond roughly to the branches of ethical inquiry mentioned in
Part I—descriptive, normative, and analytical.
In the three sections that follow, I will discuss some of the implications of the
MFP for these branches of inquiry—touching upon directions for future research.
No attempt will be made to be comprehensive in these discussions; rather, the purpose is to indicate the fertility of the notion of a “moral fractal”for each branch.
Such fertility is, in the end, the strongest argument for any methodological principle.
The Social Sciences
The MFP has two general implications for the descriptive study of business ethics,
carried on largely by the social sciences. First of all, it supports certain broad similarities in research methods across persons, organizations, and social systems.
Sociologist Philip Selznick has observed that
the study of institutions is in some ways comparable to the clinical study of personality. It
requires a genetic and developmental approach, an emphasis on historical origins and
growth stages. There is a need to see the enterprise as a whole and to see how it is transformed as new ways of dealing with a changing environment evolve. As in the case of personality, effective diagnosis depends upon locating the special problems that go along with
a particular character-structure; and we can understand character better when we see it as
the product of self-preserving effort to deal with inner impulses and external demands. In
both personality and institutions “self-preservation” means more than bare organic or material survival. Self-preservation has to do with the maintenance of basic identity, with the
integrity of a personal or institutional “self.” (141)

Selznick’s point has been echoed in other quarters and applied even more directly to
quasimoral characteristics in Robert Axelrod’s game-theoretic study of cooperation.
Axelrod writes:
The emergence, growth, and maintenance of cooperation do require some assumptions
about the individuals and the social setting. . . . Actually, these requirements (for recognition and recall) are not so strong as they might seem. Even bacteria can fulfill them by
interacting with only one other organism and using a strategy which responds only to the

One might view the “level independence” of the notion of a “player” in game theory as an illustration of the relevance of the fractal point of view to nonmoral studies of decision making. See,
for example, Davis, Game Theory: A Nontechnical Introduction.
The word “player,” incidentally, does not have quite the meaning one would expect. A player
need not be one person; he may be a team, a corporation, a nation. It is useful to regard any group
of individuals who have identical interests with respect to the game as a single player. (xvi)

13
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recent behavior of the other player. And if bacteria can play games, so can people and
nations. (174)

Both Selznick and Axelrod reinforce the suggestion of the MFP that categories such
as “self-preservation” and “cooperation.” display empirical similarities from person
to organization to system. Further research is needed that focuses directly on the
moral aspects of such characteristics as perception, reasoning, coordination, and
implementation.14
The second general implication of the MFP for social-scientific research goes
beyond similarities of method from one level to another and focuses on the connections between empirical findings on each level. Once we understand that John Reed
(in our case study) is faced with a personal moral dilemma and that Diversified
Products, Inc. is also faced with an organizational moral dilemma, we can explore
the relationships between them.
If we generalize from individual cases, and pursue causal regularities, it becomes
natural to ask such questions as whether capitalism as a system confers virtues or
vices on the organizations and institutions that comprise it; and whether the organizations and institutions that comprise it confer virtues or vices on the persons that
work for them. Similar questions might be raised in the reverse direction (from
persons, through organizations, to the system itself).
Research of this sort has been conducted during the past decade by psychoanalyst Michael Maccoby, for example, who suggests that certain character traits of
responsible executives are selected against by the “psychostructure” of many corporations leading in turn to effects on the overall character of the organizations
themselves.
Some of the questions in this branch of inquiry to which the MFP naturally gives
rise are:
–– What are the most reliable “indicators” of the various moral characteristics in
which we are interested at each level?
–– To what extent do the moral values of managers and employees at various levels
in 1 the organizational hierarchy-influence the moral values of the organization as
a whole—and conversely?
–– To what extent do the moral values of organizations of various sizes in various
sectors influence the moral values of the system as a whole—and conversely?
–– What are the mechanisms by which ethical “accommodation” takes place
between individuals and an organization, between organizations and a system,
and among systems in a global social economy?
The research challenges that lie ahead here will involve understanding patterns that
more conventional research agendas would overlook. Selznick’s observations over
25 years ago still apply, especially if we interpret “diagnosis” (if not “therapy”) in
ethical terms:

14

See Goodpaster, “The Concept of Corporate Responsibility” §6, 7, 9.
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In approaching these problems, there is necessarily a close connection between clinical
diagnosis of particular cases and the development of sound general knowledge. Our problem is to discover the characteristic ways in which types of institutions respond to types of
circumstances. The significant classifications may well depart from common-sense distinctions among enterprises according to whether they perform economic, political, religious,
or military functions. Students of personality have had similar objectives and have made
greater, although still very crude, efforts to get away from common-sense rubrics. Yet,
despite theoretical difficulties, real progress has been made, and clinical success in diagnosis and therapy lends confidence to the larger scientific quest. (142)

In summary, the MFP does have both methodological and substantive heuristic
value for the study of business ethics by social scientists. Let us now turn to the most
concrete purposes that such studies might serve, the normative decision making of
managers themselves.
Business Administration
We have seen that “moral fractals“both merit and encourage further social-scientific
inquiry. But business managers must make and act upon normative ethical judgments about right and wrong, good and evil, virtue and vice. What implications and
heuristic value might the MFP have in the executive suite?
A number of contemporary observers of management have expressed the view
that human values are increasingly becoming a part of the business of business. The
extraordinary popularity of the book In Search of Excellence by Peters and Waterman
is some testimony to the wide following that such a view possesses. Another well-
received book, The Art of Japanese Management by Pascale and Athos, expands on
the point:
Two forces are at work: employees seeking more meaning from their jobs and demanding
more concern from the corporation, and legislative pressures enforcing a broad range of
personal services, including employee rights to counseling. (193)

Management that is responsive to these forces will give special attention to the formulation and implementation of corporate policies for securing “shared values”
among employees. The MFP suggests that this process may be analogous to the
process that system-level regulators face in dealing with corporations. If so, then
corporate executives might consider a kind of “Golden Rule” in order to avoid ethical dissonance: “Regulate internally as you would be regulated externally—no more
but no less.”
A related point about dissonance is that very seldom is it possible in an administrative situation to “do just one thing”—so that conflict and internal inconsistency
must be guarded against. Policies may not only conflict with one another at a given
level (as in the case of the incentive system and the ethics code at Diversified
Industries) but they may interact from one level to the next as well (e.g., ethical
“anarchy” in the name of toleration leading to organizational amorality).
The MFP suggests that the policies governing ethical decisions for the organization as a whole should be similar to the policies governing the ethical behavior of
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individuals and/or the larger system. In other words, the normative ethical role of
the administrator may involve not only the avoidance of conflict on or between levels but the more positive task of developing a set of moral principles or “superordinate goals” for the organization analogous to those he or she would define and
defend for an individual or conversely. To quote Pascale and Athos again:
What is needed in the West is a nondeified, nonreligious “spiritualism” that enables a firm's
superordinate goals to respond truly to the inner meanings that many people seek in their
work—or, alternatively, seek in their lives and could find at work if only that were more
culturally acceptable. (193)

Some of the questions in this arena to which the MFP naturally gives rise are:
–– Is it desirable for a chief executive to try to articulate a statement or formulation
of a corporation’s moral beliefs, especially if they run the risk of disadvantaging
the company with respect to one or more of its many constituencies?
–– What are the most effective techniques for implementing such a statement (if
desirable) to foster an ethical environment in the corporation (management succession, hiring policies, reward systems, organizational structure, etc.)?
–– What is an appropriate degree of “value tolerance” in an organization, avoiding
both indifference and dogmatism?
–– What is an appropriate degree of “value tolerance” in a social system, made up
of organizations and institutions?
Leadership in administration has a profoundly normative aspect to it that reaches
from the level of the organization to both the person and the wider social system.
Managers who ignore this aspect of their role do so not only at their own peril but at
the peril of those—either within or outside—whose lives are touched by the corporation. Selznick summarizes this line of thought eloquently when he writes:
The lesson is this: Those who deal with the more obvious ideals—such as education, science, creativity, or freedom—should more fully recognize the dependence of these ideals
on congenial though often mundane administrative arrangements. On the other hand, those
who deal with more restricted values, such as the maintenance of a particular industrial
competence, should be aware that these values too involve ideals of excellence, ideals that
must be built into the social structure of the enterprise and become part of its basic character. In either case, a too ready acceptance of neutral techniques of efficiency, whatever their
other merits, will contribute little to this institutional development and may even retard
it. (141).

The MFP, then, in addition to its heuristic value for descriptive ethics in the realm
of business, offers normative guidance for those who struggle with the legitimacy
and content of the administrative point of view.
Ethical Theory
We turn now to ethical theory, which, while it includes some of the normative concerns of the previous section, embraces as well the conceptual foundations of moral
thought. Here we discover that the MFP has deep classical roots and that Plato long
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ago appreciated (and presupposed) it in his discussion of justice (Republic, Book
II). The language is richly suggestive in the context of fractals:
SOCRATES: This investigation we are undertaking is not easy, but requires keen
eyesight. As we are not very clever, I think we should adopt a method like this: if
men who did not have keen eyesight were told to read small letters from a distance, and then someone noticed that these same letters were to be found somewhere else on a larger scale and on a larger object, it would be considered a piece
of luck that they could read these first and then examine the smaller letters to see
if they were the same.
FRIENDS: That is certainly true, but what relevance do you see in it to our present
search for justice?
SOCRATES: I will tell you. There is, we say, the justice of one man, and also the
justice of a whole city. And a city is larger than one man. Perhaps there is more
justice in the larger unit, and it may be easier to grasp. So if you are willing, let
us first investigate what justice is in the cities, and afterwards let us look for it in
the individual, observing the similarities to the larger in the smaller.
Plato’s strategy in the above passage represents a rather direct application of the
MFP to the problem of analyzing the concept of justice. Similar moves might be
made with respect to other key moral concepts such as responsibility, virtue, rationality, and respect—as well as into the conditions presupposed by such concepts,
such as unity of consciousness, centralization of control, perception, freedom,
action, etc.Beyond the heuristic value of the MFP for the analysis of moral concepts
and their conditions, however, we can begin to see its value for deepening our
understanding of certain recurrent “conundrums” in ethical theory. Four such issues
have been the topic of much discussion in the twentieth century:
Ethical Relativism Can there be a cross-cultural standard of moral judgment based
on certain universal human characteristics? Or are we reduced to either moral imperialism on the one hand or what one author calls “moral isolationism” on the other?
What are the organizational and systemic analogues to this problem in the context
of multinational corporations and are they related?15.
Ethical Egoism Is it possible to provide a satisfactory account of rationality that
incorporates nonegoistic elements such as respect for others? How would such an
account test against competitive dilemmas in game theory? Is the problem of egoism present in the same way at each level of moral accountability?16
The Naturalistic Fallacy Does the temptation to supply a reductivistic “definition”
of the moral point of view manifest itself at each level of moral accountability? Can
we see in the tendency of corporations to substitute various “stakeholder” interests

15
16

See Midgley, Heart and Mind: The Varieties of Moral Experience.
See Axelrod; also see Goodpaster, “Morality as a System of Categorical Imperatives.”
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for conscience an analogue to this temptation? If so, does the organizational analogue afford any insight into the issue on the personal and systemic levels?
Collective Responsibility How are we to understand the attribution of responsibility (in various senses of that term) to individuals and collectives? Does one imply or
exclude the other?
In connection with the last-mentioned issue, it is perhaps worth mentioning that
the MFP may help resolve recent debates over the implications of ascribing moral
responsibility to corporations. Some have argued, for example, that if we were to
take the notion of corporate (let alone systemic!) responsibility seriously, we would
either be logically or morally forced to ignore individual or personal responsibility—that attribution of responsibility at one level precludes attribution at the other.17
If we take the fractal point of view, however, we can see that there is no pressure
in the direction of exclusivity as we attribute moral characteristics across levels.
Indeed, fractal geometry (in contrast to Euclidean geometry) helps us to understand
precisely how it is possible for characteristics at one level or scale to be present
simultaneously at others without exclusion.18 Recalling our case study, this translates into the observation that John Reed’s personal responsibility for honest
financial reporting is not removed by the acknowledgment of responsibilities on the
part of Diversified Industries for ethical incentive policies or the attribution of
responsibility to the social system for the regulation of capital markets.
We should note, in reflecting on the fundamental issues mentioned here, that the
MFP stimulates new questions and points out new directions for seeking answers in
ethical theory. It does this by forcing us to consider whether and in what sense corporations and social systems, like persons, can be regarded as agents and recipients
in moral transactions. The answers to such questions are not simply logical truths
about moral discourse. They have to do not with possible worlds but with the actual
world in which we live out the moral life.
Nor are they ontological truths about individuals and organizations. The “furniture” of the moral world, like that in one’s study, needn’t be regarded as ontologically primitive or irreducible in order to be used for sitting, writing, storing
information, etc. It serves its purpose if it helps one to get on with the business of
living well. The ontological status of persons, corporations, and systems can remain

See Velasquez, “Why Corporations Are Not Responsible for Anything They Do,” and
“Commentary” article by Goodpaster in the following issue of the same journal.
18
Arguments like the following from a recent article by philosopher John Ladd can thus be seen to
be flawed:
17

Just as the Greek mythology relieved individuals of responsibility for their actions and
projected it onto the gods, so also the corporate mythology enables individuals to abdicate
their responsibility for collective action and to “project” responsibility instead, onto the
corporation (14).
In the same journal issue, see a reply by Goodpaster, “Testing Morality in Organizations” 35–8.
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open while ethical theorists explore the similarities and differences among the levels of moral accountability.
Thus the MFP suggests a kind of “metaphysics of morals,” but without the trappings of logical or ontological ultimacy. It helps the ethical theorist to appreciate the
multidimensional structure of practical problems that call for moral judgment.
Conclusion
This essay has sought to integrate moral accountability on three scales or levels of
analysis—the person, the organization, and the economic system. Utilizing innovative work in mathematics on “fractals,” I have suggested some of the implications of
this conceptual model for social scientists, business managers, and ethical theorists.
Linkages to recent literature in business ethics have been indicated, as well as to
classical sources.
The concept of a moral fractal is not offered as a device for easy solutions to ethical problems. On this point, I am inclined to echo Mandelbrot’s own words on the
subject:
Most emphatically, I do not consider the fractal point of view a panacea, and each case
analysis should be assessed by the criteria holding in its field, that is, mostly upon the basis
of its powers of organization, explanation, and prediction. . . . (3).

Nevertheless, the potential relevance of the Moral Fractal Principle to business ethics is dramatic. It presents an image of great heuristic power for understanding the
multiple levels of moral accountability. This means that there may be a way to integrate the field—in the sense of providing researchable descriptive, normative, and
analytical hypotheses—hypotheses that if false, will be interestingly false and if
true will be importantly true. Theorists and practitioners alike are invited to expand
and apply these ideas with a view toward an integrated approach to business ethics.
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 ppendix 2b: Tenacity: The American Pursuit
A
of Corporate Responsibility
KENNETH E. GOODPASTER
Abstract This article attempts to answer the question, “What are the most important ideas from serving as Executive Editor of the 5-year history project that culminated in the book, Corporate Responsibility: The American Experience?” The ideas
focus on (1) clarifying the phenomenon of tenacity; (2) looking at three foundations
of our tenacity; and (3) asking “How fragile is our tenacity?” This article also presents three foundational principles that underlie the American experience of corporate responsibility. First, the Checks & Balances Principle tells us that there are
checks and balances in democratic capitalism which give us confidence that the
pursuit of economic goals will be moderated for the common good. Second, the
Moral Projection Principle shows that there is good reason to consider the corporation not only as a legal person under corporate law but also as a moral person. And,
last, the Moral Common Ground Principle reflects that there are shared moral values ascertainable by well-developed consciences in individuals and in corporations. The article concludes with this argument: The tenacity regarding corporate
responsibility that has been so characteristic of American capitalism is fragile—
calling for serious vigilance if it is to endure.
Kenneth E. Goodpaster is Professor and Holder of the Koch Endowed Chair in
Business Ethics, Opus College of Business, University of St. Thomas, Minnesota.
In February, 2013, he was the Verizon Visiting Professor in Business Ethics,
Bentley University, Waltham, MA. E-mail: kegoodpaster@stthomas.edu.
This article takes its inspiration from a 5-year project on the history of corporate
responsibility in the United States that I was privileged to lead as Executive Editor.
My distinguished colleagues and the principal authors of this history were Professor
Archie Carroll of the University of Georgia, Professor Kenneth Lipartito of Florida
International University, Professor James Post of Boston University, and Professor
Patricia Werhane of the University of Virginia and DePaul University. This work
was recently published by Cambridge University Press under the title Corporate
Responsibility: The American Experience. I should also mention that this project
was made possible by a generous grant to the University of St. Thomas from the
Halloran Philanthropies in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania1 (see Fig. A3.1).
What this history project offered to all of us who participated in it was a degree
of perspective on the subject of corporate responsibility that I doubt any of us could
have claimed at the outset of the work.2 I have been asked on numerous occasions,
“What’s the most important idea—your biggest ‘take-away’—from the 5 years of
work that went into this history?” This article represents my attempt to answer that
question.
‘‘Tenacity: The American Pursuit of Corporate Responsibility,” Business and Society Review,
(118:4, 2013), pp. 577–605.
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Fig. A3.1 Cover of corporate responsibility: the American experience

I will be arguing for three propositions:
• First, the most striking characteristic of American culture, from the time the
modern corporation arrived on the scene in the nineteenth century through the
first decade of the twenty-first century, has been the tenacity with which we have
held to a free enterprise market economy despite frequent disappointments.
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• Second, this tenacity reveals several basic convictions about business ethics in
America. These convictions encompass (a) our confidence in checks & balances
for sustaining our ideals as a society; (b) our view of the corporation not only as
a legal person under constitutional law but also as a moral person; and (c) a set
of shared moral convictions about right and wrong, good and bad, virtue and vice.
• My third proposition is that going forward, our American tenacity about corporate responsibility is fragile—because the convictions that have given it strength
in the past may or may not be able to support it in the future. If we lose confidence in our institutional systems and/or in our shared moral convictions, the
discipline and practice of business ethics as we currently understand it will
weaken and wane.
Clarifying the Phenomenon of Tenacity
During the past two centuries, corporations have demonstrated amazing productivity, innovation, and adaptability—and when they have displayed questionable ethical or social behavior, our persistent response as Americans has been to improve
them, either internally or externally, rather than to overturn the system in favor of
more socialistic models. Despite challenges to corporate legitimacy, Americans
have sought to deepen corporate responsibility.3.
Think about it for a moment: “Corporate responsibility” in the American experience is a reality that has a history! The fact that our history project has a subject
matter is a nontrivial comment on American society that we tend to take for granted.
We can joke—as we often do—about “business ethics” being an oxymoron, but
what if it really was an oxymoron? What if the attribution of adjectives like “responsible” or “ethical” to corporations was pointless, ridiculous, even self-contradictory?
The very idea of insisting that business organizations (already considered legal persons) must be ethical, or responsible actors would be meaningless unless they had
some degree of discretion or liberty.
But the idea is not meaningless. It is embedded in our law and in our everyday
discourse about leadership and corporate culture. I will say more about the legal
system later, but it is worth pointing out here, as we do in the history volume just
published, that we attribute personhood to corporations under American law and in
our common moral discourse:
US law treats corporations as legal persons and tends to hold corporations themselves, and
not merely the managers and employees who make up the corporation, accountable. In fact,
we refer to companies as if they are individual entities, and we speak of corporate responsibility as if it applied to a single entity, even though we cannot actually shake hands with
companies or lock them up. If corporations are legal persons, and thus artificial entities, this
makes sense.4

Of course the American experience with corporate responsibility reveals both “good
news” and “bad news” about business organizations.
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The Good News
Throughout the history of corporate responsibility in America, there has been praise
for the contributions of business organizations for many reasons, including the
following:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

innovation in manufacturing and technology
the provision of employment opportunities
increased productivity
contributions to the overall health and longevity of American lives
improved economic opportunities for minorities and women
general contributions to the public sector through tax revenues
philanthropic generosity to social institutions, educational institutions, and
the arts

The Not-So-Good News
Across those same pages of American history, there have been serious negative
charges leveled at the corporation, at corporate behavior, and at business as an institution. Some of the prominent criticisms have been as follows:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

abuse of power by monopolies
violence toward, and exploitation of, labor on the part of management
employee “captivity” in company towns
unsafe labor practices (including child labor)
discrimination against minorities and women in the workplace
indifference to consumer product safety
unresponsiveness to the importance of the natural environment
financial manipulation and breaches of fiduciary obligations to investors
betrayal of American workers (and exploitation of foreign workers) in the pursuit
of globalization

Instead of surrendering the business system (the private sector) by centralizing
economic decision making in the public sector, Americans have relied upon checks
and balances between and among the public sector, the private sector, and a “third
sector” that has been called by various names: the “social-cultural sector,”5 “the
moral-cultural sector”,6 the “social sector,”7 the “civic sector,”8 or simply “private
associations.”9.
During the nineteenth century, Karl Marx and other critics of capitalism saw it as
essentially morally bankrupt, relentlessly alienating in its exploitation of workers.
Indeed, between the mid- nineteenth century and the mid-twentieth century, competing economic systems were clearly gaining energy in both Europe and Asia.
However, American companies, the American public, and the U.S. government
responded to this critique with voluntary initiatives designed to “humanize” free
enterprise—or with involuntary boundaries when voluntarism was unreliable or
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prevented by competitive dilemmas. So far, this American pursuit of corporate
responsibility seems to have succeeded—or at least most forms of collectivism
seem to have failed.
It is as if the American disdain for political centralization, so evident in its rejection of monarchy, generated a corresponding disdain for economic centralization in
its affirmation of free market business organizations.
Again and again, we have witnessed this pattern: appeals by citizens and civic
associations in the public square for business leadership and accountability—and
failing this—appeals in legislatures and courtrooms for curbs on business behavior
and punishment for past wrongdoing. We presume that the corporation, despite its
preoccupations with efficiency, profitability, and competitiveness, and despite its
need to comply with governmental imperatives, can and should be responsive to
individual rights and to the common good. We presume, in other words, that the
corporation can and must develop an ethical response system, not just an economic
and a legal response system. Now let us turn to my second main proposition and the
basic foundations that lie behind the tenacity of our pursuit of corporate
responsibility.
Three Foundations of our Tenacity
Three foundational convictions underlie what I am calling American tenacity
regarding corporate responsibility:
1. The Checks & Balances Principle. There are checks and balances in democratic capitalism which give us confidence that the pursuit of economic goals
will be moderated with attention to the common good.
2. The Moral Projection Principle. There is good reason to consider the corporation not only as a legal person under constitutional law but also as a moral person.
3. The Moral Common Ground Principle. There are shared moral values ascertainable by well-developed consciences in individuals and in corporations.
Most Americans understand the idea of a political set of checks and balances, that
is, the separation of governmental powers among legislative, executive, and judicial
branches to avoid too much concentration of power in any branch. However, when
I refer to the “Checks & Balances Principle,” I have a related, but larger scale idea
in mind.
The First Underlying Conviction
The first foundational conviction has already been alluded to, namely, that Americans
have placed a good deal of confidence in the social arrangements that sustain our
core ideals. This “Checks & Balances Principle” was born alongside our Declaration
of Independence and our constitutional rejection of monarchy.
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In the nineteenth century, Alexis de Tocqueville remarked about Americans’ confidence in and reliance upon not only government and commerce but also “private
associations” to achieve social stability.10 In the twentieth century, Michael Novak,
in his book, The Spirit of Democratic Capitalism, echoed de Tocqueville when he
offered a description of American society as an intersection of three broad subsystems or “sectors”: the economic, the political, and the moral-cultural (see Fig. A3.2
below). In Novak’s words,
Democratic capitalism is not a “free enterprise system” alone. It cannot thrive apart from
the moral culture that nourishes the virtues and values on which its existence depends. It
cannot thrive apart from a democratic polity committed, on the one hand, to limited government and, on the other hand, to many legitimate activities without which a prosperous
economy is impossible.11

The economic sector accounts largely for the wealth of a nation (its production of
goods and services). In keeping with the Preamble to the United States Constitution,
the political sector aims to “establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide
for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of
Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.” The moralcultural sector shapes and articulates our moral values through the basic elements of civil society, including the
family, educational institutions, churches, the media (print and electronic), and various other nonprofit associations.
The important point is that business organizations, as elements of the economic
sector of our society, do not function in a vacuum. They function in an atmosphere
of “practical wisdom” supplied by the other two sectors: by the political sector

Political
Sector

SOCIETY

• Executive
• Legislative
• Judicial

Economic
Sector

MoralCultural
Sector

• Investors
• Managers
• Employees

• Education
• Churches
• Media & Arts

Fig. A3.2 An interpretation of Novak’s tripartite view of society
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through legal statutes, regulations, and court decisions; and by the moral-cultural
sector through appeals by various stakeholder groups, by the business press, by
churches, and increasingly by social media and the Internet.12 As Novak points out,
“At various times in American history, both the political system and the moral-
cultural system have seriously intervened, positively and negatively, in the economic system. Each of the three systems has modified the others.”13.
We have pursued corporate responsibility through actions in the public square—
identifying problems, appealing for solutions to business leadership, enlisting political leadership, and even showing leadership in the “third sector”—churches,
business schools, advocacy groups, other nongovernmental organizations, and the
media. The consistent American aspiration, in other words, has been the moral
improvement of the business corporation:
• from condemnations of child labor in 1832 to the Fair Labor Standards
Act in 1938
• from the Seneca Falls Declaration of 1848 to the Women’s Rights Movement of
the 1960s
• from the Emancipation Proclamation in 1862 to the Civil Rights Act in 1964
• from the protests leading up to the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890 to Theodore
Roosevelt’s energetic application of it in the first decade of the twentieth century14 (see Fig. A3.3 below)

Fig. A3.3 “Concerning a Growing Menace,” chromolithograph by Joseph Keppler, Puck,
September 30, 1903. (Courtesy of the Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division)15
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These transformations have evolved (sometimes all too slowly) over time from
interactions among corporations, the government, and various institutions representing the moral and cultural values of the American public. Critics of the abuses
and misfortunes of capitalism have often appealed to the public sector for control
and redress but usually as a last resort. Long before legislative, judicial, or executive
governmental interventions, Americans organized associations and appealed to
whoever would listen when the lives and livelihoods of employees, consumers,
communities, and the natural environment were at stake. Corporations often did
listen, and often sought to devise their own creative solutions to the social problems
of capitalism.
This Checks & Balances architecture means that each sector must coexist in
equilibrium with two other societal influences—a kind of social ecosystem. Each
sector must check and be balanced by the other two. Applying this to business institutions, the resilience of American capitalism has been encouraged by pressures to
respond to both political and moral-cultural stimuli.16.
As our history has repeatedly illustrated, the press, labor unions, churches,
associations of minorities and women, and groups of citizens dedicated to truth in
advertising have been the voices of the moral-cultural sector directed at business
practices when they were found wanting. When these voices have not been
heeded, they have formed coalitions with the political sector to influence business
behavior.
The Second Underlying Conviction
The second foundational conviction that underlies our tenacity about corporate
responsibility—The Moral Projection Principle— acknowledges the “checks &
balances” idea just described, but sees it as insufficient because it is too external.
The evolution of the American corporation has led us in the direction of trying to
internalize and institutionalize responsibility rather than depend solely on political
and moral-cultural external pressures.
Over the past two centuries, our society has become what Peter Drucker referred
to as a “society of organizations.”17 Personal actors on the economic, political, and
moral-cultural stage have more and more been replaced by institutional or organizational actors.18 If we combine with the evolution of our “society of organizations”
the fact alluded to earlier, that, by 1868 corporations were firmly established under
American law as “legal persons,” it should not be surprising to find that corporations
were eventually expected to behave in society with consciences analogous to individual persons19 (see Fig. A3.4).
In truth, the idea of the corporation as a legal person was established long before
the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution in 1868. It was articulated as
early as 1819 when the Supreme Court ruled that the Trustees of Dartmouth College
could act as a corporate body “to have, get, acquire, purchase, receive, hold, possess
and enjoy. . .” properties and to “accept and receive any rents, profits, annuities,
gifts, legacies, donations or bequests. . .” for their use.20.
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Individuals

Personal
Consciences &
Sub-Groups

Corporation

Conscience &
Corporate Culture

Fig. A3.4 The principle of moral projection: personal consciences and subgroups influence organizational or corporate conscience

However, it is important to add that the “legal personhood” of the corporation is
not the same as its moral personhood. Moral personhood requires that the corporation have sufficient discretion or freedom under the law so that the ideas of responsibility and conscience can make sense. Without such freedom, corporate leaders
and managers might simply be constrained by law to make decisions solely on the
basis of nonmoral considerations such as proftt maximization.21 Only an organization that is relatively free can be asked to be responsible; an organization that is
merely an arm of the state can only be compliant.22 As corporate law scholar Lyman
Johnson pointed out to our research team,
It is . . . the very discretion afforded by law that makes discussions of corporate responsibility possible and meaningful. Without such discretion—as, for example, if managers really
were legally required to maximize profits—advocacy of socially responsible behavior
would truly be academic because managers would be prohibited from engaging in such
conduct.23

In 1982, John Matthews and I formalized this analogical perspective in an article in
the Harvard Business Review, called “Can a Corporation Have a Conscience?” and
labeled it the “Principle of Moral Projection”:
It is appropriate not only to describe organizations (and their characteristics) by analogy
with individuals, it is also appropriate normatively to look for and to foster moral attributes
in organizations by analogy with those we look for and foster in individuals.

Indeed, the idea that Americans seek to “institutionalize” the values that we hold
dear has been discussed with sophistication by a number of twentieth-century scholars.24 I should emphasize a very important fact, however, related to the Moral
Projection Principle, namely that it depends for its reality on corporate leadership.
The shapers and architects of the conscience of the corporation are those who lead
the organization. For this reason, business ethics and the study of organizational
leadership are, and should be, inextricably linked.
To recap, I have been arguing so far that Americans have displayed, over the 200-
year history of capitalism in the United States, significant tenacity regarding the
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possibility that corporations not only can be held responsible (by the law and by the
moral-cultural sector) but can also be responsible by analogy with individual persons with consciences. As part of the economic sector, corporations are not only
checked and balanced from the outside by two other sectors (the moral-cultural
sector and the government), they are also expected to be influenced from the inside
by a kind of moral compass—a corporate conscience. American tenacity regarding
corporate responsibility has been reinforced and bolstered by (1) the social architecture surrounding the corporation, and (2) the way the corporation has evolved under
American law, leading us to try to institutionalize corporate responsibility in the
economic sector rather than to depend solely on political and moral-cultural external pressures. Let us now turn to the third foundational conviction behind our
tenacity.
The Third Underlying Conviction
The third basic conviction that underlies American tenacity about corporate responsibility—The Moral Common Ground Principle—is that whatever our differences in this pluralistic society, we share a significant number of moral convictions
about right and wrong, good and bad, virtue and vice. We depend upon moral common ground when we appeal to individuals and to corporations to act according to
their consciences. We assume moral common ground when we ask corporations to
develop ethical response systems beyond their economic and legal response systems.
It may be worth pointing out that according to the Oxford English Dictionary,
conscience was originally understood as a common quality which individuals
shared: “a man or a people had more or less conscience,” as persons or groups had
more or less science, knowledge, intelligence, prudence, and so on. The word came
gradually to be used as a more personal faculty or attribute so that “my conscience”
and “your conscience” were understood no longer as “our respective shares or
amounts of the common quality conscience,” but as “two distinct individual consciences, mine and yours.”25 Not long ago, New York Times columnist David Brooks
echoed this perspective as he commented on a study of the ethical attitudes of young
adults in universities across America:
In most times and in most places, the group was seen to be the essential moral unit. A shared
religion defined rules and practices. Cultures structured people’s imaginations and imposed
moral disciplines. But now more people are led to assume that the free-floating individual
is the essential moral unit. Morality was once revealed, inherited and shared, but now it’s
thought of as something that emerges in the privacy of your own heart.26

A moment’s reflection on the good news and the not-so-good news that I mentioned earlier should help us to appreciate that, regarding business, Americans have
historically shared and continue to share significant moral common ground:
• We cannot praise innovation, employment, productivity, philanthropy, educational opportunity, or paying taxes unless we have a shared idea of what constitutes a good life within a good community.
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• Nor can we protest or condemn abuses of power, exploitation of labor, unsafe
labor practices, discrimination against minorities and women, indifference to
consumer safety, environmental pollution, or breaches of financial trust unless
we have certain shared values about right and wrong, human dignity, and the
common good.
In other words, our confidence that corporations can meaningfully be said to
have consciences includes the conviction that our moral values are not entirely isolated from one another, and that they can be relied upon in debates about the behavior of our most important institutions—economic, political, and moral-cultural. We
cannot be tenacious about our belief in corporate responsibility without a conviction
that the idea of “responsibility” is not empty or fragmented. We cannot be tenacious
about corporate responsibility unless we share a conviction that in the realm of
goods and services, there are some goods that are truly good and some services that
truly serve27 (see Fig. A3.5).
In the Declaration of Independence, Thomas Jefferson listed the abuses of the
King of Great Britain, but only after stating,
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed
by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the
pursuit of Happiness.

To galvanize a people into life-risking action, the language of the Declaration of
Independence needed to appeal to moral common ground or it would have been
ineffective. In the context of corporate responsibility, the “self-evident”—or at least
“widely accepted”—truths relate to the interests and rights of employees,

Fig. A3.5 Despite
differences in a pluralistic
society, there is moral
common ground
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customers, suppliers, and local communities; to fiduciary duties to investors and
sustainability obligations to the natural environment; and to the critical importance
of integrity in leadership and an ethical culture in organizations.
As we look across our American history of corporate responsibility, we see a
pattern of speaking sometimes softly and some times loudly to business leaders,
asking them to live up to the social contract28 internally—from the inside out—
while at the same time assembling a formidable external array of controls outside
and around the corporation. Compliance with laws and regulations has always been
essential as a safeguard when responsible business conduct has not been forthcoming (due either to moral indifference or to economic pressures).
It is perhaps worth mentioning that this approach of “internal appeals backed up
by external controls” is the same strategy we employ (as parents and as educators)
in dealing with individuals in our society. The conviction that conscience is possible
(both personally and institutionally) does not mean that we are naive about its failures. It simply means that we must be prepared to contain those failures as we seek
new ways to cultivate ethical self-regulation.
To say that there has been “moral common ground” during the history of corporate responsibility is not, of course, to imply that this common ground was self-
evident from the outset. Frequently, through give-and-take in the public square, we
have witnessed something akin to institutional learning: the movement from an
unacceptable social situation to what seemed like a good solution but with unintended (and unacceptable) consequences that called for readjustment. Aristotle
described this pattern as the (sometimes elusive) pursuit and discovery of a virtuous
“golden mean” between two extremes. For example,
• In the nineteenth century, we moved from frequent worker destitution and homelessness to the innovation of company towns, with the unintended consequence
of lost civic autonomy and independence, and have since learned to lessen workers’ dependency on the corporation.
• In the wake of World War II, we grew from economic depression and material
sacrifice to corporate innovation in goods and services, leading to prosperity and
consumerism, but also to a culture of consumption. We are now attending to the
need for sustainable economic growth.
• We moved in the mid-twentieth century from an absence of credit to the innovations associated with the liberal credit/debt policies of modern banking, with the
unintended consequences of unrestrained credit, systemic risk, and eventually a
loss of trust in financial institutions, and we are now seeking to discern the
appropriate use of credit/debt.
• Our innovative business system has led us from time- consuming transportation
using horses and wagons to railroads and eventually to automobiles, aircraft, and
space technology, with unintended consequences relating to safety and pollution,
and we now are reflecting upon the true costs and true benefits of all forms of
transportation.
• That same innovative business system has led us from slow communication by
“pony express” and telegraph to a high tech Internet revolution, with its unin-
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tended side effects of too much information (and misinformation), and we are
now examining ways to protect our privacy against identity theft and our communication systems against cyber threats.
In each of these cases, our moral common ground was clarified slowly and incrementally by discerning conditions that were unacceptable in one direction, noticing
that we were replacing them with conditions that were unacceptable in the opposite
direction, and finally searching for more balanced approaches.29.
During the twentieth century, the Moral Common Ground Principle led to the
gradual emergence of “stakeholder thinking” to supplement “stockholder thinking.”
A strong theme across our history has been the trend toward enlarging the set of
parties to whom the corporation must be accountable, from providers of capital
(stockholders) to other stakeholders (employees, consumers, suppliers, the communities to which the corporation belongs, and eventually the natural environment)
whose claims increasingly seek and achieve a kind of parity with stockholder
claims.30.
Summing up, the distinctive characteristic of the American experience in the history of corporate responsibility is the tenacity with which Americans have held on
to an institutional aspiration (parallel to a personal aspiration) to uphold freedom in
the face of frequent failure.31 Beneath this tenacity, we have identified three foundational convictions:
1. The Checks & Balances Principle: There are societal checks and balances in
democratic capitalism which give us confidence that the pursuit of economic
goals will be moderated for the common good.
2. The Moral Projection Principle: We should consider the corporation not only
as a legal person under corporate law but also appeal to it as a moral person.
3. The Moral Common Ground Principle: There are shared moral values ascertainable by individuals and by corporations, and that despite economic abuses of
human rights and the common good, corporations can discern goods that are
truly good and services that truly serve.
The first is about our social system; the second is about organizations within the
system; and the third is about our capacities to know right from wrong, good from
bad, virtue from vice.
How Fragile Is Tenacity Going Forward?
Our American tenacity about corporate responsibility is fragile because the foundational convictions that have given it strength in the past may or may not be able to
support it in the future.
If we lose confidence in any or all of the three convictions that I have been calling
foundational—in our institutional checks and balances, in our belief that corporations can internalize ethical values, or in the moral common ground that we have
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been able to rely upon in the past—the discipline and practice of business ethics as
we currently understand it will be unable to sustain itself for lack of a subject matter.
Whatever the future brings, we know that certain factors will continue to evolve:
globalization, economic development, information technology, and corporate law.
The influence of these factors on the prospects of corporate responsibility might
take unpredictable forms. However, despite such uncertainties, can we say anything
about the prospects for the tenacity described in this article? Well, there are negative
signs on the horizon and there are positive signs.
The Not-So-Good News
On the negative side, we can discern several reasons for a loss of confidence and
consequently a loosening of our tenacity:
• First, of course, is the behavior of business during the first decade of our new
century, by the Enron debacle and the long list of scandals that followed it (from
Arthur Andersen to WorldCom to Tyco, and so on; from Ponzi schemes to the
mortgage crisis and the collapse or near collapse of financial institutions on Wall
Street). In the face of these scandals, it should come as no surprise that the public
has been question ing the capacity of corporations to self-regulate—to be respon
sible. It is also no surprise to see sweeping federal legislation like the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act and the Dodd-Frank Act as political responses to these failures of our
economic institutions. Apparently, the institutionalization of ethical values that
has given us confidence in the past is not clearly something we can rely upon in
the future. On this subject, of course, future leadership will be critical.
As a signal about the future of corporate responsibility and our tenacity in holding on to it, these events are discouraging as they inevitably lead to intensified
regulation that can threaten the Checks & Balances Principle as well as the
Moral Projection Principle.32
• Another reason for a loss of confidence is more diffuse but no less real, namely,
that cultural trends in our society signal a new level of moral relativism.
Sometimes, this relativism sails under the banner of “postmodernism”; the view
that “Objectivity is a myth; there is no Truth, no Right Way to read nature or a
text. All interpretations are equally valid. Values are socially subjective products.
Culturally, therefore, no group’s values have special standing.”33 Such a view,
however widespread it might be, inevitably leads us to question the “moral common ground” that has guided our pursuit of corporate responsibility in the past.
In the study of American university students mentioned earlier, David Brooks
comments:
–– The default position, which most [students] came back to again and again, is
that moral choices are just a matter of individual taste. “It’s personal,” the
respondents typically said. “It’s up to the individual. Who am I to say?”
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–– Rejecting blind deference to authority, many of the young people have gone
off to the other extreme: “I would do what I thought made me happy or how I
felt. I have no other way of knowing what to do but how I internally feel.”
–– Many were quick to talk about their moral feelings but hesitant to link these
feelings to any broader thinking about a shared moral framework or obligation. As one put it, “I mean, I guess what makes something right is how I feel
about it. But different people feel different ways, so I couldn’t speak on behalf
of anyone else as to what’s right and wrong.”
As a signal about the future of corporate responsibility, these findings suggest a
weakening of the Moral Common Ground Principle. They suggest that future
business leaders (and future stakeholders in business behavior) will not be able to
give shared meaning to the idea of responsibility, much less corporate responsibility. With such a moral-cultural breakdown (which could undermine the Checks &
Balances Principle), it is difficult to imagine our expectations of the corporation
(the Moral Projection Principle) going much beyond regulatory and judicial
compliance.
The Good News
On the positive side, we can discern several reasons for hope— hope that our past
and present tenacity will continue to be vindicated in the century ahead:
• During the past two decades, we have seen new emphasis on the ethical and cultural dimensions of corporate governance— the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
for Organizations and the rise of the Ethics and Compliance Officer as a new
profession.34 The importance of this development lies in its reinforcement of
both the Checks & Balances Principle and the Moral Projection Principle, a
new form of regulation that makes use of the internalization of ethical response
systems by the corporation.
• During the past decade, we have seen the emergence of the MBA Oath (analogous to the Hippocratic Oath)35 along with a new emphasis on management as a
profession (something that our history of corporate responsibility recounts as
born a century ago).36 Indeed, a number of authors have gone further in referring
to management as a “calling” and as a “vocation.” This development encourages
us to believe that the ideal of corporate responsibility is alive and well within the
next generation of business students and business leaders, supporting the Moral
Projection Principle.
• The emerging phenomena of “Social Entrepreneurship” and the formation of
“B-Corporations” suggests that in the decades ahead, we will see business innovation aimed at social responsibility—at widening the social benefits of our economic system and reducing many of its costs.37 These developments support all
three of the foundational convictions described earlier.
• “On the philanthropy front, there is recent evidence that even though recovery
from the 2008 financial crisis is slow, corporate giving has rebounded.”38 New
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efforts by multinational corporations to reduce poverty, pandemics, and corruption offer more reasons for hope as does the extraordinary work of the Bill and
Melinda Gates Foundation and similar undertakings.39
Conclusion
As we look to the future, corporations seeking to preserve the trust and faith of
society must embrace decision-making responsibility meaningfully. As our historical narrative insists in its final chapter, “the future of the corporation is tethered to
the future of its responsible management.”40 Businesses must address the issues that
currently present themselves, such as the need for sustainability in the provision of
all goods and services:
For if companies do not steadfastly embrace the project of corporate responsibility, other
institutions will, and that may lead to the end of the most promising form of political economy for creating economic growth: free enterprise.41

The message of this article has been that, over the past two centuries, Americans
have displayed significant tenacity in the pursuit of corporate responsibility and that
this tenacity has been grounded in three foundational convictions—about checks &
balances, moral projection, and moral common ground. Our future grasp on this
ideal for business as an institution depends profoundly on whether these foundational convictions are maintained and cultivated during the centuries that lie ahead.
Let me conclude this article with the closing lines of our history:
The freedom of free markets, like the freedom of free persons, is a precious asset so long as
society does not pay too high a price . . . For [Adam] Smith, the true “wealth of nations”
could only be realized if its citizens cultivated their moral sentiments as a foundation for
their commercial enterprises. The future of corporate responsibility in the American experience depends, ultimately, on the choices of Americans themselves.42

Notes
1. Special thanks and recognition are due to my Research Associate, Pati
Provinske, for her many contributions to this essay—thorough research, careful
editing, creative suggestions on style and graphics, and detailed citation and
reference work.
2. Throughout this paper, as in the history project, I used “corporate responsibility” as an umbrella phrase for a number of different identifiers that, while not
synonymous, overlap considerably: business ethics, corporate social responsibility (CSR), corporate citizenship, corporate community involvement, stakeholder management, sustainability, and many more.
3. So much so that at one point, I considered proposing Tenacity as the title of our
book instead of Corporate Responsibility: The American Experience (hereinafter, CRAE).
4. (Carroll, Lipartito, Post, Werhane, and Goodpaster, Executive Editor, 2012,
43–44). One recent controversial Supreme Court case illustrates the opposite
side of the coin when it comes to attributing responsibilities to corporations,
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that is, what about corporations having rights? CRAE continues “.. . in 2010, the
Supreme Court in Citizens United ruled that corporations (both for-profit and
nonprofit) and unions could contribute freely to political campaign advocacy
‘so long as they do not coordinate their efforts with campaigns or political parties’ (OMB Watch 2010). The reasoning behind this decision, following an earlier 1906 decision, was that the corporation was an ‘association of [natural]
citizens,’ and thus like individual natural citizens could freely participate in
political campaign advocacy.” See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n,
130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) and Johnson (2011, 2–6), for more on the “association of
[natural citizens].”
(Carroll et al. 2012, Introduction, 15, 415).
(Novak 1982).
(Drucker 1994, 53–80).
(Rifkin 1996, 44–45).
(Tocqueville et al. 1945).
“The origins of American industrialization and private enterprise and the division between the public and private sectors, as shown in this chapter, are all
grounded in a substantive theory of human rights. Also critical to the story are
the importance of labor, the labor theory of value, which translates into the
work ethic explained by Weber. At the same time there is the ongoing presence
and third ‘voice’ of the public square so keenly observed and articulated by de
Tocqueville” (Carroll et al. 2012, 61).
(Novak 1982, 56).
“The inarticulate practical wisdom embedded in the political system and in the
moral-cultural system has profoundly affected the workings of the economic
system” (Novak 1982, 56). It should be acknowledged that not all interventions
into the economic sector by the other two sectors have been improvements.
There has been much debate recently, for example, about the role of Fannie
Mae in the home mortgage crisis.
(Novak 1982, 57).
This list could be greatly expanded: from the Ludlow Massacre and the Italian
Hall Disaster (1913) to the National Labor Relations Act (1935) and the
Taft-Hartley Act (1947); from the utopian business communities in the postCivil War period to the company towns of the late nineteenth century to
employee stock ownership plans in the 1920s to more robust employee benefits
in the last third of the twentieth century; from the National Consumers League
(1898) to the Better Business Bureau (1912) and the Federal Trade Commission
(1914) to the Consumer Product Safety Commission (1972); from the creation
of the Food and Drug Administration (1906) to the Environmental Protection
Agency (1970); from the Federal Reserve System (1914) to the creation of the
Securities Exchange Commission (1933) to the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act
(2010); from discrimination against immigrants and the trade wars that often
accompanied global competition, to the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA, 1994) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT, 1995).
The caption continues and appears as follows: This cartoon depicts President
Theodore Roosevelt chastising two men—“Dishonest Corporations” (left) and
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“Union Tyranny” (second from left, with “Bribe” and “Graft” extending from
his pockets)—who are trampling “Law” (the female figure) (Carroll et al. 2012,
Plate 27).
In a later book, Novak makes this point even more clearly: “The fundamental
reason behind the capacity for self-reform in democratic capitalism lies in the
independence of its moral-cultural order and its political order alike. Both operate effectively upon its economic system. Each of these three systems represents a different aspect of reality, and each of them is moved by certain organic
laws that, when violated, exact considerable costs. Thus the system as a whole
comes under three quite different reality checks. This tension places the system
regularly in crisis, each becoming an opportunity for fresh restructuring”
(1993, 58).
(Drucker 1978, Eastern edition, 12).
“By 1914 almost 80 percent of workers were employed by corporations, who
produced 80 percent of the value of manufactured goods” (Carroll et al. 2012,
118; US Census Bureau 1920; Ripley 1929). In 2002, in his book, Organizing
America: Wealth, Power, and the Origins of Corporate Capitalism, Charles
Perrow wrote about the percentage of people working in organizations: “In
1820, about 20 percent of the population worked for wages and salaries; by
1900 it was 50 percent; today it is well over 90 percent. . .” (227).
I formalized this analogical perspective in an article with John Matthews in the
Harvard Business Review, “Can a Corporation Have a Conscience?” (January
1982) and eventually labeled it the “Principle of Moral Projection” (Goodpaster
2005, 363–364).
“This landmark decision gave corporate bodies, those chartered, or, later, incorporated, the same rights as individuals to buy, sell, own, and disperse property.
The decision was qualified in the conclusion with the statement that ‘[a] corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in the contemplation of law’” (Carroll et al. 2012, 43; Trustees of Dartmouth College v.
Woodward, 17 U.S. at 636, quoted in Johnson 2011, 5).
Lyman Johnson, in his commissioned essay for the CRAE history project,
observed: “After all, it is corporate responsibility that has emerged as a topic of
ongoing social concern and scholarly study. This required that the corporation
be recognized as a meaningful social and legal actor, distinguishable from its
constituents” (12).
In her article, “Ethics without the Sermon,” Laura L. Nash discusses “twelve
questions to ask when making a business decision” and the process involved in
reviewing them (1981, 88–89).
Johnson adds: “Conversely, this very legal discretion leads many to doubt that
such freedom will be used responsibly. It is to constrain corporate conduct—not
unleash it—that historically has led these persons to advocate corporate regulation of various kinds” (2011, 31).
See Philip Selznick, Leadership in Administration: A Sociological Interpretation:
“As an organization acquires a self, a distinctive identity, it becomes an institution. This involves the taking on of values, ways of acting and believing that are
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deemed important for their own sake. From then on, self-maintenance becomes
more than bare organizational survival; it becomes a struggle to preserve the
uniqueness of the group in the face of new problems and altered circumstances”
[emphasis mine] (1957, 21). Also, see Hugh Heclo’s book, On Thinking
Institutionally (2008).
This passage continues: “This individualization of the meaning of ‘conscience’.
.. signals a polarity at the core of our moral awareness: On the one hand, conscience is our subjective touchstone for ethical decision making. On the other
hand, an appeal to conscience in moral argument (or dialogue) usually lays
claim to common ground, a warrant for our ethical convictions that reaches
beyond the merely subjective. Insofar as conscience must respond in actual
decision making situations, it has a certain private authority, both in relation to
non-moral decision guides and in relation to the consciences of others. We can
refer to this as the autonomy dimension of conscience. But because conscience
can be ‘undeveloped,’ ‘neglected,’ or ‘out of touch,’ philosophers have looked
to it for a broader kind of authority, less private and more rooted in human
nature or reason. We can refer to this as the discernment dimension of conscience” (Goodpaster 2008, 407–408).
(Brooks 2011).
See Goodpaster’s “Goods That Are Truly Good and Services That Truly Serve:
Reflections on ‘Caritas in Veritate’” in the Journal of Business Ethics (2011).
Professor John B. Matthews, my mentor at Harvard Business School, wrote a
classic case study, “Tennessee Coal and Iron,” in which President John
F. Kennedy implored Mr. Arthur Wiebel, COO of a division of US Steel
Corporation in Birmingham, Alabama, to take initiatives in his company’s
workplace to advance civil rights, to be a power of example to other firms by
embracing the spirit, not just the letter, of the laws (1963, 233).
Insight into this process of discovering our moral common ground was evident
nearly 100 years ago, when University of Chicago economist J. M. Clark called
for an “economics of responsibility” from business practitioners: “The ideas of
obligation which embody the actual relations of man to man in the [twentieth]
century are radically different from the ideas which dominated the nineteenth.
.. Some have failed to recognize what the change means and have resisted it
uncomprehendingly. .. Some have gone to the other extreme and have lost their
old sense of personal accountability. .. [But] many. .. are honestly seeking to
know what their obligations are in this new era, that they may meet them on
their own initiative. More knowledge is wanted, that men may guide themselves. The modern prayer is not so much for strength as for wisdom. .. [We]
need something more; something which is still in its infancy. We need an economics of responsibility, developed and embodied in our working business ethics [emphasis added]” (Clark 1916, 209–229, in Carroll et al. 2012, 13).
I have argued recently, however, that the emergence of stakeholder thinking,
while necessary, is not sufficient in our quest for corporate responsibility. See
Goodpaster’s “Business Ethics: Two Moral Provisos” in Business Ethics
Quarterly (2010, 740–742).
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31. Lee Kwan Yew, Singapore, was a critic of US emphasis on individual civil liberties (Zakaria 1994, 109–126).
32. “If the skimpy existent mechanisms of corporate governance cannot themselves
accommodate a modern society’s evolving expectations of corporate power—
whether control lies in investor or manager hands, or is held jointly—then it is
to be expected that renewed efforts to bring non-investor voices (and concerns)
into corporate governance will begin again, or that even more extensive legal
regulation addressing various kinds of such interests will be forthcoming.
Nowhere is it clearer than in the very heart of the corporation—i.e., the corporate governance realm—that law plays a central role in the story of corporate
responsibility” (Johnson 2011, 27).
33. (Hicks 2011, 852–854).
34. An Ethics Resource Center Report provides this example by R. E. Berenbeim:
“The specifics of the Guidelines aside, the most important story that emerges
from the FSGO’s 20 year history is that the USSC’s carrot and stick approach
has catalyzed vigorous efforts by companies to promote ethical performance
and reduce organizational misconduct” (Ethics Resource Center 2012, 28;
Berenbeim 2005). The Ethics Officers Association (EOA), now called the Ethics
and Compliance Officers Association (ECOA), had its origin, of course, at
Bentley University.
35. A group from the Class of 2009 Graduates of Harvard Business School, created
the MBA Oath, “building upon these essential efforts [from the Hippocratic
Oath to Thunderbird’s Oath of Honor, and the Columbia Business School
Honor Code] to create a community of MBAs with a high standard for ethical
and professional behavior” (MBA Oath: Responsible Value Creation, n.d.).
36. In their article, “Management as a Profession?” Rakesh Khurana, Nitin Nohria,
and Daniel Penrice state, “Our speculations about a genuine professionalization
of management as a remedy for the crisis of legitimacy now facing American
business may strike some as radical. But assuming, once again, that increased
regulation is not the whole or the best answer to the problem at hand, we believe
that our idea of making management into a bona fide profession has the virtue
of asking a group that has seriously abused the public’s trust to make a serious
commitment to restoring it” (2005). Also see Michael Novak’s book, Business
as a Calling: Work and the Examined Life (1996); and the new Vatican document, the Vocation of the Business Leader: A Reflection, by the Pontifical
Council for Justice and Peace (2012).
37. Regarding social entrepreneurship, a group of “hybrid companies and proprietorships that label themselves ‘social entrepreneurs’”—include “individuals
and organizations [that] may be not-for profit, public, for-profit, or hybrid ventures. What is distinctive. .. is that their core mission is to add value not merely
monetarily, but also by making a positive social, cultural, or environmental
impact” (Carroll et al. 2012, 392). Looking at the B-Corporation: “A new type
of legally sanctioned corporation, the ‘Benefit Corporation’ or B-Corporation is
taking shape. According to the organization’s website, B-Corporation promotes
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the power of business to solve social and environmental problems” (Carroll
et al. 2012, 393).
38. (Carroll et al. 2012, 422; CEPC 2011).
39. See Poverty through Profitable Partnerships: Globalization, Markets, and
Economic Well-Being by Patricia Werhane, Scott Kelly, Laurab Hartman, and
Dennis Moberg (2010); and Obstacles to Ethical Decision-Making: Mental
Models, Milgram and the Problem of Obedience by Patricia Werhane, Laura
Hartman, Crina Archer, Elain Englehardt, and Michael Pritchard (2013).
40. “This may be the only way to preserve the corporation as an institution under
private direction for public benefit” (Carroll 2012, 423).
41. Emphasis added. (Carroll et al. 2012, 423).
42. (Carroll et al. 2012, 424).
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 ppendix 2c: Human Dignity and the Common Good:
A
The Institutional Insight
KENNETH GOODPASTER
Abstract In this article, I develop the idea of the “institutional insight” as a
pathway to two foundational values for applied ethics: human dignity and the
common good. I explore—but do not offer a definitive analysis of—these two
values that I believe are critical to the progress of business ethics (indeed to the
progress of applied ethics generally). In several previous articles (Goodpaster
1991, 2009, 2012, 2013), I have alluded to this theme, but here I hope to show that
human dignity and the common good underlie both (1) management’s fiduciary
duty to shareholders, and (2) management’s obligations to “stakeholders.” Indeed,
it may be that the frequently observed tension between the latter two normative
paradigms can be resolved only by engaging in the comprehensive moral thinking
afforded by the institutional insight.
Why were we so reluctant to try the lower path, the ambiguous trail? Perhaps because we
did not have a leader who could reveal the greater purpose of the trip to us.
–Bowen McCoy, The Parable of the Sadhu

Kenneth Goodpaster is the David and Barbara Koch Endowed Chair in Business
Ethics, Emeritus, University of St. Thomas, St. Paul, MN. E-mail: kegoodpaster@stthomas.edu.
The Parable of the Sadhu is a story and a Harvard Business Review article that
has become an icon in the teaching of business ethics over the past 30 years. Author
Bowen McCoy describes a mountain climbing expedition in the Himalayas during
which his decision making may have cost the life of a Hindu holy man (Sadhu) who
was found along the way. The quotation above is from the end of the article and
represents McCoy’s lament about his own leadership.1
In this article, I offer an interpretation of what McCoy calls revealing “the greater
purpose of the trip” as a central responsibility of corporate leadership. To do this, I
will develop the idea of the “institutional insight” as a pathway to the two foundational values for applied ethics: human dignity and the common good.
Two Moral Provisos
In 2010, the Editor-in-Chief of Business Ethics Quarterly, on the occasion of the
twentieth anniversary of the journal, asked past and present Editorial Board
Members and Associate Editors for “Anniversary Reflections” on the present and
future course of the field of Business Ethics. My contribution was entitled: “Business

‘‘Human Dignity and the Common Good: The Institutional Insight,” Business and Society Review,
(March, 2017), pp. 27–50.
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Ethics: Two Moral Provisos”2 and in it I argued that there were two “provisos” in
business ethics rather than the single proviso that many assumed, namely,
The Shareholder Proviso. Corporate responsibility rests upon a fiduciary obligation to
stockholders, shareholders, or owners, but this responsibility is provisional. It is limited by
other obligations: to employees, to customers, to suppliers, to local communities—and even
to the environment.

My argument was that stakeholder thinking was also subject to a moral proviso:
The Stakeholder Proviso. Responsibilities to stakeholders are provisional as well, calling
for ethical boundaries. Stakeholder thinking may or may not be morally necessary, but it is
not morally sufficient.

The point of the latter argument was that the pursuit of stakeholder satisfaction is no
more immune to moral critique than the pursuit of shareholder satisfaction.
Much as the “Shareholder Proviso” warned us about reducing ethical decisions
to fiduciary duties, the “Stakeholder Proviso” warns of another kind of reduction
and invites more comprehensive moral thinking.3
I discussed the idea of comprehensive moral thinking as a more basic touchstone
for normative business ethics, and I would now like to pursue this idea further.
Searching Beneath the Provisos
There can be no question that fiduciary duties to shareholders account for an important subset of corporate responsibilities, indeed that these responsibilities are part of
the nature of business as an institution in which shareholders are beneficiaries, to be
sure, but also (and more importantly) vulnerable investors.
Alexei Marcoux argues quite persuasively that the root of the fiduciary obligation of managers to shareholders lies, as with other fiduciary relationships in law (to
clients) and medicine (to patients) in the vulnerability of those to whom the obligation is owed. In his words, “To be a fiduciary for someone is to be partial to that
someone’s interests and to promote them within a certain domain, but the stakeholder theory demands impartiality among and between the admittedly competing
interests of stakeholders. Therefore, the stakeholder theory demands that managers
be fiduciaries to no one.”4
The strength of Marcoux’s article resides not only in its argumentation against
most stakeholder theories, but in its identification of a nonconsequentialist grounding for the fiduciary obligation to shareholders, by analogy with the grounding of
other fiduciary obligations (e.g., in medicine and law). It is not so much that maximizing the interests of shareholders is the central moral imperative, as that the interests of shareholders are at risk and they are vulnerable due to limitations of
information and control. Defended in this way, the shareholder view (often attributed to Milton Friedman) appeals to a deeper moral foundation than critics typically
acknowledge. And if we ask about the meaning of “deeper” in this context, I think
it is fair to interpret it as “more fundamental” for deriving fiduciary duties (and their
exceptions) than simply appealing to convention.
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Regarding the second proviso, there are many moral constraints (often regulated
by law) that relate to the wellbeing of employees, nondiscrimination, consumer
product safety, and to the treatment of local communities and the environment—the
typical parties named in stakeholder accounts of corporate responsibility. Indeed,
R. Edward Freeman sees the shareholder fiduciary view as in need of generalization
to all stakeholders.5 He offers what I once described as a multi-fiduciary account of
corporate responsibility.6 This was the view that Marcoux (above) found problematic, even incoherent.
Joseph Heath argues, however, that appeals to fiduciary obligations additional to
shareholder thinking are neither morally necessary nor morally desirable. To the
contrary, a more deontological “market failures” model gets at the obligations
implicit in stakeholder thinking much more effectively than stakeholder thinking
itself. As Heath puts it, “I think that the concept of market failure provides a much
more satisfactory framework for understanding the growth of regulation and thus
the increased legal entrenchment of the social responsibilities of business than that
of stakeholder claim recognition.”7
The strength of Heath’s line of argument resides not simply in his critique of
stakeholder theories that would multiply claims on managerial attention, but in his
appreciation that there can be moral constraints on business decision making that
stem from deeper sources – such as failures in a market system that is intended to
serve human freedom and wellbeing.
I believe that the tension between the primacy of fiduciary duties to shareholders
and the primacy of various stakeholder or market failure constructs, can only be
resolved by seeing them as derivative constructs from a more fundamental source of
ethical responsibilities in business.
We understand how the shareholder fiduciary framework ultimately appeals to
the vulnerability of the providers of capital (not unlike patients and clients to doctors and lawyers, respectively). And beneath the ethical obligation to the vulnerable
lies respect for the dignity of the weaker party. I am tempted to say respect for the
dignity of the poor, despite the irony of some investors with wealth being called
poor. Not all investors, of course, are wealthy given the role that investments play
in retirement savings and employee stock ownership plans. Perhaps it would be better to describe shareholders as “exposed” when it comes to most of the ways in
which their investments are managed.
We also understand how both the stakeholder framework and the market failures
framework ultimately appeal to the importance of groups in society affected by
business decision making, regardless of whether those others are in a position to
“push back.” Stakeholders are not only “those who may affect” but also “those who
may be affected by” the actions of organizations. Beneath ethical obligations to
stakeholders (or those affected by market failures) lies a concern for the good of the
wider community. Community, of course, can and does manifest itself on many
levels—in a family, a village, a voluntary association, a city state, a nation state, or
what we call the global community. And it may be that the ethical responsibilities
that we learn in one area of our “community of communities” will provide guidance
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for our ethical responsibilities in other areas. The principal point is that there must
be a social, not just a partial, dimension to business decision making.
So already we can see that identifying business responsibilities under the headings of “shareholder fiduciary duties” and “concern for stakeholders” reveals deeper
moral convictions. It is in the realm of such deeper moral convictions that I believe
we can appreciate what I have called “comprehensive moral thinking.” And it is
only in this realm that corporate responsibility can be fully understood. I agree with
Tom Donaldson and Jim Walsh when they observe in a recent article:
Win or lose the stockholder vs. stakeholder debate, the debate itself seems to be off point.
We need a theory of business and business success if we are to understand and guide business activity.8

As a first step in developing the idea of “comprehensive moral thinking”—from
which the more conventional models of business norms are derived—it is essential
that we reflect on the nature and role that institutions play in our social system.
Institutions and the Institutional Insight
Hugh Heclo, a professor of government and public affairs at George Mason
University, in a remarkable book entitled On Thinking Institutionally (Paradigm
Publishers 2008) offers us a rich interpretation of institutions and institutional thinking that bears on the subject at hand.
Institutions have played a critical role in human history. Indeed, it is difficult to
imagine the unfolding of human history without the proliferation of institutional
forms, beginning with families, of course, but continuing with schools, voluntary
associations, governments and economic organizations of various sizes. In Heclo’s
words, “Amid the perpetual perishing that marks our individual existences, institutions are weathered presences.”9 Institutions are ways to achieve a measure of permanence and continuity for what we value despite our mortality. We might almost
say in a phrase reminiscent of Aristotle that “man is an institution-making animal.”
Alexis deTocqueville marveled in the mid-nineteenth Century at the American
cultural tendency to multiply “voluntary associations” in response to various social
needs—associations belonging to neither the public sector nor the private sector:
Americans of all ages, all conditions, and all dispositions constantly form associations.
They have not only commercial and manufacturing companies, in which all take part, but
associations of a thousand other kinds—religious, moral, serious, futile, general or
restricted, enormous or diminutive.”10

Later we will have more to say about this observation of deToqueville, for it identifies an important role played by voluntary associations in the pursuit of human
dignity and the common good, the role of “mediating institutions.”
Michael Novak, in his book, The Spirit of Democratic Capitalism (1982), echoed
deTocqueville when he offered a description of American society as an interactive
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Fig. A4.1 Tripartite
Model of Society used by
Novak and Drucker

combination of three broad institutional bundles or “sectors”: the economic, the
political, and the moral-cultural. (See Fig. A4.1 above.) In Novak’s words:
Democratic capitalism is not a “free enterprise system” alone. It cannot thrive apart from
the moral culture that nourishes the virtues and values on which its existence depends. It
cannot thrive apart from a democratic polity committed, on the one hand, to limited government and, on the other hand, to many legitimate activities without which a prosperous
economy is impossible.11

According to Novak, institutions in the economic sector account largely for the
wealth of a nation (its production of goods and services). Political institutions
account for democratic governance nationally, at the state or provincial level, and
locally. Institutions in the moral-cultural sector shape and articulate the moral values of the community through the building blocks of civil society, including families, schools, churches, the media (press and social media), and various other
nonprofit associations.
The important point for our purposes is that business organizations, as elements
of the economic sector, and governmental agencies, as elements of the political sector, do not function in a vacuum. They function in an atmosphere of “practical wisdom” supplied by institutions in the third, moral-cultural or social sector.12
Peter Drucker, in an influential article in The Atlantic Monthly (1994),13 echoed
Novak’s model: “The knowledge society has to be a society of three sectors: a public sector of government, a private sector of business, and a social sector.” (p. 16) He
goes on to ask a question that is directly relevant to the theme of this article:
But in the society of organizations each of the new institutions is concerned only with its
own purpose and mission. It does not claim power over anything else. But it also does not
assume responsibility for anything else. Who, then, is concerned with the common good?
(p. 18, emphasis added)

Toward the end of his article, Drucker suggests what appears to be a somewhat paradoxical answer to his own question:
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[We] have to think through how to balance two apparently contradictory requirements.
Organizations must competently perform the one social function for the sake of which they
exist–the school to teach, the hospital to cure the sick, and the business to produce goods,
services, or the capital to provide for the risks of the future. They can do so only if they
single-mindedly concentrate on their specialized mission. But there is also society’s need
for these organizations to take social responsibility–to work on the problems and challenges
of the community. (p. 21)

Drucker seems to be saying that organizations must reach beyond or beneath the
specifc missions and purposes that call them into existence. They must also demonstrate an awareness of and a .practical commitment to social responsibility. The
paradox seems to be that single-mindedness is both necessary and insufficient for
institutional leadership. Leaders must “zoom in” (single-mindedness) but also
“zoom out” if they are going to sustain their institutions with any hope for social
cohesion and the common good.14
Philip Selznick, observed a century after deTocqueville that we should distinguish among associations between organizations and institutions:
As an organization acquires a self, a distinctive identity, it becomes an institution. This
involves the taking on of values, ways of acting and believing that are deemed important for
their own sake. From then on, self-maintenance becomes more than bare organizational
survival; it becomes a struggle to preserve the uniqueness of the group in the face of new
problems and altered circumstances.15

Selznick makes it clear that not all organizations qualify as institutions, and that
only those that do qualify can make a claim on us to be preserved—“to avoid liquidation or transformation on purely technical or economic grounds.”16 The institutions to which Selznick is referring are, for the most part, to be found either in the
economic sector or the moral-cultural sector.
To sum up, the first step in going deeper with respect to the stockholder-
stakeholder tension is to reflect on the nature and purpose of institutions in our history. Institutions are more than simply tools for accomplishing certain discrete
tasks. They are organized (often in bundles) to preserve or advance ways of acting
or believing deemed “important for their own sake.” They are “weathered presences,” structures that have come before us and will succeed us in the pursuit of
human flourishing. Later we will see that human flourishing is best understood in
terms of the joint ideals of respecting human dignity and pursuing the common good.
The Institutional Insight
As we reflect on the roles of institutions in our lives, from families to churches to
schools to media to voluntary associations of other kinds, and finally to businesses
and various governmental structures, it is important to keep two truths in mind at the
same time. First, we are reminded by Heclo that institutions by their nature have a
normative dimension:
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... by virtue of participating in an institutional form of life, there are more and less appropriate ways of doing things. These obligations are a kind of internal morality that flows from
the purposive point of the institution itself.17

To be sure, the normative nature of institutions must be understood as creating
what W. D. Ross called prima facie obligations in relation to our participation in
other institutions, for example, the norms of family, work, and community
volunteering.
But in addition to the prima facie character of the “internal morality” of institutions in relation to one another, there is a deeper morality to which all institutions
must be subject. To quote Heclo again:
Since people are not created for the good of institutions but institutions for the purposes of
people, any call to the intrinsic worth of an institution is a lie if it does not ultimately recognize and serve the moral and ontological primacy of human persons and their well-being.
To repeat, that means institutions exist for people, and for serving their good. People do not
exist for institutions.18

Tom Donaldson and Jim Walsh, in their 2015 article “Toward a Theory of Business,”
seem to have a similar distinction in mind:
[A] firm holds two interrelated purposes—one a focal purpose, a purpose that reflects its
work in society and two, a contextual purpose, a purpose that reflects its work for society.19

In the language of Gestalt Psychology, we might compare an institution’s internal
morality to the “figure” and its comprehensive morality to the “ground.”
It is natural to ask at this point whether it is possible to maintain a healthy focus
on one’s institutional mission (purpose)—while at the same time appreciating that
in the final analysis, one’s institution is also (and ultimately) aimed at supporting
human dignity and the common good? Can a leader see her/his institution as “special, but no different” in relation to other institutions as it pursues its mission
(purpose)?
I believe the answer is yes, and I will call the realization of this dual rationale for
any institution—its presenting mission and its ultimate purpose—the Institutional
Insight. Not every institutional leader or institutional participant grasps the institutional insight, and those who do not grasp it run the risk of dysfunctional decision making.
The Institutional Insight, then, is the realization that one’s own institution—like
all institutions—is part of a larger enterprise of forwarding the wellbeing of humankind. This means a vision and a concurrent peripheral vision about purposes on the
part of leadership.
An impediment to the institutional insight is a kind of fixation on the foreground
that I have referred to as teleopathy, the unbalanced pursuit of purpose in individuals or institutions.20 The U.S. Department of Defense has identified a similar hazard
in the training of fighter pilots:
Channelized Attention is a factor when the individual [read: institution] is focusing all conscious attention on a limited number of environmental cues to the exclusion of others of a
subjectively equal or higher or more immediate priority, leading to an unsafe situation. May
be described as a tight focus of attention that leads to the exclusion of comprehensive situational information.21
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A response to this hazard, in the context of pilot training, is to require that pilots be
accompanied by a “wingman” who can look for and warn of channelized attention
when it becomes relevant.
The Moral Insight and Dual Awareness
The use of the term “insight” in this discussion is reminiscent of the work of nineteenth century Harvard philosopher Josiah Royce, who believed that all of ethics
was grounded in what he called the moral insight (a precursor to the “moral point of
view”).22 Royce described the moral insight this way:
The moral insight is the realization of one’s neighbor, in the full sense of the word realization; the resolution to treat him unselfishly. But this resolution expresses and belongs to the
moment of insight. Passion may cloud the insight after no very long time.... We see the
reality of our neighbor, that is, we determine to treat him as we do ourselves. But then we
go back to daily action, and we feel the heat of hereditary passions, and we straightway
forget what we have seen. Our neighbor becomes obscured. He is once more a foreign
power. He is unreal... Moments of insight, with their accompanying resolutions; long
stretches of delusion and selfishness: That is our life.23

There are many aspects of Royce’s idea of the moral insight that merit our attention, but for present purposes, let me highlight his view that morality for individuals depends for its practical significance on a kind of dual awareness—self-awareness
plus “the realization of one’s neighbor.” This dual awareness complicates personal
decision making (which might otherwise be more straightforwardly self-interested), not unlike the way in which the institutional insight can complicate corporate decision making. Royce observes how the moral insight is fragile, how it can
be clouded by a kind of “forgetting” that obscures the other (our neighbor). What I
am calling the institutional insight is similar in this regard. The comprehensive
perspective that it provides to business leaders, concurrent with their missiondriven perspective (“internal morality”), can be lost (but also regained) as the decision-making framework of the corporation develops over time. The “forgetting”
seems to be a side effect of teleopathy, that is, fixation or channelized attention.
Most of us can call to mind a contemporary or historical example of a “business
statesman.” These leaders often seem to embody the institutional insight and the
capacity for dual awareness.
The institutional insight, then, contrasts with Royce’s moral insight in that it
applies not so much to the moral life of persons, as to the cultural life of organizations or institutions. But it is similar in the sense that it can be lost and regained—as
well as supported or unsupported by “resolutions” on the part of senior leadership.
Let us now turn to an important concept that will help us to appreciate the relationships between and among the institutional insight, human dignity, and the common
good, namely, “mediating institutions.”
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Mediating Institutions
Once we understand the importance of the dual awareness that an institutional
perspective requires for “backgrounding” the decisions of an organization (whatever its “sector”), it is natural to wonder about how to elicit or educate this dual
awareness, both in current leaders and in future leaders who may be in business
schools today. If it is to be practical, comprehensive moral thinking calls for a realworld pedagogy.
DeTocqueville understood the formative power of voluntary associations:
Feelings and opinions are recruited, the heart is enlarged, and the human mind is developed
only by the reciprocal influence of men upon each other. I have shown that these influences
are almost null in democratic countries; they must therefore be artificially created, and this
can only be accomplished by associations.24

Novak too, in discussing his triad of political, economic, and moral-cultural institutions, emphasized the importance of maintaining the independent value of the
moral-cultural institutions in his third societal sector (see Fig. A4.2).25 For these
mediating institutions, besides being valuable in their own right, provide critical
links to the development of our moral sense:
In voluntary associations, individuals learn to compromise, persuade, and sublimate narrow
self-interest for the greater good of the group. In other words, mediating institutions teach
that one’s welfare is tied to the welfare of one’s community. Without such training, the
impetus will be for individuals to pursue self-interest without regard to others. This theory
... makes smaller organizations the focus of the expansion of self-interest.. .26

Mediating institutions foster and reinforce the social motivations that are essential to the institutional insight. Ontologically, mediating institutions disperse a

Fig. A4.2 Mediating
Institutions
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society’s institutional power across multiple centers, limiting the power of government as the overarching institution in people’s lives.27 Functionally, however, mediating institutions, because of their typically smaller scale, can serve as “learning
laboratories” for the character traits needed in the pursuit of human dignity and the
common good.”28
Each mediating institution (the family, the school, the church, voluntary associations, etc.) provides “a framework in which one has no choice but to negotiate with
others in the organization so as to understand one’s identity within the context of the
demands and aspirations of the members of the organization. One learns interdependence and moral values.”29
Is Business a Mediating Institution?
We are now in a position to ask whether business corporations can be understood as
mediating institutions or whether, like national governments, they are part of a different, more impersonal “market sector.” The short answer is “Some are and some
are not.” Some corporations (e.g, multinationals) are so large and impersonal that it
is hard to imagine them as “learning laboratories” of any kind. But others have cultures or subcultures that are different. In Timothy Fort’s view, the key to understanding business as a mediating institution is that employees:
... remain human beings to whom social relationships are important. Emphasizing that
importance in a forum where individuals initially may be strangers therefore provides an
excellent opportunity ... to dialogue and form new communities where they realize that
individual well-being is tied to communal well-being.30

Some business corporations, then, can and do function along the lines of mediating
institutions, while others—typically those of larger scale—are simply too large to
be learning laboratories for eliciting what deTocqueville called “self-interest rightly
understood,” for example, understood in the context of a common, greater good, as
opposed to narrow self-interest.31
We should add that in addition to large corporations whose cultures lend themselves to smaller scale social learning units, there are also small and mid-sized
enterprises that comprise over 80% of businesses in the world’s economic sector.
Most of these businesses can function as mediating institutions of the “social learning laboratory” scale.
Comprehensive Moral Thinking
Returning now to the original challenge in this article—Thinking Beneath the
Provisos toward “comprehensive moral thinking”—we are now in a position to
clarify this idea. The word “comprehensive” in this context means that the leadership team in question:
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• Has achieved the Institutional Insight and appreciates the dual awareness that it
asks of them.
• Can see, therefore, that all institutions in all sectors are means to ends, not ends
in themselves; and that business corporations are one set of institutions
among many.
• Understands that the challenges faced by humankind do not fall neatly into “sectors,” so that the need for collaboration among institutions from different sectors
may in some circumstances become apparent, for example, private–public partnerships, businesses working with NGOs or mediating institutions like families,
schools, and voluntary associations.
• Recognizes that social ideals like human dignity and the common good may ask
more of us than either shareholder fiduciary duties or the promotion of stakeholder interests.
Companies are increasingly called upon to direct their ethical attention outside their
conventional spans of influence and control. The imperative to collaborate with
other institutions stems from the increasing complexity of the problems facing our
global society, namely, the 2008 mortgage crisis, environmental protection, economic globalization, the needs of those at the “bottom of the pyramid,” and
many more.
Even if certain problems cannot be solved solely by corporate initiatives, such
problems may still call on the consciences of business leaders to try to collaborate
unless and until it becomes clear that the other institutions needed for solving these
problems are unwilling or unable to collaborate. The future of the field of business
ethics will depend on significant attention to all four of the elements of comprehensive moral thinking.
Human Dignity and the Common Good
Now let us turn to the two fundamental values that I have suggested as guides for
institutions doing comprehensive moral thinking: human dignity and the common
good. Why two fundamental values instead of one? And why these two fundamental values?
In general, it is attractive to reduce the number of basic principles in ethics as
much as possible to minimize the risk of their conflicting with one another, thereby
failing to guide action. This attractiveness, however, needs to take into account the
possibility that fundamental moral imperatives in this arena are simply not reducible
to a single principle (as with utilitarianism and Kantianism).
Seventeenth century philosopher Jean Jacques Rousseau framed the challenge of
the moral point of view this way as he reflected on the terms of a “social compact”:
The problem is to find a form of association which will defend and protect with the whole
common force the person and goods of each associate, and in which each, while uniting
himself with all, may still obey himself alone, and remain as free as before.32
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Rousseau understood the polarity of each person being accorded dignity as a free
human being—while at the same time all are defended and protected as a unified group.
Respected philosophers Alan Gewirth33 and William Frankena (quoted earlier),34
are well-known for their thorough analysis of contending theories in normative ethics. Both of these philosophers concluded, independently, that two principles are
necessary and sufficient to provide the groundwork for moral responsibility. In
Gewirth’s case, the principles are protecting the freedom and well- being of those
affected by the decisions of moral agents. In Frankena’s case, the two principles for
moral agents are equality and beneficence. Beneficence, for Frankena, like the principle of well- being for Gewirth, aims at the highest quality of life and the least harm
for all—a principle that is reflected in most accounts of the common good.
Gewirth’s principle of freedom and Frankena’s principle of equality, while perhaps not identical, are focused on the dignity of individual human beings. Gewirth
identifies an individual’s “capacity for action” as the key to her/his dignity, and
coercing another does not respect that capacity. Frankena understands equality in
the following way, clearly connecting it to human dignity:
[People] ought to be treated equally ... in the sense that we ought prima facie to make proportionally the same contribution to the goodness of their lives, once a certain minimum has
been achieved by all. This is what is meant by the equal intrinsic dignity or value of the
individual that is such an important concept in our culture.35

These observations do not, of course, constitute a proof that human dignity and
the common good are the only pillars on which an adequate normative ethics for
business as an institution can be built, but they do strongly suggest that the history
of ethics and twentieth century normative theory support two principles, one of
which takes the dignity and liberty of the individual as its touchstone and the other
of which takes the promotion of good and the avoidance of harm to all as its touchstone. The latter principle invites us to search for the common good, at least as a
moral ideal.
Dignity Beneath Fiduciary Obligations
We saw in the context of Alexei Marcoux’s analysis of the fiduciary relationship of
corporate leaders to shareholders that what he called the “deeper” justification of
moral obligation in this realm resided in the vulnerability (regarding information
and control) of the dependent party (stockholder, patient, client). This deeper justiftcation amounts to
(a) an acknowledgement of the derivative status of fiduciary obligations, derivative
from more fundamental principles about asymmetries in human relationships, and
(b) an acknowledgement that the basic principle behind our duty to protect the
vulnerable is the dignity of both the vulnerable party involved and the less vulnerable fiduciary.
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Human dignity functions in human and institutional relationships not only in obligations to the trusting party, but also in our expectations of the trusted party.
The Common Good Beneath Stakeholder Thinking
We saw in the context of stakeholder analysis (and its “market failure” critics) that
the deeper moral principle came from a wider social concern—a common good.
And as we have just seen in our discussion of the institutional insight and mediating
institutions, the idea of the common good is multi-layered. That is, there are “common goods” associated with all institutions (family, church, school, voluntary associations, cities, states, nations, and more than ever the global community). We have
seen too that participation in smaller scale institutions can help develop the social
virtues needed to participate in larger scale institutions. But when we use the phrase
“the common good” in its most general sense, we seem to be referring to the flourishing of mediating institutions within themselves and in relation to one another—
the good of a community of communities.36 As Heclo puts it: “By its nature,
institutional thinking tends to cultivate belonging and a common life.”37
The point is that these two fundamental principles (respect for human dignity
and pursuit of the common good) are not arbitrary. They reflect two critical aspects
of our nature as moral agents (and as leaders of institutions). We care about individual freedom and dignity, and we have a social nature as well. We can develop
deTocqueville’s “self-interest rightly understood”—and eventually a full commitment to a common good—not as a sacrifice, but as a fulfillment.38 In this spirit,
theologian David Hollenbach, S. J. argues that the dignity of persons and the common good of the community, while distinct, are complementary: “[T]he dignity of
persons can be realized only in community, and genuine community can exist only
where the dignity of persons is secured.”39
Each of us personally finds the basis for comprehensive moral thinking in her/his
own “deepest being.” Business leaders who share the institutional insight make this
kind of thinking part of their decision making.40 Once the fundamental principles of
comprehensive thinking are identified, we are in a position to derive from them
more specific (secondary) principles or institutional arrangements for guiding
behavior. In the context of the “two provisos” with which we began this discussion,
the derivative nature of both fiduciary thinking and stakeholder/market failure
thinking in relation to the principles of human dignity and the common good,
respectively, helps us to appreciate the challenges of practical reasoning in business.
Nobel Laureate T. S. Eliot, in one of his Choruses from the Rock (1934), observed
that humankind is “forever dreaming of systems so perfect that no one will need to
be good.” The power of this poetic phrase can be appreciated in the present context
because the “systems so perfect” include the systems of market competition as well
as the law and regulatory machinery of government. Corporate leaders need to step
back—adopt the institutional insight—and to look more comprehensively: to see
that such systems are meant to serve, not to supplant, the pursuit of human dignity
and the common good.
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Summary and Conclusion
In this article, we departed from the conventional tension in normative business ethics between shareholder fiduciary thinking and different versions of stakeholder
thinking. After finding both alternatives wanting, I suggested that corporations
needed to embrace comprehensive moral thinking.
Comprehensive moral thinking asks business leaders with the institutional
insight to discern opportunities for collaboration and to respond affirmatively to
invitations to collaborate. It invites businesses to look at their roles not solely in
insular economic terms, but also in social or civic terms. Companies and industries
on this view have stockholders and stakeholders, to be sure, but they are also called
to participate in realistic ways with other institutions in building a better world. To
quote Peter Drucker once more:
The emergence of a strong, independent, capable social sector—neither public nor private
sector—is thus a central need of the society of organizations. But by itself it is not enough—
the organizations of both the public and the private sector must share in the work.41

Our institution-building must always maintain a “line of sight” to a deeper understanding of human fulfillment and human relationships—to human dignity and the
common good.42
Coming full circle, now, to McCoy’s lament in the “Parable of the Sadhu,” we
need to educate leaders who are capable of revealing to their organizations “the
greater purpose of the trip.”
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